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A Prescriptivist Account of Physical Theories
Shahin Kaveh, PhD
University of Pittsburgh, 2021
A question of central importance to any philosopher of science is: what is the essential
content of a scientific theory? What does a given theory really tell us about the world?
Philosophers of science have disagreed on many aspects of the answer to this question, for
instance whether the essential content of theories concerns entities, properties, or structures,
whether it should be cashed out in terms of sentences or models, and whether one should
be a realist or an anti-realist about this content; but philosophers have near-universally
agreed on one claim: that theories provide a description of the natural system to which
they are applied. Call this the descriptive-ontological view. I argue against the descriptive-
ontological view in physics and propose an alternative: the prescriptive-dynamical view.
According to the latter, the essential content of a physical theory is to provide prescriptions
for interfacing with the natural system. More precisely, physical theories consist of a fixed
part and an open-ended part, such that the fixed part is a prescription for constructing the
open-ended part from local data, gathered through interaction with the system. The answer
to the question of essential content directly determines or at least influences one’s response
to many other crucial questions such as theoretical equivalence (Chapter 2), theory-world
relations (Chapter 3), and realism-antirealism (Chapter 4), which I will subsequently explore.
Moreover, as I will argue (Chapter 5), the prescriptive-dynamical account also sheds fresh
light on the history of quantum mechanics as a painstaking process of realization that instead
of telling us what there is, physical theories must tell us what to do.
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1.0 Chapter 1: Physical Theories Are Prescriptions, Not Descriptions
1.1 Introduction
I argue that fundamental physical theories have a fixed part and an open-ended part, such
that the fixed part is a prescription for constructing the open-ended part from local empirical
data. Thus, the essential content1 of physical theories is in a precise sense a prescription for
how to interface with natural systems rather than a description of what (entity, property,
or structure) there is. The descriptive aspects of theories might serve as embellishment or
scaffolding, but they are inessential to the predictive success of the theory.
I will start in Section 1.2 by providing a brief exposition of the distinction between fixed
and open-ended formulae, as well as a brief explanation of what is amiss in traditional ac-
counts. Then, in Section 1.3, I go on to provide textual evidence that the two traditional
accounts of theories (syntactic and semantic views) have assumed fundamental predictive
theories to be fixed rather than open-ended. Section 1.4 is devoted to a more in-depth explo-
ration of the characteristics of fixed and open-ended equations, and their distinct relations
to the natural system and the observer. My considerations culminate in Sections 1.5 and
1.6, in which I formulate what I call the prescriptive-dynamical view (§1.5) and show how it
likely rules out all forms of the descriptive-ontological view (§1.6), respectively.
1.2 Brief Exposition of the Fixed / Open-ended Distinction
1.2.1 The two-tier character of theories
The following is a brief overview of the distinction I have in mind (a more in-depth
explanation to come in Section 1.4): upon examining the various fundamental formulae that
1The notion of essential content is akin to Kitcher’s working posits (1993, 149 ff.) and Psillos’s “indis-
pensable” or “essential contributors” (1999, 108 ff.), which are characterized as those parts of the theory
that actually contribute to its empirical success, as opposed to any idle baggage that might come with the
theory. See §1.6.1 below for further discussion.
1
are used to make predictions about a natural system, such as when Newtonian mechanics
is applied to a physical pendulum or the solar system, we find that predictions are made
using a formula that remains the same in every application of the theory plus a formula
that is different from context to context and thus must be determined based on the specific
interaction and the natural system being modelled. For instance, F = ma is the fixed principle
in Newtonian mechanics, while a “force law” such as F = −kx, F = −bv2, or F = −Gmm′
r2
supplies the open-ended formula. It is only the combination of the two that yields empirical
predictions, for their conjunction yields a differential equation that takes us from initial
conditions to final conditions. The same pattern exists in every theory that allows for a
dynamical systems formulation (see Table 1).
Table 1: The most canonical dynamical theories of physics have a two-tier character with
one fixed formula and one open-ended formula.
Theory Firxed Formula Open-ended formula
Newtonian mechanics Newton’s second law Various force formulae
Non-rel. quantum mechanics Schrödinger equation Various Hamiltonians
Quantum field theory Canonical commutation eqs. Interaction Lagrangians
Bohr’s atomic theory Bohr quantization condition Correspondence Principle
Diffusion theory Diffusion equation Diffusion functions
Standard cosmology Friedmann equations Eqs. of state and matter
Electrostatics Poisson’s equation Density functions
As I shall explain in more detail in Section 1.4, the second group of formulae are open-
ended in the sense that there is no exhaustive list of them to choose from when one comes
across a new natural system being studied for the first time, or when interacting with the
same system in a new context. There is no principle from which these formulae are derived,
nor any way (other than trial and error) to know under what physical circumstances each
must remain valid. Rather, they are “reverse engineered” from the fixed formula and the
experimental results together. The open-ended formulae are therefore not tested against
2
data; they are derived by “fitting” the fixed formula to the data.
As said, my account is particularly suitable for dynamical systems. Any theory that
features coherent state assignments and transition rules would be a dynamical system. In
particular, a differential or integral equation can typically be read as expressing the evolution
of a particular form of states, and thus theories governed by differential / integral equations
are typically dynamical systems. Since virtually all theories of physics are dynamical systems,
I expect my account to apply to physical theories broadly. Moreover, since the features I
will be drawing on are quite generic among dynamical theories, one might reasonably expect
my account to apply to other dynamical theories outside of physics, although again I will
not be arguing for this general claim here. At the very least, I take this paper to establish
the following claim: the most canonical theories at the foundation of contemporary physics
exhibit a two-tier, open-ended character.2
This should be contrasted with the state of my competition, namely the syntactic and
semantic construals of theories, which have had notorious difficulty in producing formulations
of most scientific theories in accordance with their framework: how many predictive theories
have we managed to couch as first-order axiomatic systems, and which theory have we
managed to specify through an exhaustive list of its “class of models”? In light of this,
2Some constructs that may be classified as “theories”, such as special relativity and statistical mechanics,
are not dynamical theories and thus do not fall under the two-tier analysis. However, this is not a problem
for my account, which concerns predictive theories. Statistical mechanics is a mathematical tool for bridging
micro- and macro-theories, and any prediction that may be derived from it must originate in the dynamics of
the micro-theory, rather than the posits of statistical mechanics itself. The case of special relativity is more
complicated, but the sketch of a response can be provided as follows. Special relativity may be considered as
a set of geometrical coordination rules, i.e. Lorentz transformations (which can still be taken as prescriptive
though not open-ended) for aligning measuring rods and clocks in a world in which the maximum possible
speed is some constant c. This theory makes no predictions of its own unless c is specified. Now, the
statement that c is finite and equals the speed of light may be seen as external to the coordination rules
of special relativity, either as a directly-verifiable empirical fact or as derived from Maxwell’s dynamical
equations. And as said, the light postulate is the sole source of predictive power in special relativity, to the
extent that such power exists. Therefore, statistical mechanics and special relativity are not autonomous
theories and yield no predictions of their own unless supplemented with dynamical theories. As such, they
do not undermine my account.
Note also that sometimes a theory has both a dynamical formulation (with states evolving into other
similar states) and a non-dynamical formulation. For example, General Relativity is sometimes presented
as a yes / no function that takes a specified spacetime and matter distribution and tells us whether that
combination is a physically possible universe. That is not a dynamical theory. But GR can also be formulated
as a constrained Hamiltonian system, which takes states of the form (gij , πij) to other states of the same
form, where gij is the 3-metric and πij its conjugate momentum (Lagrangian mechanics with its variational
and dynamical formulations is another example).
3
I consider a table of the most foundational theories to which my account applies to be a
promising start.
1.2.2 The problem with traditional accounts: being predictive while fixed
Nearly all philosophers of science speak of fundamental physical theories as fixed sets
of sentences and/or models, in the sense that they take the theory to be the same set of
sentences and/or models across all local applications of the theory (not to be confused with
fixity across time – see below). There are a few notable exceptions from the modeling
literature, most prominent among them Ronald Giere, who have recognized the existence
of a fixed and a movable piece in fundamental theories.3 Nevertheless, even these authors
have failed to recognize the fixed piece as a prescription for constructing the movable piece
through interaction with the system and the movable piece as truly local and open-ended
(i.e. constrained by nothing but local data). Rather, these authors speak of the movable
part as a simple addition to the fixed part that is chosen from a “family of models”, one
that is somehow constructed independently, and often based on a set of global / theoretical
restrictions (rather than local / empirical facts).
The fixed part can perhaps be a set of axioms or class of models, but it is not predictive
on its own. The entire theory which can make predictions, on the other hand, is not a
fixed set of axioms or class of models. Thus, the problem arises when we use the phrase
“the theory” to refer to something that has two attributes at the same time: i) it is fixed,
i.e. remains the same across all successful applications, and ii) it is predictive, i.e. allows
for empirical predictions in a robust range of contexts (when supplemented with auxiliaries
and such). I shall argue in Section 1.4 that one finds nothing in the practice of science
that has both attributes. But first allow me to provide textual evidence that simultaneous
endorsement of i) fixity and ii) predictiveness is indeed widespread among philosophers of
science.
3Cartwright has argued for the malleability of phenomenological laws but she, too, considers fundamental
laws to be fixed. My claim is precisely that the latter are partially open-ended. More on this below.
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1.3 Traditional Accounts of Theoretical Content
There are two main traditional accounts of what scientific theories are: the syntactic
view and the semantic view. My objections to both accounts are the same, and the rivalry
between them is independent of my dispute with both of them. However, since philosophers
of science have mostly couched their views in terms of one or the other, let us deal with
them in turn.4
1.3.1 Evidence from syntactic accounts
The theory in the syntactic view is usually treated as a partially interpreted, logically
closed set of axioms whose theorems include observation statements derived with the help of
initial conditions, auxiliaries, and correspondence rules.5 These observation statements are
then tested against empirical data.
A striking classic example is Hempel. In The Theoretician’s Dilemma, Hempel describes
a theory “as a set of sentences ... given in the form of axiomatized systems” (1958, 46). This
supports the idea that the theory is fixed across successful applications: after all, if a theory
is a set of sentences, then it would make no sense to say that the sentences of the theory
are different from application to application: a different set of sentences would simply be a
different theory.
The laws referred to [here], such as the laws of Newtonian mechanics, are what we will call
statements of strictly universal form, or strictly universal statements. (Hempel 1958, 39)
As said above, the problem is that Hempel also wants these fixed axioms to be predictive:
The principles of Newtonian mechanics, for example, make it possible, given the present
positions and momenta of the celestial objects that make up the solar system, to predict
their positions and momenta for a specified future time or to postdict them for a specified
time in the past. (Hempel 1958, 37)
4There is much debate about the equivalence or lack thereof of the syntactic and semantic views as well
as their relative advantages. These debates will not affect my arguments below. See van Fraassen 1980;
Lloyd 1988/1994; Suppe 2000; Halverson 2012; 2013; 2016.
5I will use “auxiliaries” to refer to background facts and theories of instrument, and “correspondence
rules” to broadly mean any set of principles that connect theoretical terms to observable and/or measurable
quantities (Halvorson 2016, 6).
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Thus, Hempel explicitly endorses both (i) fixity and (ii) predictiveness.6
To be clear, I shall not criticize Hempel for claiming that F = ma is a universal, excep-
tionless proposition. As is well-known, Cartwright has raised objections of this kind on the
ground that the statements featuring in such predictive schemata are not strict generaliza-
tions and require ceteris paribus clauses (1983, 45 ff.; 1999, 24 ff.). My arguments below
largely bracket the role of ceteris paribus clauses, if any. My point is rather that the fixed
formulae of Newtonian mechanics are not predictive on their own, even if we were to add
ceteris paribus clauses to them, and that they only become predictive when supplemented
with a formula that is open-ended, which again may or may not be qualified by c-p clauses.
In Cartwright’s terminology, my claim is that the fundamental theoretical laws (such
as those from Table 1) are partially open-ended and local – something Cartwright herself
strongly denies. She claims that phenomenological laws (e.g. amplifier models, exponential
decay models, etc.) “tell what happens in concrete situations” whereas fundamental laws
are “thoroughly abstract formulae which describe no particular circumstances.” (Cartwright
1983, 11) Importantly, Cartwright’s fundamental / phenomenological dichotomy cannot be
mapped onto my fixed / open-ended distinction, because unlike fixed and open-ended formu-
lae which must be conjoined for prediction to be possible, fundamental and phenomenological
laws do not complement each other. Rather, they are said to work independently and at
cross-purposes: a phenomenological law is said to single-handedly describe and predict the
behavior of the system, but not explain it. A fundamental law, on the other hand, is taken
as sufficient for explaining the behavior of the same system, but not for predicting it (ibid,
6Hempel proposes the following schema for such predictive inferences:
C1, C2, ..., Ck
L1, L2, ..., Lr
——————
E
Here, C1, C2, Ck are statements of particular occurrences (e.g., of the position and momenta
of certain celestial bodies at a specified time), and L1, ..., Lr are general laws (e.g., those
of Newtonian mechanics); finally, E is a sentence stating whatever is being explained,
predicted, or postdicted. (Hempel 1958, 37-8)
Both assumptions are clear in this passage: the theory is i) a set of “general laws” that ii) leads to empirical
predictions in conjunction with “particular occurrences” such as initial conditions.
6
p. 3). The examples Cartwright gives for “fundamental laws” include “the equation of con-
tinuity and Boltzmann’s equation” (ibid, p. 11), which suggest that Cartwright would put
all formulae in Table 1 in the category of “fundamental laws”, which she takes as fixed and
global.
It is also important to distinguish my notion of fixity across applications from fixity
across time, as is found for example in Lakatos’s (1978) evolving research programs and
Friedman’s (2001) relativized a priori. Friedman argues that theories consist of an “a priori”
part and an “a posteriori” part. The former can change occasionally when a “paradigm shift”
occurs, but it is otherwise not directly susceptible to empirical modification, for it is needed
for any empirical data to be possible at all – similar to Kant’s transcendental conditions for
the possibility of experience. The “a posteriori” part, however, consists of ordinary theories
which respond directly to empirical data. As such, unlike my fixed formulae, Friedman’s a
priori principles are not prescriptions for local construction of the malleable part; they are
global conditions for the possibility of any empirical knowledge at all, and thus transcend
specific theories such as those in Table 1 and instead concern fundamental matters of space
and time. By contrast, what I consider the fixed part of a theory here is typically a differential
equation that prescribes rules for assigning dynamical states to the system. One might say
that my entire discussion is located within the “a posteriori” section of Friedman’s framework.
Regarding Lakatos, he posits that a research program consists of certain “core assump-
tions” that resist modification in light of new data, along with a “protective belt”, i.e. a set
of malleable assumptions which are allowed to adjust over time in order to protect “the hard
core”. While this framework can be useful in discussing the evolution of scientific frameworks
over time, it still presents a theory at any given time as a set of global propositions that
are fixed for all applications. To see the difference, consider the application of Newtonian
mechanics to a physical mass-spring system. One often begins by using the secondary for-
mula F = −kx (somewhat unfortunately called Hooke’s “law”) for the restorative force of
the spring. But this formula loses validity if the spring is stretched beyond a certain limit
(which is different for different springs). At that point, terms such as x2, ẋ, etc. might show
up in the restorative force. Stretching the spring still further would continue to change this
formula in ways that are hard to anticipate, and so would immersing it in a new medium,
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heating it, subjecting it to stress or vibration, applying an external electromagnetic field,
and so forth. For any new context, the secondary formula must be constructed anew from
empirical data within the range of variables that characterize the local context.7
To force this into Lakatos’s system, one would have to say that “the theory” (the con-
junction of core and belt assumptions) is being “falsified” and revised every time the spring
is further stretched, stressed, etc. This strikes me as an absurd and awkward characteri-
zation of what is going on. After all, the physicist never assumes that the most recently
constructed force formulae are going to be universally valid, nor is she ever surprised or dis-
mayed that the formula quickly loses relevance under new circumstances. On the contrary,
that is precisely what she expects to happen. Hooke’s “law” is not truly a law, and cannot
be “falsified”, for there is no prior presumption as to its exact form or scope of validity; it is
simply an open-ended, local construction that depends on the context.8
Fixed characterizations of fundamental theories are by no means obsolete among the
proponents of the syntactic view. Take for example Halvorson, who has recently mounted
a vigorous defence of the syntactic view against the “bandwagon” of semantic conceptions
(2012; 2013; 2016). He characterizes the syntactic view as follows:
A scientific theory consists of two things:
1. A formal system, including:
(a) Symbols;
(b) Formation rules; and
(c) Deduction rules.
2. Some use of this formal system to make claims about the physical world [using cor-
respondence rules], and in particular, empirically ascertainable claims. (Halvorson 2016,
3)
Once again, a fixed set of axioms is taken to entail empirical predictions when conjoined
with other auxiliaries. Indeed, the notion of a theory as a fixed set of axioms is taken so
seriously that any set of axioms, including the empty set, is considered a theory (Halvorson
2012, 191).9
7That is, unless one has a way of calculating the secondary formula from microscopic equations that
govern the particles in the spring, but that is more wishful thinking than anything related to the actual
practice of physics.
8This is not to deny that such accounts can be useful in discussing theoretical change over time.
9Halvorson does criticize both syntactic and semantic views for taking theories to be “flat” rather than
“structured”. However, what Halvorson means by “structure” here is inferential hierarchy, which involves
commitments to what is a logical consequence of what (including what is analytic and what is synthetic),
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The above should suffice for demonstrating that syntactic accounts take theories to be
both fixed and predictive.
1.3.2 Evidence from semantic accounts
On the semantic side, the class of models is usually picked out by a set of axioms or simply
the intention of the scientist which delineates the class, and then structurally compared
to empirical data through notions of isomorphism, homeomorphism, or sometimes broader
notions of “similarity”. The adherents of the semantic conception also take theories to be
i) fixed classes or categories of models that ii) allow for empirical predictions in a range of
contexts.
For a classic source, consider van Fraassen channelling Suppes10:
Suppes’s idea was simple: to present a theory, we define the class of its models directly,
without paying any attention to questions of axiomatizabilizy, in any special language... .
[I]f theories are to be reified – then a theory should be identified with its class of models.
(van Fraassen 1989, 222)
That there is no open-ended component to theories in this view is fairly clear from the
language of “class of models”. Classes are defined through their membership and thus do
not allow for open-endedness by definition.
But in case there are any lingering doubts about the fixity of theories in van Fraassen’s
view, consider the following. First of all, note that van Fraassen is simultaneously cham-
pioning both the semantic view and the dynamical systems approach. In the dynamical
approach, the essential content of a theory is given by two things: state assignments and
transition rules. Hamiltonian mechanics, for instance, assigns states of the form (x, p) and
encodes the transition rules among states of this form (permissible trajectories in the state
space) in the quantity H. Once the state space and the transition rules are provided, the
model is complete and can be used to make predictions. Now, it is clear that for van Fraassen,
both the state space and the transition rules are pre-determined by the “class of models”.
and so on (Halvorson 2012; 2016). But Halvorson’s “structured” account still takes theories to be fixed.
10Much of van Fraassen and others’ program was built on the pioneering work of Evert Willem Beth (e.g.
1960; see also: van Fraassen 1970).
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This introduces the idea of a cluster of models united by a common state-space; each has
in addition a domain of objects plus a “history function” which assigns to each object a
history, i.e. a trajectory in that space. (van Fraassen 1989, 223)
As we shall see below, the “history function”, which provides the transition rules determining
allowable trajectories in state space, is precisely the component that is open-ended. By
assuming that the models are already restricted by a particular set of history functions, van
Fraassen is implying that both the states and the transition rules are pre-ordained and hence
fixed by the theory.
The same practice of treating both state assignments and transition rules as fixed and
pre-ordained is also found in Frederick Suppe’s work, who declares that for a realist seman-
ticist: “a theory is empirically true just in case theory structure-allowed state transitions are
identical to those possibly occurring in the actual world.” (Suppe 2000, S106) Both states
and transition rules are taken as pre-determined and tested against empirical data.
This brings us to claim (ii), namely that the fixed class of models is taken by semanticists
to have predictive content. Van Fraassen explains:
In Ronald Giere’s recent encapsulation of the semantic approach, a theory consists of (a) the
theoretical definition, which defines a certain class of systems; (b) a theoretical hypothesis,
which asserts that certain (sorts of) real systems [such as the solar system] are among (or
related in some way to) members of that class. (van Fraassen 1989, 222)
To be fair, Giere himself does not use the language of “classes” but “families”, which
might be taken as more loosely defined (1988; 2010). In fact, he is to my knowledge the
only semantic theorist who has highlighted the “hierarchical” nature of physical theories in a
manner similar to my “two-tier account” (see §1.2.1). He takes master formulae such as F =
ma to be “definitions” that allow physicists to construct more specific, “representational”
models. The latter include specific secondary formulae such as force laws. This leads Giere
to conclude that theories are not “well-defined entities”, for there are “no necessary and
sufficient conditions for what constitutes an admissible force function” (1988, 86 ff.). One
might construe this as very close to saying that the theory is open-ended.
Not quite. In the account proposed here, there are very clear necessary and sufficient
conditions for what secondary formulae are allowed: namely that they be fitted to the local
data under the guidance of the fixed formula. The “open-endedness” of the secondary for-
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mulae here refers not to the fact that there are no necessary and sufficient conditions, but
that the necessary and sufficient conditions require conformity only to the local empirical
data. Giere, on the other hand, assumes that scientists themselves provide the secondary
formulae:
[T]o be part of the theory of classical mechanics a model must bear a “family resemblance”
to some family of models already in the theory. ... That question, it seems, is solely a
matter to be decided by the judgments of members of the scientific community at the time.
(Giere 1988, 86)
That is, Giere’s secondary formulae are partially pre-determined by theorists and tested
against data models (ibid; see also 2010, 271). Apart from the “collective judgment” of the
scientific community, Giere says very little about how the movable pieces are constructed.
This obscures both the prescriptive nature of the fixed part and the open-ended nature
of the movable part. I shall argue below that such “family resemblance” restrictions only
hamstring a dynamical theory.11
Once again, the approach outlined above is far from obsolete. For a more contemporary
counterpart, consider Thomas Barrett’s characterization of theories in his recent discussion
of theoretical equivalence:
Criterion. Theories T1 and T2 are equivalent according to the model isomorphism criterion
if for every model of T1 there is an isomorphic model of T2, and vice versa. (Barrett 2017,
3)12
Isomorphism, as a bijective relationship, requires fixed sets. Furthermore, it is clear that
11While it is true that Giere talks about theories as “rules” for constructing concrete representational
models, and that might sounds quite similar to “prescriptions”, this talk for Giere is not specific to the fixed
part of the theory: he considers the entire conjunction of the fixed and movable part as a set of rules for
creating fully specified models of particular systems.
The rules instruct one to locate the relevant masses and forces, and then to equate the
product of the mass and acceleration of each body with the force impressed upon it. With
luck one can solve the resulting equations of motion... . (Giere 1999, 94-5)
Giere’s “rules” clearly encompass Newton’s laws of motion plus a specific force function. My “prescriptions”,
by contrast, explain precisely how the latter is constructed from the combination of the former and local
data in the first place.
12Halvorson makes this more precise in what he calls “pointwise isomorphism of models”: “M is the same
theory as M′, just in case there is a bijection F :M→M′ such that each model m ∈ M is isomorphic to
its paired model F (m) ∈M′. (Halvorson 2012, 190)
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Barrett considers these fixed sets of models to have “empirical content”, which Barrett
identifies with “the allowable trajectories for particles in the system” (ibid, 13).13
Thus, traditional accounts of science have ignored the open-endedness of predictive the-
ories. As a note of reconciliation, a syntactic or semantic framework can still be useful in
analyzing physical theories in certain contexts in which the locality and open-endedness of
the formulae is not of concern to us (e.g. when remaining restricted to one singular applica-
tion of the theory or when discussing a hypothetical “final theory”). But my point here is
that these conditions are typically not met in the ordinary practice of physics.
To see how this leads to prescriptivism at the expense of descriptivism, we will need some
preliminaries on the nature of open-endedness.
1.4 Preliminaries on the Nature of Open-ended Formulae
1.4.1 Local Empirical Mediating Principles (LEMPs)
Consider Newton’s theory of mechanics. How is this theory applied in order to make
predictions? To begin, the master formula F = ma by itself does not provide any empirical
predictions whatsoever, even if one were to add supplementary assumptions such as “corre-
spondence rules” that connect F , m, and a to observables, as well as auxiliaries concerning
theories of instrument, initial and boundary conditions, and ceteris paribus clauses. The
fundamental reason for this is that F is not independently specified by Newton’s theory.
Thus, one needs a second formula that independently specifies F , something like F = −kx,
F = bvn, or F = C
r4
, say. Once this second formula is supplied, one can write down a
truly predictive equation by eliminating F from the two relations. If the force formula is
F = −kx, for instance, then the predictive relation is the differential equation ẍ = − k
m
x.
With sufficient supplementary assumptions, this formula can be used to make predictions.
Specifically, one needs two inputs, namely (x, ẋ), to be provided as initial conditions. Once
13There have been important recent developments in the modeling literature that add complexity to
the traditional semantic accounts regarding the relationship between theory, model, and experiment (see:
Morgan and Morrison 1999). However, all such nuanced views still fail to note the open-ended character of
theories in the sense defended here. See, e.g., ibid, 3-4, for an endorsement of theoretically fixed models.
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(x(t0), ẋ(t0)) are provided for some time t = t0, the differential equation generates predictions
for the values of (x(t), ẋ(t)) for all other t. This input-output dynamic is the core driver of
predictive success in Newtonian mechanics.
This is of course true of all canonical theories of physics. In Lagrangian mechanics, the
Lagrangian is the quantity that is not independently specified. In Schrödinger’s quantum
mechanics, it is the potential energy operator V̂ . In effective QFT, it is the interaction terms.
And so on. All of these theories have a master formula that contains a quantity which is
not independently specified, and which, once specified, together with the master formula
would yield a predictive differential equation that takes us from initial conditions to final
conditions. For reasons to be explained shortly, I shall call these secondary formulae Local
Empirical Mediating Principles or LEMPs for short.
1.4.2 LEMPs are transition rules
The dynamical systems approach, which has seen a resurgence of interest in recent
years14, provides an excellent framework in which to easily understand the difference of
content between fixed formulae and LEMPs. As said above, the dynamical approach in-
volves focusing on states and transition rules as the essential content rather than on entities,
properties, or structures. If one focuses on ontology, fixed formulae and LEMPs seem on a
par: both attribute properties to objects. But from a dynamical standpoint, the difference
of content is crystal-clear: the fixed formulae are always state assignments, while the LEMPs
are always transition rules.
Define the dynamical state of a system as follows:
The dynamical state of a system is the collection of measurable quantities of interest whose
values at one time and place would uniquely determine their values at other times and
places were the system to be deterministic.
In Newton’s theory of mechanics, for example, the master formula F = ma calls upon us to
form differential equations of second order in position: ẍ = f(x, ẋ, t, ...), called equations of
motion. This is equivalent to assigning dynamical states of the form (x, ẋ) to the system:
14See e.g. Wallace 2012; Rosaler 2015a; 2015b; Yoshimi 2012; Giunti 2006; 2016; Zednik 2011; Kaplan
2015; Ross 2015; Meyer 2018.
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whenever the equation of motion has unique solutions, its solution is determined by a pair
of inputs x and ẋ. Now, given initial values (x(t0), ẋ(t0)), the form of f(x, ẋ, t, ...) will
determine whether the future (x(t), ẋ(t)) will be unique and what values they can acquire.
Thus, f(x, ẋ, t, ...) encodes the transition rules. Since f(x, ẋ, t, ...) is left unspecified, one can
say that the fixed part of Newton’s theory assigns states of the form (x, ẋ) to each degree
of freedom in the system, while the open-ended force formulae such as F ∝ x and F ∝ 1
r2
provide the transition rules among states of that form. The same goes for any other theory
that can be given a dynamical systems formulation. If I am right, traditional accounts have
gone wrong in assuming both the state assignments and the transition rules to be fixed by
theory (see §1.3 above). In light of this, we may revisit the table of theories from Section
1.2 (see Table 2).
Table 2: The fixed formula in a dynamical theory provides the general form of state as-
signments while the open-ended formula encodes the missing ingredient for determining the
transition rules among said states.
Theory State assignments (fixed) Transition rules (open-end)
Classical mechanics (x, ẋ) F , L, or H
Non-rel. QM experimental Hilbert states evolution operator
Quantum field theory Beams of sharp momentum |k〉 S-matrix amplitudes
Bohr’s atomic theory Bohr’s stationary states Amplitudes permitted by CP
Diffusion theory (ρ(0, x), ρ(t, 0), ρ(t, R)) diffusion function
Standard cosmology (a, ρ) equations of state and densities
Electrostatics Dirichlet/Neumann boundaries density function
Next I will explain in what sense the LEMPs must be considered open-ended.
1.4.3 Two aspects of open-endedness
In the next two subsections, I will elaborate on those characteristics of LEMPs which earn
them the label “open-ended”. At the beginning of this paper, I expressed the open-endedness
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of LEMPs by saying that these formulae do not get tested ; they are rather derived by “fitting”
the master formula to the local empirical data in the first place. In the following, I will unpack
this in terms of two notions of abundance (a fact about theories) and inexhaustibility (a fact
about the world), which will prove important for my argument in Section 1.6.
1.4.3.1 Characteristic 1: LEMPs are abundant
There is only one condition for the existence of a predictively accurate LEMP: namely
that the master formula be applicable to the system at hand. This is because the theory tasks
us to presuppose both the master formula and the experimental results in a first encounter with
a system and “reverse engineer” the LEMP from the two presuppositions such that the master
formula plus the LEMP entail the experimental results. For example, suppose the natural
system being studied is such that an acceleration ẍ can be assinged to it. Then it is not
surprising that ẍ has some functional dependency on x and t: as the system moves through
space, it will have some acceleration for any given position and time: ẍ = f(x, ẋ, t, ...).
Therefore, whatever the observations are, one would simply assign the value of force to be
whatever is needed to make F = ma true, namely let F = mf(x, ẋ, t, ...).15
The dynamical framework allows us to generalize this. Since fixed formulae are (the
general form of) state assignment rules and LEMPs are (the missing ingredient for) transition
rules, one could generally say that as long as the state assignments of the theory are applicable
to the system at hand, there exist transition rules that predict the behavior of the system. For
instance, as long as a system of dilute metallic gas gets deflected in a Stern-Gerlach machine,
it can be assigned (detected and prepared in) various spin states. One can therefore record
the state of the system as s(t1), s(t2), etc. at different times. One can then construct an
evolution operator Dδt : {s(ti)} → {s(ti)} by demanding that Dt2−t1s(t1) = s(t2), and so
on for all recorded times. Whatever Hamiltonian function is the generator of this evolution
operator will then give the Hamiltonian of the system. More generally we have:
ABUNDANCE: The only condition for the existence of a predictively accurate LEMP is
that the state assignments of the theory be applicable to the system at hand.16
15This is of course assuming that one has not previously constructed a suitable LEMP for the same system
and the same context of interaction such that one already expects f(x, ẋ, t, ...) to be a certain way.)
16Since LEMPs are abundant, the only reason to abandon a theory in this framework is if the state
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One might object to ABUNDANCE by arguing that theories do put restrictions on
LEMPs. For one thing, some transition rules may not be expressible as specific types of
functions (e.g. Hamiltonian) due to mathematical restrictions on such functions. Moreover,
one might impose additional requirements on LEMPs, such as requring that forces be de-
terministic, compliant with Newton’s third law, conservative, time-independent, functions
of position only, attributable to an identifiable source entity, and so on. As soon as one
adds any such constraints beyond F = ma itself, it becomes possible that one fails to find
a suitable force equation that satisfies both conditions. For example, since Mercury can be
assigned states of the form (x, ẋ), according to ABUNDANCE there is a force formula that
predicts Mercury’s orbit in conjunction with F = ma. One can confirm this by letting the





), where L is the angular momentum of the planet. This
force predicts the anomalous precession of the perihelion of Mercury to the same accuracy as
General Relativity.17 However, this force explicitly depends on angular momentum. Thus,
the objection goes, Newtonian theory fails to accommodate Mercury’s orbit if one requires
that gravity depend on relative distance only.
My response to this objection is that in practice, these additional constraints are easily
discarded in favor of predictive power, and therefore they cannot be part of the essential
assignments of the theory become inapplicable to the system at hand. A thorough discussion of this condition
is beyond the scope of this paper, but an illustration can be provided using the case of quantum mechanics.
One might begin by asking: if LEMPs are abundant, could we not find a modified force formula that
would allow F = ma to fit quantum phenomena? The answer is of course yes, we can. That is precisely
what Bohmian quantum mechanics accomplishes. In Bohmian mechanics, one adds a “quantum potential”
Q to the classical potential energy function V , and calculates the force as the gradient of this augmented
potential function. The addition of Q accounts for all strange quantum behavior, evidenced by the fact that
Bohmians can draw continuous trajectories for particles in a double-slit experiment.
So, then we ask: why do physicist consider quantum phenomena a reason to abandon F = ma rather than
modify the force formula? The prescriptivist answer would be that F = ma has lost operational relevance:
the state assignments of classical physics (namely x and ẋ) are still theoretically possible but no longer
operationally assignable to quantum systems. This is because the correlations baked into the quantum
potential Q make it impossible to prepare or detect the system in an arbitrary (x, ẋ) pair: attempting to
prepare or detect the system in a particular x causes one to lose control over ẋ and vice versa. So, while
F = ma is not technically “refuted” by quantum phenomena, it has lost its experimental relevance. This
is why many practicing physicists state that Bohmian mechanics has no empirical relevance – a statement
that makes perfect sense from a prescriptivist standpoint but is difficult to understand descriptively, given
that Bohmian mechanics captures all of the same empirical data as its standard alternative.
In short, physicists switch to a new theory when the old state assignment rules become operationally
inapplicable to the system. This can happen despite the fact that a modified LEMP can still be found for
the theory to “save the phenomena”.
17For a derivation, see Brown [manuscript].
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content of the theory. As said above, as long as the state assignments are applicable, with
enough patience one can always construct an adequate transition operator from the local
data, and use the latter to form a predictive differential equation. There is no reason for the
scientist to hamstring themselves and settle for less predictive power by ruling out certain
transition rules in a priori fashion. For instance, Lagrangian and Hamiltonian mechanics are
taken by the physicist as assigning states of the same form but encoding the transition rules in
different quantities.18 As such, physicists are quite opportunistic with respect to the different
ways of encoding transition rules: in situations where mathematical restrictions prevent a
certain type of function (e.g. Hamiltonian) from encoding certain empirical transition rules,
the physicist swiftly moves to a different “formulation” of the theory (e.g. Lagrangian,
etc.) in which the transition rules can be encoded. The Lagrangian formalism, for instance,
is primarily used for unknown constraints and holonomic systems (see e.g. Goldstein 1980
[1950], 49), while Hamiltonian mechanics is mainly useful for systems with cyclic coordinates
(see e.g. ibid, 351) and numerical calculations (see e.g. Finn 2008, 130). Even further, if
the occasion calls for it, physicists will not shy away from mixing and matching Lagrangians
and Hamiltonians in what they refer to as “Routhian” functions (Goldstein 1980 [1950],
352; Finn 2008, 137). Forces are used when the other methods do not pay off and/or are
inapplicable (Goldstein 1980 [1950], 49, 351; Finn 2008, 130).
Or consider determinism. As Norton (2003; 2008) has argued, requiring that all forces be
deterministic (causal fundamentalism) would preclude Newtonian mechanics from modeling
many ordinary natural systems. Take the (in)famous example of a mass on top of a dome
whose shape gives rise to the LEMP: F = r
1
2 . This LEMP encodes indeterministic transition
rules: the mass might slide down the dome at any arbitrary time in the future, but it is not
determined when or whether the slide will occur. But once the mass slides, Newtonian
mechanics can be used to predict its trajectory. The physicist would not rob themselves of
this predictive power by imposing arbitrary constraints on LEMPs.19
18Mathematically-minded readers would disagree that Lagrangian and Hamiltonian mechanics assign the
same states, for the state-spaces of the two theories have different geometrical structure (one is a tangent
bundle, the other a symplectic manifold). For extensive discussion of this issue see: North 2009; Curiel 2014.
However, from a prescriptive standpoint, the two theories yield the same equations of motion whenever they
are both applicable. The two state assignments are thus dynamically equivalent.
19The other requirements are similarly discarded in favor of predictive power. The requirement that forces
be compliant with Newton’s third law (action and interaction) would exclude constraint forces (Wilson
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Ruetsche has recently pointed out a similar situation in applications of Quantum Field
Theory to curved spacetime. In semi-classical gravity models, where one treats the stress-
energy tensor Tµν (but not the Einstein tensor) as a quantum operator, a constraint known
as the Hadamard condition must be imposed on the correlation functions of the quantum
fields in order to ensure that the expectation value of stress-energy Tµν remains finite (Wald
1994, §4.6). Thus, one might be tempted to say that only Hadamard fields are physical.
Nevertheless, as Ruetsche (2015; 2016) has pointed out, the Hadamard condition is not a
universal constraint. In dealing with Hawking radiation, for instance, one needs to assign
non-Hadamard fields to the system (using the same commutation relations as state assign-
ment rules). Now, the Hadamard condition is a constraint on correlation functions, which
ultimately provide the LEMPs. Thus, one can diagnose the issue as follows: the descriptive
attributes of semi-classical LEMPs are different from those of Hawking LEMPs. Therefore,
any strict requirement that all LEMPs be Hadamard would hamstring QFT in its quest for
maximum predictive power.20
Of course the idea of local theorizing is not new in itself: Norton, Wilson, and Ruetsche,
from whom several of the above examples were borrowed, have championed different versions
of the idea for some time (also cf. the local notion of “system laws” in Woodward and
Wilson 2019).21 I am obviously sympathetic to these philosophers. As the examples show,
[manuscript], 5) and arguably electromagnetic forces (assuming a vectorial form of the third law); demanding
an identifiable source entity for all forces disqualifies entropy and viscous forces (Wilson 2018, 26-27); the
requirement that forces be conservative leaves out dissipative forces; and so on.
20ABUNDANCE is in direct contrast to Giere’s views (see above), for according to ABUNDANCE there
is a set of necessary and sufficient conditions for what secondary formulae are allowed: namely that they be
fitted to local data. Moreover, ABUNDANCE implies that new models should not be required a priori to
have any sort of “family resemblance” to existing ones. In other words, the descriptive attributes of LEMPs
are not treated by the scientist as global constraints, but as local facts of experience. Hence the adjective
“local” in “local empirical mediating principles”.
21Broadly speaking, there have been two species of local philosophy of science: methodological and semantic
/ ontic. The methodological variety – i.e. the notion that different areas of science require different heuristics
and principles of reasoning – includes Cartwright’s “dappled world” (1999), Norton’s material theory of
induction (2016) and Wimsatt’s “piecewise approximations” and “heuristic strategies” (2007). The semantic
/ ontic version of locality – i.e. the idea that theoretical descriptions of the world aquire different meaning or
ontological character in different local contexts – includes Norton’s arguments against causal fundamentalism
(2003; 2008), Wilson’s arguments that concepts of classical mechanics often have “wandering significance”
which allows them to bridge different “patches” of applied mathematics (2008; 2018), Ruetsche’s “locavore”
ontology of quantum field theories (2015; 2016), as well as Lloyd’s “nesting models” account of evolutionary
biology (1994 [1988]; 2013). Of interest to my project is the semantic / ontic variety, which can be easily
accommodated in a prescriptive-dynamical framework.
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the locality pointed out by them is often (though perhaps not always) rooted in the locality
exhibited by LEMPs. This diagnosis strikes me as illuminating, in particular since some
of these local accounts have been limited to specific subdisciplines (e.g. Wilson to classical
mechanics, Ruetsche to QFT in curved spacetime). Thus, the prescriptive-dynamical view
can serve as a broader framework in which to accommodate local philosophies of science.
Nevertheless, I suggest that local philosophies of science have not gone far enough in
their rejection of traditonal accounts, for none of the authors have considered the descriptive
locality of theories as an invitation to abandon the descriptive-ontological view.22 The con-
tinual adherence to descriptivism is understandable given that no diagnosis has been offered
for the origin of descriptive locality and thus the issue has remained somewhat mysterious.
I diagnose the root of descriptive locality to be the open-endedness of transition rules which
I shall argue calls for abandoning descriptive-ontological construals of theories in favor of a
prescriptive-dynamical one.
But first let me point out another closely-related aspect of open-endedness that will prove
important for my argument below.
1.4.3.2 Characteristic 2: LEMPs are inexhaustible
ABUNDANCE is a fact about theories, namely that they put no global restrictions on
their LEMPs, effectively allowing any predictive LEMP as long as the state assignments are
still applicable. But that is also a reflection of a fact about nature, namely that the transition
rules tend to surprise us in new circumstances, whether this be a new context of interac-
22To be fair, Ruetsche comes closest, for instance in her occasional reference to the cannonical commuta-
tion relations as “recipes” (2015, 3437 ff.). Nevertheless, she remains committed to descriptivism, evidenced
by her commitment to Fine’s Natural Ontological Attitude, which still takes theories as guides to ontology,
notwithstanding the emphasis on the multiplicity of local ontologies (see ibid, 3426). I should recognize the
sole exception at this point: in The Quantum Revolution in Philosophy (2017), Richard Healey explicitly ar-
gues against descriptive readings of quantum mechanics and uses prescriptive language to interpret quantum
mechanical state assignments. Healey’s account is the closest to mine, with two differences. Firstly, Healey’s
are prescriptions of credences. To be sure, the credences are derived from the state assignments, which are
prescriptions in my view. Nevertheless, Healey is highlighting a second sense in which quantum mechanics
is prescriptive, one compatible with but slightly different from mine. Secondly, Healey’s prescriptiveness is
unique to quantum mechanics, whereas mine is more general. (Prof. Healey has expressed his agreement
with the foregoing assessment of the relationship between his view and mine in personal communication.)
Nevertheless, Healey provides the essential roadmap for dispelling oneself of (quantum) descriptivism. More
on this in §1.6.1.
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tion or a new natural system altogether. I shall refer to the fact that new circumstances
might require new LEMPs as the inexhaustibility of LEMPs because it means that there
is no exhaustive list of LEMPs to choose from when one finds oneself in new experimental
circumstances.23
First consider new contexts of interaction with the same system. An example we have al-
ready discussed occurs in modeling a restorative system such as a mass-spring or a pendulum,
where F = −kx is a common choice for the second formula in textbooks of Newtonian me-
chanics as well as in practice. But despite being called “Hooke’s law”, the formula F = −kx
does not have a pre-ordained scope of validity and will cease to apply as soon as the spring
begins to behave non-linearly. While any given spring or pendulum has a linear (Hookean)
phase, there is a threshold of stretch beyond which non-linear terms in x and eventually ẋ
begin to show up in the restorative force formula. A new context of interaction (a wider
range of stretch, a new temperature, a medium other than air, etc.) might always require a
new LEMP to model the spring.
This is not specific to restorative systems of course. Consider how the same liquid has
different viscosity functions under different circumstances (temperature, pressure, distur-
bance, etc.), which supply the local LEMPs of fluid mechanics. Or consider another LEMP
of Newtonian mechanics, the inverse-square formula: F = Gmm
′
r2
. Both Modifiend Newtonian
Dynamics (MONDs) and dark matter shift this “law” to fit the data to galaxy-level contexts
of experiment. Once again, the scope of validity is not pre-ordained.
In short, the first way in which LEMPs are inexhaustible is that a new context of inter-
action is always allowed to surprise us.
INEXHAUSTIBILITY I: New contexts of interaction might require new LEMPs.
The second way in which LEMPs are inexhaustible is upon examining a new system
that has not been studied before. Here too there can be no a priori knowledge of what
the LEMPs for that system will look like, as the theory does not come with a catalog of
physically relevant LEMPs to choose from.24 Rather, as said above, the theory asks us to
23I do not mean to claim that the inventory of the fundamental building blocks of nature itself is inex-
haustible (I doubt that we can have such knowledge one way or another). Rather, my claim is that our
theories do not tell us when this inventory has been exhausted.
24I do not mean to imply that the fixed formulae are “a priori” in Friedman’s neo-Kantian sense (2001). The
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presuppose the master formula and carefully “reverse engineer” the LEMP. For instance,
having presupposed F = ma, Newton spent much of the Principia fine-tuning the inverse-
square formula to the best of his data. He proved that in general, if T ∝ rn, where T
is the period of the planet and r the distance to the Sun, then F = ma implies that
F ∝ r−(2n−1) (Newton 1999 [1687], Prop. IV, Cor. 7). In accordance with this, Newton
carefully considered possible deviations from n = 3
2
in the data, ultimately finding the
deviations negligible within the margin of error (ibid, Book III, Theorem 2, Prop. 2; see also
Norton 2010 [2002], 128). Following this method, several physicists such as Laplace (1798-
1827) and Asaph Hall (1894) attempted to read back corrections of the form F ∝ 1
r2+δ
from
the data, which Hall considered a continuation, rather than a disconfirmation, of Newton’s
project. And of course this is not specific to gravity. Much of the project of Newtonian
chemistry in the 19th century was devoted to finding the right force formulae to account for
chemical reactions. One proposal, contemplated by James Keill among others, was a short-
range attractive force that diminishes faster than gravity and depends on the shapes of the
particles (cones, cylinders, cubes, spheres) as well as their masses (see Thackray 1970, 67 ff.).
The attitude exhibited in these research programs confirms the scientist’s tacit commitment
to the inexhaustibility of LEMPs for new systems (and as a result, lack of commitment to
any sort of “family resemblance” a la Giere).25
INEXHAUSTIBILITY II: New systems might require new LEMPs.26
master formulae are not conditions for the possibility of empirical knowledge, although they are instructions
for constructing LEMPs.
25The same goes for non-classical theories. In Quantum Field Theory, for instance, one holds the canon-
ical commutation relations of fermionic and bosonic fields fixed, and experimentally reads off interaction
Lagrangian terms of the form Lint = −ieψ̄γµAµψ for various species of particles and the interactions they
participate in. Thus, there is no theoretical prediction for the number, form, or strength of terms in the
interaction Lagrangian: the number of generations of fermions and the existence of right-handed neutrinos,
for instance, are open-ended in the Standard Model. Each interaction term corresponds to a particular set
of experimental findings. This means that if new transition amplitudes – e.g. corresponding to some of
the many versions of the inflaton field – turn up in future experiments, we must simply accept them into
the family. However, the Standard Model does present a potential trouble case for my view, insofar as the
Weinberg-Salam electroweak Lagrangian (a LEMP) predicted the existence of the Higgs field. A satisfac-
tory treatment of this case is beyond this paper, but my short response is as follows: sometimes the state
assignments plus some empirical data imply certain coherence conditions which essentially state that either
the transition rules must obey certain constraints or else the state assignments lead to contradiction. It
is therefore not precisely theoretical considerations that fixed the electroweak Lagrangian, but logical and
empirical ones, namely the fact that the previous LEMPs required gauge invariance for the theory to be
coherent, and guage invariance required the Higgs field.
26What if the “new system” can be modeled as composed of several component systems with known
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One might object to INEXHAUSTIBILITY by saying that we do know when Hooke’s
law applies, namely it only applies to “small” disturbances in restorative systems. After all,




can delineate the scope of Hooke’s law as the range of displacements in which the higher
order terms are negligible. My response is that this does not help us delineate the scope
of validity of Hooke’s law. First of all, note that any arbitrary restorative system will
conform to Hooke’s law for some range of displacements. Therefore, “small” disturbances in
this context are simply defined as “those displacements for which higher-order terms of the
above expansion are negligible”, which is equivalent to “those displacements that conform
to Hooke’s law”. In other words, this is equivalent to saying that Hooke’s law is valid as
long as Hooke’s law is valid! Thus, the scope of validity of Hooke’s law is circularly defined.
And similarly for LEMPs in general.
Corollary to INEXHAUSTIBILITY: The scope of validity of a LEMP is circularly defined.
The above also helps respond to another objection to the idea of inexhaustibility.27 Ac-
cording to this objection, the appearance of open-endedness stems from how one individuates
“theories”. If one identifies one big “Newtonian theory” and considers different Newtonian
systems as models of this umbrella theory, then it looks like the theory is open-ended. But
alternatively, one can identify F = ma as a theory fragment and its conjunction with each
LEMP as a separate, complete theory with a specific domain of application: Newtonian
gravitational theory, Newtonian projectile theory, Newtonian pendulum theory, Newtonian
strut theory, and so on. Then, the objection goes, each of the mini-theories can be considered
fixed within its own domain.
There are several issues with this approach. First of all, it is not clear that this approach
amounts to more than a verbal maneuver. After all, the mini-theories are not handed down
LEMPs? Could one deduce the LEMP of the total system from those of the components? I do not deny the
possibility of educated guesses about the LEMP of the total system; but these guesses inevitably hinge on
certain substantive assumptions about compositionality / additivity of the components’ LEMPs. However,
compositionality and additivity are ultimately empirical assumptions, i.e. it is ultimately up to experience
to decide whether LEMPs are holistic or not. As such, it would not be a violation of Newtonian mechanics if
the force formula for a three-body gravitational system were different from the sum of pair-wise gravitational
forces.
27Thanks to an anonymous referee for discussion of this objection.
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from the sky: when an engineer creates a new elastic band or metal beam with novel prop-
erties, they still need to construct a new “mini-theory” for this new system, and they must
do so under the guidance of the master formula F = ma combined with local experimental
data. That is of course why the master formula features in each of the mini-theories as an
“axiom”. As such, the list of mini-theories is still open-ended and context-dependent; there is
still a guiding principle, and this principle is still generating an open-ended list of predictive
equations through engagement with the system. It therefore appears that we have achieved
a resemblance of fixity merely by insisting that one refrain from using the word “theory” in
reference to the open-ended guiding principle, which is merely a verbal difference.
Secondly, it is not true that the mini-theories are fixed within their own domains. For
instance, if “Newtonian gravitational theory” specifically refers to the conjunction of F = ma
and F = Gmm
′
r2
, then Newtonian gravitational theory is not fixed within its own domain. If
it were, Laplace and Hall would have considered their work on possible modifications to
the inverse-square formula a potential refutation of Newton. But as explained above, they
considered theirs a continuation of Newton’s project, which implies that they considered the
inverse-square formula open-ended within the domain of celestial mechanics.
Thirdly, as the Corollary above implies, since each “domain” is defined by a fixed LEMP,
the boundaries that separate the mini-theories are circularly defined. Again taking “Newto-
nian gravitational theory” to refer to the conjunction of F = ma and F = Gmm
′
r2
, one can see
that there is no sharp boundary for when this mini-theory is valid. For example, is motion
at the scale of galaxies included in the domain of application of Newtonian gravitational
theory? It is according to Dark Matter theories, which keep the same LEMP F = Gmm
′
r2
and merely posit invisible mass in the system. By contrast, according to Modified Newto-
nian Dynamics (MOND), galaxy-scale motion is a new domain for Newtonian gravitational
theory. This is because a “domain” is defined as those applications for which the LEMP is
fixed, and MOND recommends a modification of the LEMP for galaxy curves. But this is
once again circular: the validity of the LEMPs determines the domain in retrospect, while
the domains are themselves supposed to tell us when each LEMP is expected to apply and
when it needs to be changed.
This concludes our preliminaries on LEMPs. I will now briefly sketch the prescriptivist
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alternative that is suggested by the considerations above before moving on to argue against
descriptivism.
1.5 The Prescriptive-dynamical Construal in a Nutshell
The above considerations suggest the following prescriptive-dynamical account of the
essential content of physical theories: a physical theory is a prescriptions for state assignment
to natural systems for a range of interactive contexts. More precisely, the prescriptions of
the theory come in three steps:
1- (Fixed) Assign dynamical states of such and such a form to the system (e.g. (x, ẋ)).
2- (Open-ended) Read off the transition operator Dδt from local experimental phenomena.
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3- (If possible) Compactify Dδt in a simple quantity (e.g. F , L, or H).
The two main tenets of the prescriptive-dynamical view therefore are: i) the essential
content of the theory must be couched in dynamical terms (states and transition rules)
rather than in ontological terms (entities, properties, structures), and ii) the fixed part of
the theory’s working posits is an injunction to interface with the system through certain
state assignments, rather than a description of what is there and what it does.
The prescriptivist thus rejects the widespread attitude in philosophy which Woodward,
following Dewey, has labeled “the spectator view” (Woodward 2020 [preprint]): an approach
to epistemology in which passive observation is taken as the paradigm example of knowledge
acquisition. It is natural for a philosopher taking this approach to consider a theory a
description of what one is looking at. If, by contrast, one takes active interface as the
paradigm of knowledge acquisition, one is naturally led to the idea that a theory tells us
what to do, rather than what there is. As such, the prescriptive-dynamical view has strong
affinities with pragmatism, though I shall not insist on this label and its myriad connotations
in what follows.
Let us now turn to my argument against descriptivism.
28Note: I use “transition” in a more general sense than change in time. The “transitions” of Poisson’s
equation (∇2φ = f(x, y, z)), for example, are purely spatial. Thus, the transition operator may well be Dδx,
etc.
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1.6 The Descriptivist’s Dilemma
In this section, I will summarize how the foregoing considerations rule out all forms of
descriptivism. I shall begin by examining the possibility of descriptive content in the fixed
parts of theories, which I argue is extremely thin if at all existent. I will then proceed to
show that attempting to pinpoint the descriptive content of the open-ended parts traps the
descriptivist in an unpleasant dilemma.
1.6.1 Do the fixed formulae have descriptive content?
My concern in this paper is with the essential content of physical theories, a notion
akin to Kitcher’s working posits (1993, 149 ff.) and Psillos’s “indispensable” or “essential
contributors” (1999, 108 ff.). The essential content would be those parts of a theory that
actually contribute to its predictive power as opposed to any idle baggage that might come
with the theory. My claim is not that physical theories in their many formulations throughout
history have never contained any descriptions; to the contrary, physicists often use descriptive
statements to scaffold their theories and make them more intuitive and visualizable. My
claim, rather, is that insofar as physical theories contain descriptive statements, these play
no role in the predictive power of the theory.
A teacher of Newtonian mechanics might start by describing a world full of point particles
and rigid bodies and forces that push them around, proceed to claim that these objects carry
properties such as mass, momentum, etc. before finally writing down the equation: F = ma.
However, once said equation is written down, the only relevant manipulations the student
needs to retain are those summarized in §1.5 above, namely: how to assign a state consisting
of a position x and a velocity ẋ to the system of interest at any given time, and how to
pack/unpack the transition rules in the quantity F by forming and solving second-order
differential equations. The essential insight of classical mechanics is simply that the state of
the system must be tracked through the ordered pair of position and velocity, not position
alone, and not any other combination of measurable quantities. That insight is a prescription,
not a description.
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As we have seen, Newton’s theory does not tell us whether forces are deterministic or not,
whether they must emanate from an identifiable source object or not, whether they conserve
energy or not, etc. Nor does the theory tell us what variables the force can be expected to
depend on (position, velocity, mass, shape, size, composition, color of the object, the age
of the particle, ... ?). The problem persists even for a structuralist, for the mathematical
structure of the state space changes with the choice of LEMP (see, e.g.: Swanson and
Halvorson 2012, 9). For instance, some but not all Lagrangians and Hamiltonians impose
a metric structure on the state spaces of their respective theories (see: Barrett 2015). In
general, the descriptively salient content of the theory largely depends on the open-ended
LEMPs and appears quite empty without them. Without the local force formulae, for
instance, the descriptive content of F = ma is simply “the product of mass and acceleration
will equal something”, which is trivially true of any system that can be assigned mass
and acceleration, and false otherwise.29 So F = ma picks out a class of natural systems
(namely those that can be assigned mass and acceleration), but the theory makes no essential
statements about which systems allow these assignments and which do not; nor does it
provide any description of the further characteristics of those systems that do.
But one might still insist: doesn’t Newton’s theory at least make such claims as that
there are forces in the world that move objects around, even if it does not tell us much
about the attributes of these forces? My answer is once again: such claims are not essential
to the predictive power of the theory. As explained above, the essential core of Newtonian
mechanics is a differential equation of motion of the form ẍ = f(x, ẋ, t, ...). It is this equation
that takes us from initial to final states, thus enabling us to make predictions. But forces do
not feature in the equation of motion, because they are eliminated from the two formulae
that yield said equation. Thus, forces are certainly not implied by the immediate success-
generators of Newton’s theory. Consequently, the only way the existence of forces would
be considered essential to Newton’s theory is if the derivation of equations of motion had
to go through the assumption of forces. But this is clearly not the case, as one can often
derive the same equation of motion from a force-free theory such as Lagrangian mechanics.
29Indeed, the sentence in quotes is the “Ramsified” version of Newton’s second law, which is precisely
what structuralists such as Sneed (1979 [1971]) and Stegmüller (1979) considered to be the entire content of
the theory. Ironically, they, too, puzzled over the triviality of this statement.
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Since forces are neither featured in the predictive equation of motion nor necessary for the
derivation of the same, they are not part of the essential content of the theory.30
Note that I am not making an underdetermination argument. My claim is not that we
should doubt forces because they have alternatives, but rather that forces fall outside the
essential content of the theory, and are thus immune from underdetermination problems.
It is precisely the supposition that forces are part of the essential content of Newtonian
mechanics that leads to underdetermination. For if forces are essential, then presumably
so are Lagrangians, Hamiltonians, etc. And once both forces and Lagrangians, say, are
considered essential, one has set oneself up for a powerful underdetermination argument:
two theories with radically different essential contents are seen as saving the same empirical
phenomena, thus raising questions about believing their essential posits.
The prescriptive-dynamical view, on the other hand, avoids this underdetermination
problem entirely, for the latter takes forces and Lagrangians to be descriptive scaffolding:
alternative ways of compactifying what is essentially the same local transition rules. As
we saw in §1.4.3.1, compactification rules are used opportunistically and chosen based on
pragmatic considerations. The common content of all these formalisms is the prescriptions
for forming the differential equation of motion, which only specify state-assignment and
transition rules: forces and Lagrangians are ultimately eliminated in order to derive this
equation. If anything, this argument should help us dodge the underdetermination problem
by separating the essential, dynamical content of the theory from its inessential, descriptive
baggage. Rather than arguing that we should not believe in forces despite the enormous
predictive power of the theory that posits them, I argue that the predictively relevant part
of the theory posits no such things.31
30This argument is independent of where one falls on the debate about the (in)equivalence of Newtonian,
Lagrangian, and Hamiltonian mechanics, for the point can be made about a specific system or group of
systems to which more than one formulation of classical mechanics applies.
31How about the existence of masses or various families of particles? For instance, doesn’t the Standard
Model of particle physics contain the claim that there are massive vector bosons such as the Z and W? To
see if this is the case, first of all note that the Standard Model is a LEMP in my terminology for which the
canonical commutation relations of quantum field theory operate as the fixed master formulae. Quantum
field theory in itself does not imply the existence of anything; it merely lays out a number of ways one could
assign quantum field operators to systems. Thus, even if the Standard Model implies the existence of various
kinds of fields / particles, that is consistent with the prescriptive-dynamical framework, insofar as the latter
locates descriptive content in the local LEMPs.
But regardless, the appearance that each kind of quantum field represents a specific kind of entity is
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I conclude that the fixed formulae contain extremely thin descriptive content, if any at
all.32
1.6.2 The descriptive content of open-ended formulae: a dilemma for the de-
scriptivist
As we have seen, the LEMPs are needed to give theories non-trivial descriptive content.
But the LEMPs are numerous and each might carry some novel descriptive element. The
descriptivist might hope to reconcile these two facts by simply conceiving of the theory
as either a massive disjunction or a massive conjunction, with each disjunct / conjunct
corresponding to one choice of LEMP. The two cases are slightly different, but ultimately
neither works, because the LEMPs are inexhaustible, and thus one can never know if the
disjunction or the conjunction is complete. More precisely, INEXHAUSTIBILITY imposes
an unpleasant dilemma on the descriptivist: should the disjunction or conjunction include
all possible LEMPs, or known LEMPs only? As I will argue, neither horn is pleasant for the
descriptivist.33
Consider the disjunctive case first, which is simpler. The suggestion is to formulate the
misleading anyway. A massive vector boson, for example, is replaced through the Higgs mechanism with
two massless bosons (one vectorial and one scalar), without affecting the resulting equation of motion. If
descriptive claims that such and such particles of such and such masses exist were essential to the Standard
Model or quantum field theory, either the same equation of motion could not be derived without them, or
else one would face a vexing underdetermination problem.
Once again, this is unproblematic from a dynamical point of view, for the latter construes each type of field
operator (scalar, vector, spinor, etc.) as instructions for dynamical state assignments, which instructions can
be scaffolded with a number of different ontologies. It is not surprising that a dynamical state with three
degrees of freedom (massive vector) can be swapped with one state with two degrees of freedom (massless
vector) plus one with one degree of freedom (real massless scalar). The ontologies differ radically, but the
state assignments are equivalent, and underdetermination is avoided. (A detailed treatment of how quantum
operators can be treated as prescriptions for state assignment is explored in Healey 2017.)
32To be clear, the fact that a certain state assignment is the best prescription for a given context implies
a descriptive fact about how the world works, namely something to the effect of “the (hidden) underlying
dynamics of the system is such that these state assignments track the true transitions of the system.” But
this is hardly much of a description at all, and certainly not comparable to ordinary descriptive statements
such as “there are particles and forces and they are related in such and such a way,” which the prescriptivist
considers as either embellishment or scaffolding for the state space.
33One can extend the argument to an account with movable pieces (such as Giere’s) by asking: should
one include all possible family resemblances or only known ones? Since family resemblance is not a local or
empirical matter, Giere’s view faces a similar dilemma as the traditional, fully-fixed accounts.
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theory as a massive disjunction:
(L&M1) ∨ (L&M2) ∨ ... ≡ L&(M1 ∨M2 ∨ ...) (1)
where the propositional constant L denotes the “law-like” master formula and Mi the various
mediating principles (LEMPs). But this runs into a dilemma: should one include all possible
LEMPs among the Mi or known LEMPs only? Neither option works.
Including all possible LEMPs makes (M1 ∨M2 ∨ ...) a tautology and reduces the theory
down to L. This cannot be right. L is not a predictive equation and thus cannot be the
entire content of the theory. At least not if “the theory” is to be something that figures in a




Initial / boundary conditions
————————————
Prediction
As the above schema makes clear, “the theory” cannot simply be the master formula alone
or else the predictive schema would be deductively invalid. As argued above, the master
formula is fairly vacuous on its own.
On the other hand, including known LEMPs only would mean that all the disjuncts are
false for any new context which might require a new LEMP, even if the master formula is
still applicable in that context. But according to INEXHAUSTIBILITY, such contexts are
always possible, and according to ABUNDANCE, some LEMP will predict the behavior of
the system in such contexts. Consequently, including known LEMPs only would merely ham-
string the theory in making predictions about new circumstances. Therefore, the disjunctive
account fails under both horns.
Let us consider the conjunctive view next. Presumably, the suggestion is to consider the
theory as a conjunction of statements of the form: “If such and such circumstances obtain,
use such and such a LEMP”. The full theory would thus look like the following:
[C1 → (L&M1)]&[C2 → (L&M2)]&... (2)
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where Ci are the descriptions of the circumstances under which each LEMP is valid. There
are two problems with this. First of all, the circumstances Ci are ill-defined. This is due
to the corollary to INEXHAUSTIBILITY. The circumstances Ci are meant to delineate the
scope of validity of each LEMP Mi, but according to the corollary, such scopes can only be
defined circularly, i.e. we have Mi → Ci. Given this, the ith conjunct is logically equivalent
to Ci → (L&Ci), which is the same as Ci → L. Thus, the theory as a whole is given by
(C1 → L)&(C2 → L)&..., which is in turn logically equivalent to (C1∨C2∨ ...)→ L. But this
cannot be the content of the theory, for this proposition merely states the scope of validity
of the master formula L: it says that as long as one of several conditions holds, the master
formula applies. This is not an empirically predictive proposition, because as said above the
master formula by itself does not make any predictions.34
But let us put aside the circularity of the conditions. Consider the original massive con-
junction again and assume the Ci are well-defined. What Ci should we include? All possible
circumstances or only known circumstances? Once again, neither option works. For to in-
clude all possible Ci, one would need to know the corresponding LEMP for every possible
circumstance, which we do not know according to INEXHAUSTIBILITY. Moreover, unless
one is dealing with a “theory of everything”, the master formula is bound to become inap-
plicable under some possible circumstances, which means that we cannot include all possible
Ci. Thus it might seem reasonable to include only those Ci under which the theory is known
to work. But this means that given any new circumstance C ′ that was not among the origi-
nal Ci, all conjuncts of the theory will be vacuously true, and the theory will be contentless
with no predictions. Once again this is problematic because of INEXHAUSTIBILITY and
ABUNDANCE, as this approach would deprive the theory of its ability to make predictions
in novel circumstances. Therefore, the conjunctive account also fails.
34Besides, what circumstances are the Cis meant to range over? If they are meant to cover all possible
circumstances, then (C1 ∨ C2 ∨ ...) is vacuously true, and the massive conjunction simply boils down to L
itself, which once again is not the entire content of the theory. If, on the other hand, the Ci are only meant
to range over known physical circumstances in which the theory has been tested, then all of the conditionals
become vacuously true in all untested circumstances, which means that the theory is empirically impotent
outside of known circumstances. But again, INEXHAUSTIBILITY means that new LEMPs are always
possible, and ABUNDANCE implies that the theory can make predictions about new systems and contexts
as long as its master formula is still applicable. Including only known LEMPs would once again deprive the
theory of future success in any amenable contexts that have not been encountered before.
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A final note: the above argument also indicates that prescriptivism is the only way to
prevent the master formula from becoming dispensable. Both disjunctive and conjunctive
accounts make the master formula superfluous, because each pair of statements L&Mi owes
its predictive power to a differential equation from which the theoretical terms of L and
Mi have been eliminated. For example, if the theory is Newtonian mechanics (taking the
disjunctive account for simplicity), we are told to write the theory as
[(F = ma)&(F = −kx)] ∨ [(F = ma)&(F = cx
1
2 )] ∨ .... (3)
But then one could eliminate the force from each pair of equations and simply write:
(ẍ = − k
m




2 ) ∨ .... (4)
Assuming the disjuncts are fixed (even if infintie), there would be no need to repeat a formula
such as F = ma, which contains an eliminable unkown. Why not simply a disjunction
of differential equations which are couched in purely experimental terms? Why does the
scientist insist on keeping the master formula around? The descriptivist struggles to answer
this question35. According to prescriptivism, on the other hand, we keep the master formula
around because it provides a recipe or prescription for interacting with nature in new contexts
and systems.
35This is a manifestation of Hempel’s Theoretican’s Dilemma. Thus, the prescriptive-dynamical view
provides a new solution to the Theoretician’s Dilemma, one that unlike Psillos’ (1999, 22 ff.) does not
require questioning the observational-theoretical distinction itself. But that is beyond this paper.
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1.7 Conclusion
     I have argued that the essential content of the most foundational theories of physics 
consists of fixed prescriptions for what quantities to keep track of (the dynamical states of the 
system), and what quantities to record (the transition rules). These prescriptions are by 
themselves devoid of descriptive content, but they are “filled” with open-ended empirical 
formulae that encode the local transition rules. The latter are unrestricted by theory 
(ABUNDANCE) because they are local and empirical, and tend to take new and surprising 
forms in new contexts (INEXHAUSTIBILITY). This open-endedness means that the 
descriptive content of the theory cannot be formulated as a massive disjunction or 
conjunction, as the descrip-tivist would have it. Insofar as theories describe entities, 
properties, and structures, such descriptions are inessential posits (scaffolding, embellishment, 
etc.) that do not contribute to the success of the theory.
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2.0 Chapter 2: Theoretical Equivalence as Dynamical Equivalence
2.1 Introduction
In this chapter, I will discuss the implications of my view for theoretical equivalence.
The main operative premise for the majority of my arguments below – which I take as
having been established in Chapter 1 – is the following dual fact: Predictive physical the-
ories have fixed state assignments and open-ended transition rules. I called this view the
prescriptive-dynamical view, because the fixed parts are prescriptions for constructing the
open-ended parts from local data. I will begin in Section 2.2 by examining the notions of
theoretical equivalence that emerge from this prescriptive-dynamical construal of theories.
The main one that I argue is relevant to the practice of physics is what I call “dynamical
equivalence”. Section 2.3 then surveys three mainstream accounts of theoretical equivalence
from the current literature and raises some general objections to these definitions. I will
then proceed in Section 2.4 to a critical review of the recent debates on classical mechanics,
which have arisen from applications of mainstream accounts of theoretical equivalence to the
case of classical mechanics. I shall argue that these debates are founded on a misconstrual
of physical theories and their two-tier, fixed/open-ended character, and that the bulk of the
disagreement and confusion in this literature can be resolved by recognizing that dynamical
theories have fixed state assignments and open-ended transition rules. This discussion will
also illustrate the application of prescriptive-dynamical notions of equivalence to the case
of classical mechanics. Finally, Section 2.5 presents evidence that my interpretation of the-
oretical equivalence as dynamical equivalence explicitly conforms to that of the practicing
physicist by reviewing some quotes from textbooks of classical mechanics.
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2.2 Theoretical Equivalence from a Prescriptive-Dynamical Point of View
2.2.1 Theoretical equivalence and essential content
Two theories are said to be empirically equivalent when they make the same predictions
about observable or measurable facts. This is to be distinguished from theoretical equivalence
(the topic of this chapter) which is a stronger condition and occurs when two theories’
unobservable parts agree.
Now, one would not want to demand that all unobservable aspects of the two theories
match for them to count as equivalent. What matters is rather the essential content of the
two theories. Following others in the literature, I use “essential content” to refer to that
(hypothesized) core set of assumptions of a theory that plays a role in its empirical success.
The essential content is to be contrasted with the “inessential” or “idle” parts of the theory,
if any, which are typically mere embellishments and/or scaffolding and do not contribute to
predictive success. (See Chapters 1 and 3 for a more detailed discussion of essential content.)
A reasonable standard of theoretical equivalence would allow equivalent theories to disagree
on the inessential components, but require that they converge on their essential posits.
Since theoretical equivalence means sameness of essential content, any answer to the
question “What is the essential content of a theory?” will inevitably serve as the basis for an
answer to the question “When are two theories equivalent?” and vice versa.1 In Chapter 1,
we answered the first question roughly as follows: the essential content of a physical theory is
a local prescription for assigning dynamical states to the system and recording the transitions
of these states. Let us briefly recap this account and see what notion of equivalence we can
infer from it.
2.2.2 Some basic facts from Chapter 1
As explained in Chapter 1, the prescriptions of a theory break down into three commands:
1- State-assignment rules (fixed): Assign dynamical states of such and such a form to the
system (e.g. (x, ẋ)).
1Barrett 2017, 22-23 makes extensive arguments for this proposition. And see Coffey 2014 for a similar
conclusion. Also cf. Nguyen 2017, 982.
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2- Transition rules (open-ended): Read off the transition operator Dδt from local experi-
mental phenomena.2
3- Compactification rules (on an if-possible basis): Encode Dδt in a compact quantity (e.g.
F , L, or H).
The first step is the state assignment rules, which are shown schematically here. This part of
the theory tells us what collection of measurable variables should be tracked as the dynamical
state of the system, and how these assignments should be coordinated in space and time.
In classical mechanics, these variables are the position x (or q for generalized coordinates)
and the velocity ẋ (or q̇ for generalized velocity), which must be coordinated using the
transformations of the inhomogeneous Galileo group.
The second step is the empirical measurement of local transition rules. In this procedure,
the scientist must presuppose step 1 and “fill” the prescription by engaging the system in
accordance with the state assignment rules and consequently recording the evolution operator
that arises from the local empirical data.
Thirdly and finally, the scientist is asked to encode the obtained transition rules into
a compact quantity. In classical mechanics this may be a force function, a Lagrangian, or
a Hamiltonian. This will give us the local empirical mediating principles (LEMPs). This
should all be familiar from Chapter 1.
2.2.3 Prescriptive-dynamical notions of theoretical equivalence
What account of theoretical equivalence can we derive from the above? Since there are
three nested steps to the prescriptions of any given theory (each step presupposing the last),
on a crude examination one would expect three ways in which theories can be equivalent or
inequivalent, corresponding to agreement or disagreement on each of the three steps:
Equivalence I: The two theories agree on step 1 but disagree on step 2 (and therefore 3).
Equivalence II: The two theories agree on steps 1 and 2 but disagree on step 3.
Equivalence III: The two theories agree on all three steps.
2Note: I use “transition” in a more general sense than change in time. The “transitions” of Poisson’s
equation (∇φ = f(x, y, z)), for example, are purely spatial. Thus, the transition operator may well be Dδx,
etc.
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However, in reality Equivalence I is not a real possibility. Step 2 is local and open-
ended: it is “reverse engineered” from experiment by presupposing the state assignments.
Therefore, the (in)equivalence of two theories cannot possibly hinge on (dis)agreement on
step 2. Rather, either of two things can happen: i) two theories agree on state assignment
rules, in which case they are bound to agree on transition rules, for these are inferred from
local data; or ii) they do not agree on state assignment rules, in which case they cannot agree
on transition rules, for transition rules are relations between states and defined in terms of
them.
Therefore, there are at most only two types of prescriptive-dynamical (in)equivalence:
one hinging on (dis)agreement on step 1 and the other on (dis)agreement on step 3. Let us
call these two notions Dynamical Equivalence and Compact Equivalence, respecitvely.
2.2.3.1 Dynamical equivalence
Let us call two theories dynamically equivalent if they agree on step 1 (and therefore 2).
Dynamical Equivalence: Two theories are dynamically equivalent iff they prescribe the
same experimental state assignment rules.
Note that to be equivalent, the two theories must agree on state assignment rules in
experimental practice. The qualifier “in experimental practice” is very important, because
“agreeing on state assignment rules” does not mean having isomorphic geometrical state-
spaces or anything on that level of abstraction. As we shall see in Section 2.4, much has
been made of the fact that the geometrical structure of Lagrangian and Hamiltonian state-
spaces are distinct (non-isomorphic) and that therefore, the argument goes, they are not
equivalent in any interesting sense. However, a good pragmatist would only be interested
in those aspects of state assignments that prove important for step 2, namely the physical
movements that the scientist must go through in the lab in order to prepare or detect (i.e.
assign) the natural system in one of the states prescribed by the theory. Thus, the idea is that
two dynamically equivalent theories “induce the same movements” in the lab. Dynamical
equivalence is the pragmatist’s notion of equivalence.
I will further argue that dynamical equivalence is indeed what the practicing physicist
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means by “equivalence”. But first let us examine the other notion of equivalence that arises
from agreement on step 3, i.e. the compactification rules.
2.2.3.2 Compact equivalence
Let us call two theories compactly equivalent if they are dynamically equivalent and have
fully compatible compactification rules such that every transition rule that can be encoded
in one can also be encoded in the other.
Compact Equivalence: Two theories are compactly equivalent iff they are dynamically
equivalent and have interchangeable compactification rules.
The Schrödinger and Heisenberg pictures of quantum mechanics may be said to be com-
pactly equivalent: they generate the same equations of motion and any transition rule that
can be encoded in one can also be encoded in the other, as both theories compactify their
LEMPs in a Hamiltonian operator. Hamiltonian and Hamilton-Jacobi theories may serve
as another pair of compactly equivalent theories. Of course I do not deny that compactly
equivalent theories may nevertheless have different computational virtues.
On the other hand, the same set of state assignment rules (step 1) might be compatible
with several different compactification instructions (step 3), and some compactification rules
might simply fail to apply to certain specific systems. The LEMPs of certain non-conservative
systems, for instance, cannot be encoded in a Hamiltonian function (Curiel 2014, 309). As is
well-known, there are also non-conservative and/or nonholonomic Newtonian systems that
have no Lagrangian or Hamiltonian model.3
Unlike dynamical equivalence, which I argue is the practicing physicist’s notion of theo-
retical equivalence, compact equivalence is of little relevance in the practice of physics. Let
us see why this is.
3In general, there is no unique set of necessary and sufficient conditions for Newtonian systems to have
Lagrangian counterparts, though one can find multiple sets of sufficient conditions. See Butterfield 2006.
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2.2.3.3 Dynamical equivalence is the only pragmatically relevant notion of the-
oretical equivalence
Compact equivalence does not respect the open-endedness of transition rules: the com-
pactification rules in step 3 often put additional (non-local) restrictions on the transition
rules, and are therefore at risk of failing in certain local contexts. As we shall see below in
the case of classical mechanics, for instance, Lagrangian and Hamiltonian frameworks fail to
capture certain types of acceleration patterns, in which case the physicist typically defaults
back to a very liberal notion of “force” that is essentially read back from the product of mass
and acceleration. The point is that practicing physicists, who are often sharply aware of the
open-endedness of transition rules, do not take step 3 as an essential part of a theory, but
rather as an opportunistic set of instructions for simplifying the equation of motion – hence
the “if-possible” clause in step 3. (I will present textual evidence for this claim in Section
2.5 below.)
On the other hand, well-formed and manipulable mathematical structures that theo-
reticians and philosophers typically refer to as “theories” generally come with both state
assignments and transition operators. From that perspective, a “theory” without transition
rules appears as a mere theory-fragment. Thus, mathematicians and philosophers who do
not dabble in open-endedness might be inclined to argue that compact equivalence is the
only relevant notion of theoretical equivalence.
This disagreement often manifests itself in the form of a terminological mismatch in
which practitioners of physics tend to use “theory” to refer specifically to the state assign-
ment rules alone, while the mathematically-minded often refer to a fixed conjunction of both
state assignment rules and compactification rules as “theory”. The former group would say
two theories that agree on step 1 but disagree on step 3 are equivalent (or even further: that
we are dealing with only one theory altogether), while the latter group would disagree. As
we shall see below, this is indeed the case when it comes to classical mechanics, and it does
indeed explain part of the confusion in the literature. The former use of the term “theory”
seems to underlie physicists’ ubiquitous references to the three versions of classical mechan-
ics as “different formulations of the same theory” – an assertion that baffles philosophers
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and mathematicians whose stricter notion of “theory” identifies different version of classical
mechanics as truly distinct and even incompatible theories.
To avoid arguing over terminology, in the following I will allow both uses of the term
“theory”, and will simply remain vigilant of the two uses and flag the relevant meaning
when important. When “theory” is used to mean the state assignment rules and nothing
else, there can be only one of kind of theoretical equivalence, namely dynamical equivalence.
On the other hand, when “theory” is used to mean a set of state assignment rules plus a
set of compactification rules, another notion of equivalence presents itself, namely compact
equivalence.
Terminological confusion aside, the important point to note is the following: compact
equivalence is of little relevance to the practicing physicist because it goes with a restrictive
notion of “theory” that violates the open-endedness of LEMPs. In practice, there need not
be any one-to-one correspondence between the models of two dynamically equivalent theories
(taking each model to correspond to one choice of LEMP). The open-endedness of LEMPs
means that it is always possible to come across a new system or context of interaction whose
transition rules can be compactified in one way but not another. As such, for the practicing
physicist, one-to-one correspondence between models (as compact equivalence entails) can
never be a strict requirement for declaring two theories equivalent!
We shall see how this fact dissolves much of the recent debate on theoretical equivalence
in classical mechanics. But before summarizing this debate, I would like to address one
lingering issue: the definition of dynamical equivalence provided above may be criticized
as rather vague: what does it mean to “prescribe the same experimental state assignment
rules”? How can one prove this relationship mathematically? To remedy this, I shall provide
a more rigorous but equivalent definition of dynamical equivalence in the following section,
and for that we need to turn our attention to equations of motion.
2.2.3.4 Redefining dynamical equivalence through equations of motion
As discussed in Chapter 1, steps 1 and 2 of a dynamical theory can be captured in a single
differential equation. In classical mechanics, this equation is of the form q̈ = f(q, q̇, t, ...),
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where the lacuna indicate that f might depend on any number of different quantities. The
left-hand side of this equation tells us to keep track of q and q̇ as our initial conditions,
no more and no less, while the right-hand side tasks us to search for a function f that
captures the transition rules. Those are precisely steps 1 and 2. What this equation does
not tell us is the third step, namely how to compactify the transition rules. Newtonian
mechanics asks us to write the equation in terms of Cartesian coordinates and encode the
resulting f directly in a vectorial “force” function F = mf . Lagrangian and Hamiltonian
theories allow for cleverer compactifications that may not be feasible in all cases but that
greatly simplify problem solving in the right sort of context (e.g. Lagrangian when there
are unknown constraint forces and Hamiltonian when there are cyclic coordinates or when
numerical methods are required). The same is of course true of all other physical theories:
the first two steps are captured in a differential equation that tells us what to keep track
of and what to look for, whereas the third step is a separate command regarding how to
compactify the results.
Particular instances of q̈ = f(q, q̇, t, ...) (i.e. with f filled in) are called equations of
motion (EOMs). One familiar example would be ẍ = − k
m
x. These equations are obtained
by conjoining the master formula (e.g. F = ma) with a LEMP (e.g. F = −kx) which
encodes the missing ingredient for transition rules.4 The ultimate purpose of both the master
formula and the LEMP is to merge into an EOM, which is the sole source of the theory’s
predictive power. Thus, one might think of physical theories as compactified equation-of-
motion-generating schemes (provided the EOMs are understood in a prescriptive-dynamical
fashion).
Equations of motion are the closest theoretical items to direct empirical evidence, given
that theoretical terms such as force or Lagrangian do not appear in them. Nevertheless,
EOMs contain more than “purely observational statements”, even if one were to use a liberal
notion of “observation” that includes all things measurable. This is because the same set
of observations / measurements can be captured in different differential equations. That
is, different equations of motion can predict the same trajectory. For instance, the forward
4Note that “equations of motion” is sometimes used to refer to the master formula itself, such as Newton’s
second law or the Euler-Lagrange equations. I shall always use the phrase to refer to the equation that results
from putting the master formula and the LEMP together.
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motion of a mass-spring system can be captured in the differential equation ẍ = − k
m
x, but it




(a2 − x2), where a is the maximum stretch. The
two equations agree on all observations of a forward-going mass-spring, but they disagree
on which aspects of this motion should be encoded as the state of the system and which
aspects as the transition rules. Such alternatives instruct us to keep track of variables other
than the (q, q̇) pair, and thus result in different LEMPs. It is therefore possible to agree on
empirical results despite generating different EOMs. This should not be surprising, since the
prescription that such and such collection of variables should be tracked, which is what the
EOM dictates, is not an observable / measurable statement; it is rather a conjecture that
forms the central injunction of the theory. The equations of motion are therefore “one level
above” pure observation (arguably, the only “pure observation” would be a recording of all
the variables of interest at all times and places).
As such, equations of motion are the perfect place for equivalent theories to converge:
they are neither too theoretical to avoid idle baggage from either theory, nor too observational
to prevent our definition from collapsing into mere empirical equivalence; they are just right.
Since, as said above, the first two steps are captured in the equations of motion, agreeing
on step 1 entails that the two theories would generate the same EOMs for the same natural
systems.
Dynamical Equivalence: Two theories are dynamically equivalent iff they generate the same
equations of motion for every natural system to which they both apply.
To emphasize, I am proposing dynamical equivalence as a form of theoretical equivalence,
which means that it must be stronger than mere empirical equivalence. And it is, because
as said above, an equation of motion is not a “mere observational statement”.
The different “theories” of classical mechanics are all dynamically equivalent, for each
pair of “theories” generates the same EOMs whenever both theories apply, but they do not
apply to all of the same systems: each “theory” advises us to encode the transition rules in
different functions, which allows that one theory have exclusive applications that the other
theories’ compactification rules do not permit.
We are now ready to review the recent debates on the (in)equivalence of the different
theories of classical mechanics. First off, let us quickly review the existing definitions of
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theoretical equivalence in the literature upon which this debate is largely founded.
2.3 Traditional Definitions of Theoretical Equivalence and their Discontents
In this section, I would like to quickly survey the existing definitions of theoretical equiv-
alence in the descriptivist literature and point out some general problems with them.
2.3.1 Traditional accounts
2.3.1.1 Definitional equivalence
One of the oldest and most well-known criteria of theoretical equivalence is definitional 
equivalence, different versions of which have been attributed to Quine and Glymour. The 
idea behind this notion is straightforward: two theories are equivalent if they are “intertrans-
latable”, i.e. if what each says about the world could just as well be derived from the other 
theory through new terms defined in the language of the latter. But unlike Quine (1975), 
who required a direct translation of one theory into the other’s language, Glymour (1970, 
2013) required that there be a third language into which both theories can be translated. 
As Barrett and Halvorson (2016a) have argued, Glymour’s version is less stringent and thus 
more plausible. Here is one formulation of it due to Barrett and Halvorson:
Definitional equivalence: Let T1 be a Σ1-theory and T2 be a Σ2-theory [where Σ1 and Σ2 are 
languages or “signatures”]. T1 and T2 are definitionally equivalent if there is a definitional
extension T+1 of T1 to the signature Σ1 ∪ Σ2 and a definitional extension T
+
2 of T2 to the
signature Σ1 ∪ Σ2 such that T+1 and T
+
2 are logically equivalent. (Barrett and Halvorson
2016a, 470)
The so-called “common definitional extension” T+ is subject to two conditions: it must
say everything that either theory says and nothing that either one does not say. Other
expositions of the idea of definitional equivalence as well as purported counterexamples to
it can be found in Halvorson 2012, Barrett 2017, Barrett and Halvorson 2016b, McSweeney
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2017, Weatherall 2016a, and Teh and Tsementzis 2017.5
2.3.1.2 Structural equivalence
Definitional equivalence is clearly couched in syntactic terms: it requires the specification
of languages (“signatures”) and definitions to demonstrate the equivalence of theories. Such
a definition would not be of much help for an adherent of the semantic view of theories.
Rather, a semanticist would presumably seek to establish some sort of equivalence among
the models or structures of the two theories. In light of this, several notions of structural
equivalence have been proposed. They look roughly something like the following:
Structural equivalence: M is the same theory as M′, just in case there is a bijection
F :M→M′ such that each model m ∈M is isomorphic to its paired model F (m) ∈M′.
(Halvorson 2012, 190)
Halvorson 2012 and Barrett 2017 provide further discussion of and counterexamples to struc-
tural equivalence.
2.3.1.3 Categorical equivalence
Critics of structural equivalence claim that it is too permissive, in the sense that it is
“too easy” to establish such isomorphic relations among classes of models that intuitively
belong to different theories. A more recent shot at defining equivalence attempts to remedy
this by loading additional “global” structure (i.e. relations among the different models of
the same theory) to the class of models, and requiring that this global structure also be
preserved. This is the notion of categorical equivalence, which was popularized by Halvorson
in recent years and has already gained quite a bit of traction. The definition sounds simple
enough:
Theories T1 and T2 are categorically equivalent if there is an equivalence between the
category of models of T1 and the category of models of T2 that preserves the empirical
content of the theories. (Barrett 2017, 8)
5Barrett and Halvorson 2016b point out that definitional equivalence only allows predicates to be trans-
lated into each other and therefore fails to obtain when the two signatures Σ1 and Σ2 use different sorts
(e.g. Euclidean geometry couched in terms of points vs. lines). They propose a generalization of definitional
equivalence called Morita equivalence which allows for sorts to be translated into each other as well.
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But there is actually quite a bit of technicality here. “Equivalence” here refers to a technical
notion in category theory. As such, a full understanding of the significance of the above
definition requires knowledge of category theory, which I shall not venture into here. But
roughly speaking, a category is a structured class of objects which, unlike a simple class,
has “arrows” defined between the objects. The arrows indicate some notion of identity or
interchangeability among the objects and therefore give the class additional structure. An
equivalence is a functor between two categories that is full, faithful, and essentially surjective
(see ibid for definitions of these terms).
The main point to take away is that categorical equivalence is less permissive than struc-
tural equivalence because the equivalence functor must preserve the global structures (the
arrows) that define relationships among the different models as well as establishing an isomor-
phic bijection between the models (also cf. Curiel 2014, 294 for remarks on the importance
of global structure).6 Note that categorical equivalence has claims to both syntactic and
semantic traditions (Nguyen 2017, 985). See also Halvorson 2016, Barrett and Halvorson
2016b, Weatherall 2016a; 2016b for further discussion.
2.3.2 Problems with traditional accounts of equivalence
As we have seen, there are three major definitions of theoretical equivalence (one syn-
tactic, one semantic, and one hybrid) currently in circulation among philosophers of science.
Each definition has been criticized for being either too permissive or too strict or both. I
shall not delve into these counterexamples here. Instead I would like to point out a few
general problems with the definitions presented above.7
6One could define an even stricter criterion than categorical equivalence by requiring that the two cat-
egories of models be isomorphic rather than merely equivalent. However, Weatherall (2016a, 1081) argues
that such a criterion is too strict, for it judges the Faraday tensor formulation of electromagnetism to be
inequivalent to the vector potential formulation, which Weatherall seems to consider as a test case for any
criterion of equivalence.
7There is another general objection to these defintions that I will not go into: these notions of equivalence
are purely formal and thus ignore the fact that a formal system is not a theory until it is interpreted in some
way. Thus, the above notions of equivalence rule out the possibility that the same formal system may be
interpreted in a multitude of ways and be equivalent to another formal system under some but not all of
those interpretations. This objection has recently been raised against formal definition of equivalence in
general (see Coffey 2014; Nguyen 2017).
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2.3.2.1 Lack of distinction between essential and inessential content
First of all, as I mentioned at the beginning of the chapter, a reasonable criterion of
equivalence should allow for the possibility that theories contain superfluous baggage that
plays no role in their success, aka idle posits. Under such circumstances it would seem
unnecessary to require that the two theories say all of the same things, seeing as much of
what they say is mere embellishment or scaffolding. Yet this is precisely what all of the
mainstream definitions of equivalence seem to require.
The lack of attention to idle posits in the mainstream criteria is not simply an oversight.
In fact, McSweeney (2017) argues that any criterion of equivalence must require that the two
theories’ contents match in their entirety. Allow me to produce a lucidly synoptic paragraph
to represent McSweeney’s argument:
[I]f we don’t know that T and T ′ are fundamentally equivalent, it must be that we don’t
know exactly what their fundamental commitments are. And if this is the case, we can’t
be justified in removing structure from T and T ′ in order to evaluate them for equivalence,
since we don’t know which bits of them are metaphysically committing and which are not.
Nor can we be justified in restating them in different terms, for doing so would require
us to know what that restatement needed to preserve and what it did not. What we are
justified in doing is checking to see whether we can extend them into a single theory that
doesn’t remove anything from either one. (McSweeney 2017, 275)
Thus, McSweeney argues that any account of “core equivalence” that allows for non-essential
content variation must be a cheat. But the argument crucially hinges on the conditional at
the beginning of this paragraph, and this conditional strikes me as puzzling. Consider the
following two abilities:
a) the ability to delineate the “metaphysically committing” (i.e. working) parts of a theory
from its superfluous (i.e. idle) parts;
b) the ability to evaluate the equivalence of the theory with any other theory that is also
stripped of its unnecessary content.
McSweeney’s argument seems to hold a tacit premise that (a) automatically entails (b).
But what is the justification for this premise? Perhaps there is an assumption that the
unnecessary parts can be peeled off and the gem of the theory displayed only in one particular
language, and therefore that all polished theories are in the same language, and thus that
if they are equivalent, they will be manifestly and trivially so. This assumption seems
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unsupported, however. As we have seen, it is possible to distinguish the theory’s prescriptive-
dynamical content from its descriptive-ontological embellishments or scaffolding, for instance,
without automatically settling the question of equivalence.8 For instance, it is possible to
hold all of the following propositions as true without contradiction:
• The essential content of Newtonian mechanics is assigning states of the form (x, ẋ) and
encoding the transition rules in a vectorial quantity proportional to acceleration.
• The essential content of Lagrangian mechanics is assigning states of the form (x, ẋ) and
encoding the transition rules in a scalar quantity typically but not always equal to T−U ,
where T is kinetic energy and U potential energy.
• It is not clear whether Newtonian mechanics and Lagrangian mechanics are equivalent
(until one examines when and whether forces can be converted to Lagrangians and vice
versa).
In other words, just because we have isolated the working posits of the theories as their state
assignment and compactification rules does not mean that we know the two compactification
rules to be equivalent. In other cases the state assignments themselves may not be manifestly
equivalent. The Schrödinger and Heisenberg formulations of quantum mechanics provide a
well-known example of two state-spaces that were secretly equivalent. This secret would
certainly not reveal itself automatically upon the declaration that the the “metaphysically
committing” parts of both theories are their state-space structures and nothing more. And
as we shall see in a moment, many have doubted whether the Lagrangian states of (x, ẋ)
are equivalent to the Hamiltonian (x, p). Once again, this doubt is fully consistent with the
idea that the essential core of both theories is their state-space structure, which many in this
debate seem to tacitly assume. In short, one can isolate the working posits of two theories
without thereby having settled the question of their equivalence automatically.9
8McSweeney’s argument has resonances with another familiar objection to the idea of working posits
raised by Stanford (2003) in response to Kitcher’s original introduction of the concept. The objection is
that one can never differentiate the working posits from the idle ones except in retrospect, i.e. after one has
already established what was right and what was wrong about the theory. As I shall argue in Chapter 3,
this is also remedied in the prescriptive-dynamical account for the same reason as above.
9A weaker, more plausible version of McSweeney’s claim would be that one cannot expect to commit to an
essential / non-essential distinction in theoretical content without thereby having made some commitments
about what theoretical equivalence amounts to. This is of course the thought with which we began the
chapter, and which brings me to my last objection to traditional notions of equivalence.
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2.3.2.2 Lack of applicability to physical theories in practice
The next general problem with the mainstream definitions of equivalence is that these
definitions are couched in frameworks that have questionable application to the practice of
science. Hardly any major physical theory has been convincingly formulated in terms of a
first-order language with predicate logic, model theory, or category theory, which creates
a serious disconnect between philosophy of science and the science it is meant to be a
philosophy of. This problem is in fact occasionally recognized in passing by the very authors
who continue to use such frameworks (see Barrett 2017, 7; Weatherall 2016a, 1080), only to
be dismissed in the hopes that the conclusions remain general nonetheless.
It is not surprising that these accounts of equivalence have found little success in being
applied to the practiced theories of physics. After all, the above-mentioned accounts of
equivalence, whether syntactic or semantic or hybrid, all operate under the assumption that
the theory is a fixed set. This requires, among other things, that two theories must share
all of the same models, i.e. say the same things about every natural system that they apply
to, in order to be equivalent. Basically, all mainstream definitions of theoretical equivalence
are versions of compact equivalence, which as argued above is irrelevant to the practice of
physics.
Once one realizes that the transition rules are in practice open-ended, any notion of
a bijection between two theories that share all of their consequences / models becomes
irrelevant. There cannot be a guarantee that all of the future models of the two theories
will overlap, because one cannot predict future LEMPs due to inexhaustibility. Theories
can only be (in)equivalent with regard to their fixed parts, which is the state assignments.
As such, any criterion of equivalence that requires a one-to-one match-up or translation
of theorems or models of the two theories is going to be inapplicable to physical theories
(though perhaps useful for mathematical theories). As a result, the descriptivist must either
find artificial reasons for restricting herself to a subset of the two theories’ models which
does fully overlap, or else admit that she cannot make sense of the ubiquitous claims of
equivalence by physicists.
Since the issue of restrictions on LEMPs is clearly demonstrated in discussions of equiv-
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alence in classical mechanics, I will suffice it to the above for now. Let us see how all of this
plays out in the context of the recent debates on classical mechanics.
2.4 A Critical Review of Recent Debates on Theoretical Equivalence in
Classical Mechanics
2.4.1 Applications of traditional accounts of equivalence to classical mechanics
The recent resurgence of interest in theoretical equivalence was sparked by a paper by
North (2009). North seems to be implicitly working with structural equivalence as the
criterion of theoretical equivalence (cf. Barrett 2017, 3). She begins by suggesting that
physics tells us about the structure of the world, and goes on to ask how this structure
is to be identified given a physical theory, especially when there are genuinely different
formulations of the theory, such as one finds in the Heisenberg vs. Schrödinger formulations of
quantum theory or in Lagrangian and Hamiltonian mechanics. After several examples, North
concludes that structure in general must be modeled after geometric structure, which she
defines as whatever is invariant under coordinate transformations (ibid, p. 61-2). A vector
as a mathematical object is invariant under coordinate transformations but its components
are not. Therefore, the vector is part of the “structure” whereas its components are not.
Thus, according to North, one finds the structure of the world as described by the theory
by transforming coordinate- and frame-dependent descriptions of the theory into each other
and identifying the invariant objects. (As a result, North adds yet another definition to the
menu of definitions of “structure”, ostensibly different from the “mathematical equations”
view, Ramsification, relations, and relations of relations. See Chapter 3 for a menu of such
definitions.)
The gist of North’s argument is that Hamiltonian and Lagrangian theories have different
state-space structures, because the former is a symplectic manifold or a cotangent bundle
with just a volume element, while the latter is a tangent bundle which comes with a metric.
Transformations from one set of Lagrangian coordinates to another ... preserve [the Rie-
mannian line element] in the form of a quadratic differential form of the q̇’s. This allows us
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to say that the structure of the Lagrangian statespace is that of a Riemannian manifold,
with a Riemannian metric defined on it.
The statespace of Hamiltonian mechanics – phase space, the cotangent bundle – is differ-
ent. Phase space has symplectic structure; it does not have metric structure. Symplectic
structure comes with, or determines, a volume element, but not a distance measure. (ibid,
p. 73)
North appeals to a sort of “structural Ockham’s razor” to conclude that Hamiltonian me-
chanics should be preferred, but that particular conclusion does not concern us here as our
focus is the question of equivalence itself.
Curiel (2014), seemingly working with a criterion along the lines of categorical equiva-
lence, disagrees with North on the mathematical details and on which of the two theories
must be preferred, but the two authors agree on the inequivalence of the two theories. In
fact, Curiel draws a conclusion far stronger than North’s regarding this lack of equivalence.
The gist of Curiel’s argument is that classical states are characterized by two quantities: a
configurative one such as q and a velocital one such as q̇. While one cannot through mere
measurement find which measurable quantities are configurative and which ones are veloc-
ital, Curiel’s argument goes, we know through experience that the configurative quantities
have a “fixed” equation of motion, such as ẋ = v, which is to say that their equation of
motion does not depend on the system or the type of interactions it is involved in. Velocital
quantities, on the other hand, have an “unfixed” equation of motion such as v̇ = F
m
, which
varies from system to system. It is this difference in the fixity of the equations of motion that
distinguishes configurative variables from velocital ones. Now, the crux of Curiel’s argument
is that ẋ = v is an unchangeable kinematical constraint in Lagrangian mechanics, whereas
the same formula is not even required by Hamiltonian mechanics and can be violated in many
examples. Therefore, Curiel goes on to conclude, Lagrangian mechanics describes classical
systems whereas the Hamiltonian theory does not.
One way to see this is that one has no way [in Hamiltonian mechanics] to formulate the
kinematical constraints appropriate to Lagrangian mechanics [e.g. ẋ = v] for one has no
almost-tangent structure, but those kinematical constraints are the natural ones for abstract
classical systems.
In sum, then, the family of dynamical evolutions Hamiltonian mechanics admits for systems
it represents is not isomorphic to the family of kinematical vector fields of an abstract
classical system [which is isomorphic to the Lagrangian structure]. (ibid, p. 298)
49
Of course if one were to stipulate that p = mv, Hamilton’s first equation would entail ẋ = v.
But the problem is that there is no basis in the Hamiltonian structure for assuming that
p = mv.
What about Legendre transformation? Doesn’t it convert the Lagrangian and Hamilto-
nian models to each other? First of all, Legendre transformations only work on a subset of
all possible Lagrangians (and likewise the reverse Legendre transformations only apply to a
subset of possible Hamiltonians). Most natural systems can be assigned both a Lagrangian
and a Hamiltonian, although natural systems with nonconservative forces, which have no
Hamiltonian model, can sometimes be treated with inhomogeneous Lagrange equations. This
and the other facts mentioned above lead Curiel to the conclusion that the Legendre trans-
formations take Lagrangian models to Hamiltonian models that quantitatively agree with
them but that mean something else entirely :
Thus, even when Lagrangian and Hamiltonian mechanics provide individual models of the
same physical system, no structure in the individual model of the one is isomorphic to any
in the other in a way that has real, non-trivial physical significance... . The only way to
deny this conclusion is to claim that sameness of solutions to equations of motion by itself
– mere sameness in brute description of motion – ensures sameness of physical significance,
but that is nothing more than the most naive form of verificationism.10 (ibid, p. 314)
A flurry of inquiry ensued the exchange between North and Curiel. Here are the high-
lights. Swanson and Halvorson (2012) take issue with many technical aspects of North’s
analysis. As it turns out, comparing structures is harder than North had assumed: con-
trary to North’s analysis, Swanson and Halvorson point out that symplectic manifolds have
symplectic forms as well as orientations whereas metric spaces do not have orientation.
Therefore, they argue, there is no straightforward sense in which Hamiltonian mechanics has
“less structure” than Lagrangian mechanics. We will return to some other complications
pointed out by the authors below.
Barrett (2014) also takes issue with many of North’s assertions. Barrett argues, contrary
to North, that the Lagrangian state-space is not necessarily always endowed with a metric
structure, and that the Hamiltonian phase space often has a metric structure (especially
when the Lagrangian counterpart does). Barrett also echoes Swanson and Halvorson’s ob-
10Note Curiel’s talk of sameness of solutions to equations of motion, which is empirical equivalence, rather
than sameness of equations of motion, which is my notion of dynamical equivalence.
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jection that due to the existence of orientation on symplectic manifolds, such structures are
“incomparable” to tangent bundle structures. These are important technical disagreements,
but they do not change the verdict that the two theories are inequivalent because their
state-spaces are non-isomorphic.
In a more recent paper, Barrett (2017) argues that whether Lagrangian and Hamiltonian
mechanics are (categorically) equivalent depends on many factors. First of all, Barrett
limits his inquiry to hyperregular models of both theories (Barrett 2017, 10-13). These are
essentially models that are amenable to Legendre transformation (Abraham and Marsden
1987, 218 ff.). This restriction does not automatically settle the question of equivalence,
because as we saw part of the debate concerns the fact that even when a bijective Legendre
transform is available, this transformation is not structure-preserving (Curiel 2014, 308 ff.).
Nevertheless, the restriction to Legendre-amenable models is a substantial assumption as far
as equivalence goes. Consider for example the fact that much of Curiel’s arguments regarding
the inequivalence of the two theories hinges on the fact that not all models have well-defined
Legendre transforms: “the Legendre transform does not always map all Lagrangian vector
fields to Hamiltonian ones” (ibid, 309) and “not all Hamiltonian vector fields map to second-
order [i.e. Lagrangian] vector fields under the inverse-Legendre transform.” (ibid, 310)
Given the dialectical stakes, it is somewhat puzzling that Barrett gives no justification for
the restriction to hyperregular models.
In any case, even the restriction to hyperregular models is not enough to do the trick.
Having argued for categorical equivalence as the superior criterion of equivalence, Barrett
shows that if one defines Hamiltonian mechanics on a symplectic manifold, then it is not
categorically equivalent to Lagrangian mechanics, but if one defines it on a cotangent bundle,
then it is so (Barrett 2017, 14 ff.). To sum up, Barrett shows that hyperregular Hamiltonian
mechanics defined on a cotangent bundle is equivalent to Lagrangian mechanics. Otherwise
the two theories are inequivalent.
Teh and Tsementzis (2017) reach a similar conclusion using definitional equivalence as
their criterion. Having restricted the case to hyperregular models only, Teh and Tsementzis
proceed to show that Lagrangian theory as formulated on a tangent bundle TQ of the con-
figuration space and Hamiltonian theory as formulated on a cotangent bundle T ∗Q, are
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definitionally equivalent if we “lift” both theories to the cotangent bundle of the tangent and
cotangent bundles (T ∗TQ and T ∗T ∗Q). Following a clever method devised by Tulczyjew
(1974, 1977), the authors then show that the tangent bundle of the tangent and cotangent
bundles TT ∗Q can serve as the “third language” in which to build the common definitional
extension of the two “lifted” theories. Thus, Teh and Tsementzis reach the same verdict as
Barrett albeit using definitional equivalence rather than categorical equivalence: if Hamilto-
nian mechanics were hyperregular and formulated on a cotangent bundle (as opposed to a
symplectic manifold), then it is equivalent to Lagrangian mechanics.
2.4.2 Problems with recent debates on theoretical equivalence
There are two main problems with this debate, both having to do with the two-tier
character of theories that has been my main focus: 1) some parts of the debate violate the
fixity of state assignment rules, and 2) other parts of the debate violate the open-endedness
of transition rules. Let us examine these problems in turn.
2.4.2.1 The problem of open-ended state assignments: A Tale of Two Hamil-
tonians
If what I have been arguing is correct, then physical theories have fixed state assignments
and open-ended transition rules. My emphasis has been mostly on the latter fact, as it is
typically the neglected one; but the former fact is of course of equal importance. Indeed,
some of the deepest problems with the debate on theoretical equivalence in classical physics
can be traced back to a violation of the requirement that a theory’s state assignments be
fixed before the transition rules are read off. Allow me to explain.
From a traditional, descriptive-ontological point of view, it appears as though one can
formulate a theory without any direct assignment of the dynamical states to experimental
procedures. To be sure, the theory must connect to experience at some point for it to
have empirical import, but traditionally this connection need not be at the level of state
assignments: it can be much further down the chain of inference. This stems from the fact
that in traditional accounts, “the theory”, which is a fixed set of sentences or models, comes
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equipped with a state-space as well as a list of specific transition rules (e.g. Hamiltonians)
that are somehow handed down to us in a pre-ordained manner, as if in a physics exercise.
One then puts the states and the transition rules together to infer a trajectory in state-
space, which can then be projected on the configuration space, giving x(t), say, as the final






Once the trajectory is given as a mathematical function, all one needs is some set of “corre-
spondence rules”11 (as well as auxiliaries, as the case may be) to tell us how to measure the






Descriptivist accounts therefore take this final product, i.e. the physical trajectory, to be the
only necessary point of contact between theory and experience. In other words, in traditional
accounts, the theory need not connect to measurement until after the transition rules are
plugged in and a trajectory is inferred.
The situation is fundamentally different in the prescriptive-dynamical view: the “corre-
spondence rules” must be provided for all components of the state assignment before tran-
sition rules can be recorded to begin with. In other words, the theory’s state assignments
must have a fixed and unambiguous connection to experimental procedures, independently
of what the local transition rules may turn out to be. This is of course due to the fact that
11I use “correspondence rules” very loosely in the sense of whatever unspecified (and likely complex)
information is needed to relate theoretical quantities to measurement results. My arguments do not depend
on the specifics of how these rules work, and in particular whether correspondence rules establish direct or
indirect links with observation and whether theoretical terms should be considered “meaningless” prior to
the application of the correspondence rules. For discussion see Hempel (1958; 1966), Carnap (1953; 1966),
Nagel (1961), Hesse (1965), Schaffner (1969), Halvorson (2016)).
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transition rules are “reverse engineered”, by first assigning the prescribed states and then
following them along as they evolve. This means that the theory must connect to experi-
ment at the level of state assignment rules, long before any prediction is made. One must
be able to prepare or detect the system in some of the proposed states or else there will be












The next steps are the same as in traditional accounts.
I shall refer to the statement that the theory connects to experience at the level of state
assignments as Early Point of Contact (EPOC):
EPOC: The state assignments of the theory must be experimentally fixed prior to the
construction of LEMPs.
EPOC is necessary for a theory to be productive. By “productive” I mean that the theory
allows the scientist to generate original LEMPs through direct engagement with the system
upon the discovery of a new system or local context of interaction for which no LEMP has
been recorded yet.
Productivity: A theory is productive iff it enables the scientist to produce potentially novel
transition rules for new systems and contexts.
In order for this to happen, it is not enough that the scientist treat the set of transition
rules as open-ended; it is also necessary (and sufficient) that knowledge of transition rules
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not be required for connecting the state assignments to experimental procedures, i.e. that
the theory satisfy EPOC.
Bohr’s atomic theory provides a great illustration of a productive theory. The state
assignments of this theory are given by the Bohr-Sommerfeld quantization condition, while
the transition amplitudes are encoded in the Correspondence Principle (see Kaveh 2014).
Experimentally, the state assignment rules can be inferred from the spacing between different
spectral lines, whereas the transition amplitudes must be read off the brightness of the
lines. Consequently, Bohr was able to devise experimentally unambiguous state assignment
rules that can be applied independently of the transition rules. This is important, because
without the assignment of Bohr’s stationary states, there is no link between the intensities
of spectral lines and any notion of transition amplitude. The connection is only established
after one has decided on a way to assign initial and final orbit labels to each spectral line,
which requires state assignments. Bohr’s theory therefore allows one to reverse engineer an
appropriate correspondence principle to encode the amplitudes, just as a proper productive
theory should.
By contrast, if a theory violates EPOC, and hence requires both a state-space and a
LEMP to be provided before it can connect to experience, then the theory is infertile: there
is no way to read off the local transition rules for a new system or context of interaction,
because by assumption the state assignment rules of the theory depend on what the tran-
sition rules are. This means that the theory must borrow both its state assignment rules
and its transition rules from somewhere else. Such theories must therefore purloin their
state assignments and LEMPs from productive theories if they are to have any empirical
applications. I shall refer to such theories as unproductive theories.
An unproductive theory would have no application without another theory to piggy-back
on, for one would not know how to begin applying the theory. We cannot have transition
rules unless we have states, and if the states are open-ended, there is nothing to guide what
one should keep track of. But if one could find another theory with fixed state assignments
to piggy-back on, one could have a “theory” of some kind by constructing a “translation
manual” between the two formalisms that fixes both state assignments and transition rules.
The most prominent example of an unproductive theory with open-ended state assign-
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ments is Hamiltonian mechanics when it is considered as parasitic on Lagrangian mechanics.
Textbooks of physics often treat Hamiltonian mechanics this way by presenting it as always
being the result of a Legendre transformation – a mathematical technique that connects the
Lagrangian formalism to that of Hamiltonian mechanics. One begins with a Lagrangian L
and assigns pi =
∂L
∂q̇i
and H = Σipiq̇i − L. The momentum p often turns out to be mv or a
similar expression that is linear in generalized coordinates (something like pi = Σλ
j
i q̇j). But
there is no guarantee. The momentum p need not be linear in velocities and might turn
out to be any number of things depending on what L looks like. Nevertheless, the resulting
Hamiltonian model with (x, p) as the states and H as the encoder of the missing ingredient
for transition rules will always yield the same equations of motion as the Lagrangian with
(x, ẋ) as states and L as the missing ingredient for transition rules. Hamiltonian mechan-
ics as presented in these textbooks is therefore parasitic on Lagrangian mechanics, because
without knowing L, one would not know what to assign p to. Every time we stumble upon
a new natural system or a new context of interaction (say, electromagnetic fields), we need
to consult Lagrangian mechanics first to know what the state assignments and LEMPs of
Hamiltonian mechanics are going to be. This theory does not come with a manual of what
types of states to assign under what types of circumstances. Lagrangian mechanics tells it
what to do.
Now, to be clear, there is nothing special about Hamiltonian mechanics that forces it to
be a parasitic theory: both theories can be autonomous if they fix their state assignments
independently. And to emphasize, they must fix their state assignments experimentally :
Lagrangian mechanics must tell us what experimental procedures measure x and ẋ, and
Hamiltonian mechanics must do the same for x and p. The question of how precisely this is
done in the case of a productive theory and how precisely it fails in the case of an unproductive
one can get rather intricate. I have provided more technical details regarding experimental
state assignments as well as an example of a system for which the Hamiltonian model is
unproductively obtained in Appendix A below.
To sum up, there are at least two things that might be called “Hamiltonian mechanics”:
i) an autonomous and hence productive theory with fixed state assignments but narrower
application;
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ii) a parasitic and hence unproductive theory with open-ended state assignments but wider
application.
A scientist working with the autonomous theory begins by assigning states of the form (q, p)
to the system, where q and p are attached to known experimental procedures that determine
their value, and proceeds to extract transition rules from the data and compactify them
in the quantity H. A scientist applying the parasitic Hamiltonian formalism, on the other
hand, begins with assigning Lagrangian states of (x, ẋ), goes on to record the local empirical
transition rules, encodes them in a Lagrangian, and then proceeds to assign p = ∂L
∂q̇
and
compute the Hamiltonian through a Legendre transformation. In the autonomous theory,
the momentum p must be assigned to a fixed measurable quantity for all systems and context
to which the states apply. As a parasite to Lagrangian mechanics, however, p is assigned
to something different every time, and is therefore undetermined until one is given the
transition rules as encoded in a Lagrangian. The autonomous Hamiltonian satisfies EPOC;
the parasitic Hamiltonian does not. The former is productive, the latter unproductive.
Now, what do our authors mean by “Hamiltonian mechanics”? As I will now argue, the
authors in this debate have been working with a “Hamiltonian theory” that is presumably an
autonomous theory, but one that also has open-ended state assignments. As I have argued,
an autonomous physical theory cannot have open-ended state assignments. Thus, if I am
right, all of the foregoing debates regarding theoretical equivalence in classical mechanics
should be considered irrelevant to empirical science. Let me justify this accusation.
Take Curiel for instance. What Curiel refers to as “Hamiltonian mechanics” seems to
be an autonomous theory. For example, he defines x and p entirely abstractly, without
connection to any physical quantity (Curiel 2014, 296 ff.). He argues that Hamiltonian
systems can violate ẋ = v (ibid, 298), and makes use of “funny” examples that have no
physical relevance (ibid, 305-6). He also claims that p = mv is an “ad hoc” condition in
Hamiltonian mechanics, whereas for a parasitic Hamiltonian system that piggy-backs on
Lagrangians, the relation p = mv is merely the result of the Legendre transformation of
the usual kinetic term. In line with this, Curiel argues that Hamiltonian models that apply
to classical systems are “a small class” of all Hamiltonians (Curiel 2014, 304). These facts
indicate that the Hamiltonian theory Curiel has in mind is not the one that is obtained by
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applying a Legendre transformation to a Lagrangian, but one that starts with its own axioms
and geometrical structure, and allows Hamiltonians that have no Lagrangian representation.
The second fact, namely that what Curiel has in mind by “Hamiltonian mechanics” has
open-ended state assignment rules, can be inferred from the following observations. Curiel
claims that “one ... loses the capacity to identify configuration space in the Hamiltonian
formulation” (Curiel 2014, 298). This means that the Hamiltonian q is not necessarily
position. But neither is it assigned to any fixed quantity other than position, for Curiel
argues that one can “mix up” or even “swap” q and p at will. Moreover, we are told that
one must “impose” relations of the form pi = Σλ
j
i q̇j “by hand”, which implies that without
this intervention, p is not assigned to any experimental procedure: if both p and q were
independently measurable, then relations of the form p = f(q̇) would be empirical facts,
not conditions imposed “by hand”. Finally, Curiel does not shy away from examples that
involve unphysical momenta (ibid, 314). These facts indicate that in Curiel’s “Hamiltonian
theory”, q and p are not assigned to any fixed experimental procedure.
Therefore, what Curiel has in mind by “Hamiltonian mechanics” is a theory that is a)
autonomous of Lagrangian mechanics, and b) has no fixed state assignment rules. This is
not a legitimate empirical theory and as such, Curiel’s analysis is fundamentally comparing
apples to oranges.
The situation is no better with the other authors. First of all, as we saw, both Barrett
and Teh and Tsementzis work with a Hamiltonian theory that is restricted to its hyper-
regular models. The fact that one needs to restrict this theory before it can be equivalent
to Lagrangian mechanics clearly implies that this “Hamiltonian theory” is not parasitic on
Lagrangian mechanics but rather an autonomous theory. Secondly, hyperregular models are
those that are amenable to Legendre transformations. If the authors intend to include all
hyperregular models, then as we saw above, this includes perfectly physical Lagrangians
whose Legendre transform results in odd momentum assignments that do not correspond
to the quantity transferred in collision. Therefore, even though this theory is meant to be
autonomous, it has no experimentally fixed state assignment rules, which once again means
we are dealing with a non-physical theory.
So, the entire debate regarding the equivalence of Lagrangian and Hamiltonian mechanics
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rests on equivocation on what “Hamiltonian mechanics” refers to.
2.4.2.2 The problem of restricted transition rules
As we saw, those authors who argue that Lagrangian and Hamiltonian mechanics are
descriptively equivalent reach this conclusion by restricting our attention to a subset of each
theory’s models, typically that of the hyperregular models on a cotangent bundle. Why this
restriction? First of all, note that one could not justify such a restriction by pointing out
that physicists typically work with models that are amenable to Legendre transformation
(which is the property that picks out hyperregular models). The question of interest to us is
whether the two theories are equivalent, and this question is independent of which models the
physicist chooses to focus on. “Hyperregular Lagrangian” and “hyperregular Hamiltonian”
do not designate theories of their own. Besides, what about those times when physicists do
use models of Lagrangian mechanics that are not hyperregular? Whatever else one might
say about this, it is clear that physicists are not switching to a different theory in doing so.
Therefore, there is nothing natural or physical about the restriction to hyperregular models.
As I argued above, such arbitrary restrictions are to be expected if one is trying to make
sense of physicists’ unanimous and unrelenting insistence on the equivalence of Lagrangian
and Hamiltonian theories in a descriptivist framework. This is because the two theories
have non-overlapping models, whereas definitional equivalence, structural equivalence, and
categorical equivalence all require fully overlapping models. Consequently, the physicist must
be judged flatly wrong, if not idiotic, for making such careless pronouncements unless one
finds a way to restrict one’s attention to the overlapping subset of models only.
Now, the problem is that restrictions to a subset of models amounts to restrictions on
permissible LEMPs : the restrictions to hyperregular models and to cotangent bundles are
both restrictions on the types of Lagrangian / Hamiltonian that one is willing to allow.
This is problematic given the open-endedness of LEMPs. As I argued in Chapter 1, it is
important for physical theories to satisfy ABUNDANCE, i.e. not to put a priori restrictions
on the types of transition rules that are allowed. If theoretical equivalence can only be
shown by fixing the LEMPs, then equivalence of physical theories can never be shown, for
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mathematical theories cease to be physical theories as soon as they are fixed.
Restricting the LEMPs serves as a sneaky way of ruling out those pesky non-overlapping
models that make trouble for equivalence claims. But that is not all. Restrictions on
LEMPs cause even deeper distortions in the project pursued by the authors above and
threaten to undermine traditional notions of equivalence as well as structuralist approaches
more generally. This is because the structure of state-space itself depends on the choice of
LEMP. As soon as one specifies a Lagrangian or Hamiltonian function on the manifold, the
“structure” of the state-space is altered. In fact, this has been recognized in the literature,
although its catastrophic consequences for the above inquiries have not been acknowledged
due to the assumption that theories are fixed. Swanson and Halvorson discuss the dependence
of state-space structure on the choice of LEMPs as a criticism of North’s argument:
Part of the difficulty in making broad structural comparisons the way North does, is that
neither Hamiltonian nor Lagrangian mechanics purports to be a complete description of
the world. A complete physical model is generated only once particular forces and dynam-
ical laws [i.e. LEMPs] are specified, along with how the statespace description of these
structures maps onto spacetime. By focusing her attention on the two theories abstractly,
and not on particular, fully detailed models, North’s analysis only captures the features of
a generic model, the structure that every model of Hamiltonian or Lagrangian mechanics
has in common. But most models have more structure, and much of this structure appears,
on a natural interpretation, to be physically important. (Swanson and Halvorson 2012, 9)
Barrett also mentions the effect of LEMPs on state-space structure in a similar fashion:
[North] demonstrates that Lagrangian mechanics has metric structure by considering both
the statespace T∗Q [a tangent bundle] and the Lagrangian L : T∗Q → R defined on that
state-space. The argument that Hamiltonian mechanics has symplectic structure, however,
only relies on the Hamiltonian state-space T ∗Q [a cotangent bundle]. It does not take into
account the Hamiltonian H : T ∗Q→ R defined on the state-space.
When this asymmetry is remedied, one can see that insofar as the Lagrangian state-space
is equipped with the [metric] structure gq, the Hamiltonian state-space is equipped with
the [metric] structure g∗q . (Barrett 2014, 811)
Indeed, as Teh and Tsementzis point out, even the meaning of “isomorphism” itself depends
on the choice of Lagrangian (Teh and Tsementzis 2017, 46-47)
Now, as mentioned above, these authors do not consider the dependence of state-space
structure on transition rules to be a fatal issue for their inquiry, because the assumption in
the literature is that the transition rules are somehow given to us, handed down from the
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sky, as it were (see, e.g., how Barrett characterizes a “model” of Hamiltonian or Lagrangian
theory to include a specification of a Hamiltonian / Lagrangian, respectively (Barrett 2017,
10, 11)). Under such an assumption, there is no major crisis: all one needs to do is make
sure one has a full catalog of all the relevant LEMPs (Lagrangians and Hamiltonians) before
comparing structures. This sentiment is expressed by Swanson and Halvorson as follows:
The interpretive question which motivates the structuralist razor is not, “which of these
two theories posits less common structure between its models,” but rather “which of these
two theories posits less total structure on the world.” It doesn’t help to know that the
generic Hamiltonian dynamics only require statespace to be a symplectic manifold if addi-
tional structure must be posited on a model-by-model basis in order to illuminate how this
statespace description relates to structures in spacetime. (Swanson and Halvorson 2012, 9
– emphasis in the original)
But there is no such thing as “total structure” unless the LEMPs are fixed. Since altering
the LEMPs alters the structure of the theories, to know the total structure one must first
know the complete set of LEMPs. However, as I have been arguing all along, there is no such
thing as a complete set of LEMPs ! The LEMPs are open-ended. The open-endedness of
LEMPs implies that the state-space structure itself is open-ended. Consequently, structural
comparisons can never settle questions of equivalence: no fixed LEMP, no fixed structure;
no fixed structure, no descriptive equivalence. More generally, structuralism itself appears
to be chasing after a ghost.
On a more dialectical note, one can see where the source of disagreement in the literature
is: since LEMPs are open-ended, the (in)equivalence of theories cannot really be established
unless one does one of two things: allow all possible LEMPs, or allow a subset of “well-
behaved” LEMPs. North and Curiel do the former and conclude that the two theories are
inequivalent, while Barrett and Teh and Tsementzis do the latter and conclude the opposite.
As we saw in Chapter 1, both options regarding what LEMPs to allow are problematic
(see Ch. 1, Section 6, the Descriptivist’s Dilemma). LEMPs can be neither restricted nor
assumed to cover all possible transition rules; they must remain open-ended.
Let us wrap up this section by summarizing how things stand in the prescriptive-
dynamical view.
1- The autonomous Hamiltonian mechanics and Lagrangian mechanics are dynamically
equivalent. They generate the same equations of motion for any natural systems to which
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they both apply, but the Hamiltonian framework will fail to compactify many such EOMs
in certain cases that the Lagrangian theory treats just fine.
2- The autonomous Hamiltonian mechanics and Lagrangian mechanics are not compactly
equivalent, since there are Lagrangian systems that have no well-defined Hamiltonian coun-
terpart.
3- The parasitic Hamiltonian mechanics is “unproductively equivalent” to Lagrangian me-
chanics, meaning it encodes the same EOMs, but must derive its state assignments from a
productive Lagrangian theory.
In the final section below, I would like to present evidence that dynamical equivalence is
precisely what a practicing physicist means when they claim that Lagrangian and Hamilto-
nian mechanics are equivalent.
2.5 Dynamical Equivalence is the Practicing Physicist’s Notion of
“Equivalence”
I claim that dynamical equivalence as defined above is not only the notion of equivalence
that makes sense of scientific practice, but also one that the physicist all but explicitly
adheres to. One way to justify the latter claim is to survey physicists on what they mean
by theoretical equivalence. But that method is unlikely to produce satisfactory evidence
one way or another, as physicists’ responses to philosophical questions tend to be largely
half-baked, incoherent both within and between individuals, and couched in philosophically
sloppy terms. But this should not worry the philosopher, for physics is not done in words,
but in actions. More important than what physicists say in response to a survey question is
how they are trained from the ground up to interpret and manipulate symbols on a page, and
what significance they are taught to attach to these symbols. Whatever notion of equivalence
arises from this early training is likely to carry through the physicist’s career. And what
better place to look for the fundamental characteristics of this training than the widely used
textbooks of foundational physics? Since the recent debates on theoretical equivalence have
been focused on classical mechanics, in this section I will present textual evidence for the
claim above from some of the most prominent textbooks of classical mechanics.
Recall that dynamical equivalence comes down to the two theories generating the same
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equations of motion. I argued that this notion of equivalence is stronger than mere empirical
equivalence (agreement on trajectories) and yet allows for the idle parts of equivalent theories
to be in disagreement. I will now present textual evidence that this is exactly how physics
students are trained to understand equivalence.
Let us begin with Patrick Hamill’s A Student’s Guide to Lagrangians and Hamiltonians,
which provides one of the most lucid expositions of the idea. The section in which Newton’s
second law and Lagrange’s equations are introduced is called “Obtaining the equation of
motion”. Hamill quotes Landau and Lifshitz saying that once coordinates and velocities
are given, “the state of the system is completely determined and ... its subsequent motion
can, in principle, be calculated”, which matches my characterization of dynamical states and
their role in physical theories. Hamill then goes on to point out that assigning states of the
form (q, q̇) is equivalent to writing a second-order differential equation:
In other words, the equations of motion can be expressed as relation of the type:
q̈i = q̈i(q1, q2, ..., qn; q̇1, q̇2, ..., q̇n; t) (5)
(Hamill 2014, 18)
which once again matches my characterization of the essential content of classical mechanics.
Hamill then goes on to introduce Newtonian and Lagrangian systems as ways of obtaining
the EOM:
If the masses are constant, an elementary way way to obtain the equation of motion is to





Another way to obtain the equation of motion is to use the Lagrangian technique. (Hamill
2014, 19)
The same sentiment is expressed vividly in a footnote: “In general, the Lagrangian is defined
to be a function that generates the equation of motion.” (ibid) The same idea is also conveyed
upon the introduction of the Euler-Lagrange equations: “use it as a tool for obtaining the
equation of motion” (ibid, 20). And similarly when Poisson brackets are introduced:
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We have expressed the equations of motion for a mechanical system in a variety of ways,
including Newton’s second law, the Lagrange equations, and Hamilton’s equations. The
equations of motion can also be expressed in terms of the Poisson brackets, as we now
demonstrate. (Hamill 2014, 119)
In Volume 1 of their Course of Theoretical Physics Landau and Lifshitz agree:
Like Lagrange’s equations and the canonical [Hamiltonian] equations, the Hamilton-Jacobi
equation is the basis of a general method of integrating the equations of motion. (Landau
and Lifshitz 2000 [1960], 148)
One finds the same approach in Goldstein’s legendary textbook on classical mechanics:
[F]or systems where one can define a Lagrangian, ..., we have a very convenient way of
setting up the equations of motion. (Goldstein 1980 [1950], 25)
The idea being conveyed is that the value of these different formulations is purely instru-
mental and one should hold the equations of motion in mind as the ultimate end. This is
expressed more explicitly in some moments:
In view of the difficulties in formulating a variational principle for nonholonomic systems,
and the relative ease with which the equations of motion can be obtained directly [i.e. via
Newton’s method], it is natural to question the usefulness of the variational approach in this
case. It is for this reason that discussions of variational principles and their consequences
will be confined from here on to holonomic systems in which generalized coordinates are
independent. (Goldstein 1980 [1950], 49)
The different formulations are thus distinct for the physicist only insofar as they provide
different compactifications:
We have seen that the Lagrangian and Hamilton’s principle together form a compact in-
variant way of implying the mechanical equations of motion. (Goldstein 1980 [1950], 53)
That is why upon introduction of Hamiltonian mechanics, Goldstein declares that “nothing
new is added to the physics involved” (Goldstein 1980 [1950], 339) when one switches from
one formulation to another.
In his Classical Mechanics, Gregory similarly cashes out the equivalence of Lagrangian
and Hamiltonian mechanics in terms of equations of motion:
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Lagrange’s equations of motion can be derived from Hamilton’s principle, which can there-
fore be taken as the basic postulate of classical mechanics, instead of Newton’s laws. (Gre-
gory 2006, 367)
Also note how Gregory qualifies the above claim a few pages later:
[H]amilton’s principle ... can be regarded as the fundamental postulate of classical mechan-
ics, instead of Newton’s laws, for any mechanical system that has a Lagrangian. (Gregory
2006, 387 – emphasis added)
From a descriptivist point of view, Gregory’s is a contradictory statement: how can two
theories be “equivalent” but “only for such and such cases”? Equivalence tends to be a
matter of all or nothing for the descriptivist. However, as we have seen, the prescriptivist
vantage point makes perfect sense of this: the two theories are equivalent insofar as they
generate the same EOMs whenever both compactification rules are applicable, i.e. they agree
on the state assignments (dynamical equivalence), which allows for the possibility of models
that are not shared between the two theories.
The idea of dynamical equivalence is also expressed quite clearly in Morin’s Introduction
to Classical Mechanics :
Consider the system of a mass on the end of a spring. We can analyze this, of course, by
using F = ma to write down mẍ = −kx. ... We can, however, figure things out by using
another method which doesn’t explicitly use F = ma. In many (in fact, probably most)
physical situations, this new method is far superior to using F = ma.
For the problem at hand, [the Euler-Lagrange equation] gives mẍ = −kx which is exactly
the result obtained by using F = ma. An equation such as [the above] is called an equation
of motion. (Morin 2007, 218-219 – emphasis in the original)
And a few pages later, Morin declares:
At this point it seems to be personal preference, and all academic, whether you use the
Lagrangian method or the F = ma method. The two methods produce the same equations
[of motion]. However, in problems involving more than one variable, it usually turns out to
be much easier to write down T and V , as opposed to writing down all the forces. (Morin
2007, 221)
Taylor similarly cashes out the equivalence of Newtonian and Lagrangian theories in
terms of their capacity to generate equations of motion and their differences in terms of
compactification:
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The last three examples are sufficiently complex that solution using the Newtonian approach
requires considerable ingenuity; by contrast, the Lagrangian approach lets us write down
the equations of motion almost without thinking.
The Lagrangian formalism always (or nearly always) gives a straightforward means of writ-
ing down the equations of motion. (Taylor 2005, 254 – emphasis added)
And similarly for Hamiltonian mechanics:
[I]t is a wonderful property of Hamilton’s approach (like Lagrange’s) that it provides an
almost infallible way to find the equations of motion. (Taylor 2005, 528)
[W]e see that the Hamiltonian formalism provides an alternative route to the same final
equations of motion as we could find using either the Newtonian or Lagrangian approaches.
(Taylor 2005, 532)
To emphasize, as said above, agreement on EOMs is stronger than agreement on obser-
vations, and physicists are aware of this fact: note how Taylor characterizes the equations
of motion as clearly “one level above” observations:
If we are very lucky, the equations of motion may have an analytic solution, but, even when
they do not, they are the essential first step to understanding the solutions and they often
suggest a starting point for an approximate solution. (Taylor 2005, 254)
I rest my case that students of physics are trained to treat the different formulations of
classical mechanics not as mathematically distinct geometrical theories, but as “recipes” for
achieving one ultimate goal: deriving the equations of motion, and that the latter are the
“minimally theoretical” result that all dynamically equivalent theories converge on. In the
following, I will argue that construing classical theories as fixed geometrical structures has
been extremely misleading in recent debates on theoretical equivalence.
2.6 Conclusion
The two-tier character of physical theories (namely that they must have fixed state as-
signments and open-ended transition rules) has profound consequences for theoretical equiv-
alence. As far as experimentally contentful theories are concerned, no one-to-one correspon-
dence of models can be expected, for each model corresponds to an open-ended choice of
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LEMP. In discussions of classical mechanics, in particular, traditional accounts have gone
wrong both because they ignore the fixity of state assignments (and thus compare productive
and parasitic theories to each other) and because they ignore the open-endedness of tran-
sition rules (and thus require too much of equivalent theories in a way that is inconsistent
with the practitioner’s proclamations).
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3.0 Chapter 3: Essential Content in a Prescriptive-Dynamical Framework
3.1 Introduction
My arguments in the first two chapters relied quite centrally on the notion of “essential
content”. In this chapter I will delve more deeply into this notion, review the literature,
and flesh out the relationship between the essential content of a theory (in the prescriptivist
framework) and external reality in more detail.
In the following, Section 3.2 elaborates on the idea that state assignments are the essential
/ working parts of dynamical theories. First, I will use the case of Bohr’s atomic theory in
§3.2.1 to demonstrate my first two goals, namely that one has reason to believe that Bohr’s
theory has idle posits and that its state assignment rules are its essential content, regardless
of debates surrounding realism. §3.2.2 is then devoted to generalizing beyond case studies
my argument that state assignments are the generators of predictive success in dynamical
theories. Next, in Section 3.3, I will argue my third point by offering an account of how state
assignments are related to unobservable reality. This section is also divided into a specific
and a general section: first, in §3.3.1, I show specifically that Bohr’s states track the true
dynamical states of the system in a precisely defined sense, but they need not in any sense
represent or refer to anything in the system to be successful. Then in §3.3.2 I outline a
generalized account of tracking and its most important features, including its relationship
to predictive and referential success. Finally, in service of my fourth goal, Section 3.4 is
devoted to a survey of existing accounts of selective realism. I submit that the necessity
of referential transparency has been presumed (sometimes implicitly) by both proponents
(§3.4.1) and critics (§3.4.2) of selective confirmation, and that this has caused the former
group to struggle to produce a coherent account of essential content, and the latter to
overstate the reach of their criticisms.
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3.2 State Assignments Are the Essential Content
Not every component of a given empirical theory necessarily contributes to its empirical
success. It is possible that the theory contains superfluous baggage that comes along for the
ride but is not among the subset of posits that actually generate the predictive power of the
theory. This extra baggage might be embellishment or scaffolding, a heuristic or “visualiza-
tion” technique, put in place as a result of metaphysical prejudice, intellectual inertia, or
whatever other personal or societal influence. To believe that one can differentiate between
the “success-generators” of a theory and its superfluous baggage, and to have distinct epis-
temic attitudes towards each part, is to be a selectivist. The selectivist thus distinguishes
between the “working” or “essential” posits of a theory and the “idle” or “merely presup-
positional” ones, and recommends a favorable epistemic attitude only towards the former
group of posits. That is why selectivism is sometimes referred to as the divide et impera
move.1
Why be a selectivist? Selectivism is typically discussed as a savior of realism in the face
of historical challenges such as the pessimistic induction (Laudan 1981) and the problem
of unconceived alternatives (Stanford 2006). According to selectivists, the impressive novel
success of a mature scientific theory should not and could not warrant a realist attitude
towards all of the theory’s posits, but only towards the subset of posits that actually con-
tributed to bringing about the theory’s success. This would block historical challenges if
it could be shown that these same parts also feature in subsequent theorizing, for then the
realist’s success-to-truth inference would remain intact in the face of revolutionary theory
change. This approach has been championed in particular by Kitcher (1993) and Psillos
(1999), and subsequently many others (Leplin 1997; Niiniluoto 1999; Sankey 2001; Thagard
1To be clear, throughout this chapter as well as in the vast majority of the literature on selectivism,
“success” always refers to impressive novel predictions (see Vickers 2013, 195 for a discussion of “unimpressive
novel success”). Admittedly some authors (e.g. Chang 2003; Badino 2016) seem to work with other notions
such as explanatory success, but that is more of an exception that proves the rule. For one to say that the
prediction of a phenomenon P was a “novel” prediction by theory T, at the very least it would have to be
the case that T was constructed without taking into account any data relevant to P or data based on which
P could reasonably be expected. This might be either because the data had not been gathered yet (temporal
novelty), or if it was, because the data was not deliberately baked into the theory (use novelty). It has been
argued that novel predictive success is necessary for no-miracles-type arguments to go through (Saatsi 2009,
356, 360; cf. Vickers 2017a, 50 ff.). See Alai 2014 for a thorough discussion of the notion of novelty.
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2000; 2007). Moreover, structural realism (as proposed by Worrall 1989 and others) can also
be considered a form of selective realism.
However, although selectivism is almost always formulated as a defense of realism in
the face of historical challenges, my first goal in this chapter is to argue that selectivism is
independently motivated. In a way, my arguments in Ch. 1 already serve as independent
grounds for believing that physical theories are often embellished or scaffolded by descriptive
claims that are unnecessary for, if not detrimental to, the predictive success of the theory.
There I argued that predictive success stems from the prescriptive-dynamical content of the
theory. Since my arguments in Ch. 1 did not draw on realism or historical pessimism at
all, they provide reasons to be a selectivist regardless of realist concerns. In the following, I
will flesh this out both in general terms and through the specific example of Bohr’s atomic
model.
3.2.1 State assignments: the case of the Bohr model
3.2.1.1 Why Bohr’s state assignments do all the work
Bohr (1913) posited that an atom is analogous to a mini-solar system, the nucleus being
the “sun” and the electrons orbiting it being like “planets”, but with one important restric-
tion: of all the orbits that are classically permitted by Coulomb’s inverse square law, the





where E is the binding energy of the electron, K is the Rydberg constant, and n is an integer
known as the principal quantum number, which labels the discrete energy levels. Bohr further
posited that the electron does not emit radiation unless it “jumps” from one orbit to another,




(En − Em). (8)
Bohr was able to derive the emitted frequencies in the spectral lines of the hydrogen atom
from these posits, which is not all that impressive in itself given that he constructed his theory
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to account for the hydrogen spectrum. However, Bohr was also able to make impressive,
novel predictions about the spectral lines of once-ionized helium, twice-ionized lithium, and
other single-electron ions. These successes reportedly prompted Einstein to say “the theory
of Bohr must then be right” (see Pais 1991, 154)! Yet of course Bohr’s theory is certainly
not anywhere nearly right about the mini-solar system and the classical orbits.
How did Bohr’s theory achieve its success despite its radically mistaken world picture?
Vickers (2012; 2013) lists the Bohr model as a potentially devastating problem for the selec-
tivist. He remarks: “The crucial question for the [selective] realist is how it is possible for
Bohr’s theory to be so successful when we now know that it is so far off the mark (in the
light of modern quantum theory)” (Vickers 2012, 10). Now, Vickers goes on to concede that
a promising solution has already been proposed in the literature: Norton (2000) effectively
argues that the essential or working posit of Bohr’s model is the assumption of discrete
energy states; the classical orbits play a purely heuristic role. Norton writes:
The reduced form [of Bohr’s model] eschews all talk of elliptical orbits other than in the
domain of correspondence with classical theory... . No assumption is made or needed that
these stationary states are elliptical orbits of some definite size and frequency of localised
electrons. What is retained is that these states possess a definite energy. (Norton 2000,
86-87)
Norton’s is essentially the same as the solution I will be recommending2 (although Norton
does not approach the problem from a prescriptive-dynamical standpoint).
One can convince oneself that the stationary states are all that Bohr needed in order
to make his predictions regardless of realist anxieties. The experimental evidence to which
Bohr was answering was that of spectral lines, which are characterized by two quantities:
frequency (manifested in the relative separations of the lines and their colors) and intensity
(manifested in the brightness of the lines). In order to predict the frequencies, all Bohr
had to do was identify each spectral line as a transition and recommend a procedure for
tagging each line with two integers n and m corresponding to the initial and final states of
the transition. This procedure is encoded in Bohr’s energy quantization conditions. The
frequency is then given by the difference of energy between the two assigned states. In fact,
it was known before Bohr that one can construct a series of wavelengths known as the “term
2See also Ghins 2014.
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series” such that the wavelength of every spectral line can be obtained from the difference
of two terms in the series. Bohr’s innovation was to associate the terms with energy levels.
What about the intensities? They certainly could not be derived from state assignments
alone. And in fact Bohr’s theory does not provide any predictions about the intensities of
the spectral lines. The intensities depend on the transition amplitudes, i.e. the probabil-
ities associated with different transitions. The more likely a given transition is, the more
frequently it will occur, thus increasing the brightness of the corresponding spectral line.
As I’ve argued elsewhere (Kaveh 2014), the task of determining transition amplitudes and
hence the intensities was delegated to the infamous Correspondence Principle. However, the
Correspondence Principle was not a definite formula; it was an open-ended recipe for linking
transition amplitudes to the Fourier coefficients of the orbits, and its exact form was to be
determined experimentally. But as I have been arguing, this is precisely what one would
expect from a dynamical theory! As I argued in Chapter 1, a physical theory consists of fixed
prescriptions for state assignment and open-ended transition rules, with the latter being de-
termined locally and empirically. There has been much puzzlement about the open-ended
character of the Correspondence Principle, but if I’m right, that is simply how every physical
theory operates. Sommerfeld’s theory of the fine structure, proposed soon after, is another
clear example in which the state assignments are the source of the theory’s success (cf. Vick-
ers 2012). Sommerfeld’s theory had several “versions”, each with a different set of transition
rules, adapted to the experimental results obtained by Paschen around the same time (Kragh
1985, 71 ff.). Once again, in accordance with the prescriptive-dynamical account, we have a
theory with fixed state assignments which function as the essential content and open-ended
transition rules which are fitted to local empirical data under the presupposition of the state
assignments.
The idea of keeping Bohr’s state assignment rules and discarding the rest is not anachro-
nistic and, contrary to Stanford’s (2006) worries, was not “unintelligible” to scientists at the
time. In the early 1920s, the idea of dispensing with classical orbits was gaining popularity
among physicists including Bohr himself. Van Vleck discussed whether this “bold proposal”
would “invalidate” the successes of Bohr’s theory and concluded in the negative:
Such successful applications, however, need not be forfeited if only we assume that the
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Bohr frequency condition and standard quantum conditions [i.e. the state assignment rules]
retain their validity, even though the motions quantized by the latter are not in accord with
ordinary dynamics... .
These requirements are much less stringent than the restriction that the quantized orbits
shall conform closely to the classical mechanics, and are, in fact, so very general that they
do not determine at all definitely the form of the orbits. (Van Vleck 1926, 108-109)
To sum up, the empirical evidence was characterized by the two parameters of frequency
and intensity. The former can be predicted through Bohr’s state assignments, while the
latter is local and empirical and should not be fixed (predicted) by the theory in the first
place. Since there is no further empirical content, his state assignment rules exhaust “what
was right” in Bohr’s theory. The descriptive ontology of his theory (the entities, properties,
and structures), on the other hand, was wrong through and through.
3.2.1.2 Vickers’s objections
Vickers briefly raises two potential problems with the idea that Bohr’s state assignments
were his only essential posits. First of all, Vickers argues that Bohr’s theory would not get
off the ground if it were not for the way he sets his parameters by comparing them to the
classical case in the classical limit:
A possible objection to this story would be that Bohr still ... makes use of the assumption of
elliptical orbits for very large quantum numbers... . Some might be tempted to claim that
this is crucial to Bohr’s derivation, but not even approximately true according to modern
QM. (Vickers 2012, 10).
Vickers is right in that in his original presentation, Bohr postulated that in the limit of
n,m n−m, i.e. for orbits that have very large quantum numbers but are in the vicinity
of each other (which is how one must characterize a classical Larmor radiation in Bohr’s
system), one must have
ωnm ≈ τω (9)
That is to say, Bohr posited that in the classical limit, the frequency of radiation must be
an integer multiple of the mechanical frequency, as required by classical physics (Bohr 1913,
13; 1920, 429-430).
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However, this does not support Vickers’ objection for two reasons. First of all, contrary
to what Vickers says, Bohr’s postulate that radiation and orbital frequencies coincide in
the classical limit does not imply that there are elliptical orbits in the classical limit. The
assumption is explicitly only about frequencies, not orbits. Just as one can separate assump-
tions about the shape of the lower orbits from assumptions about their energy, so too one
can distinguish assumptions about the shape of higher orbits and their frequencies.
In any case, there is a second problem with Vickers’ first objection: as it turns out,
Bohr did not actually need the assumption about the classical limit, because as Van Vleck
later proved, equation 9 can be derived through the action-angle formalism, the quantization
condition, and a few other trivial assumptions (Van Vleck 1924, footnote 4). Thus, equation
9 is not part of the essential content of Bohr’s model because it is not a necessary premise
in Bohr’s argument.
The second objection Vickers considers is that in response to a point made by Fowler,
Bohr argued that the nucleus is not exactly stationary, but “wobbles” due to the influence
of the orbiting electron. Vickers argues that this is problematic for the selectivist because
it crucially hinges on the assumption of real electron orbits. I do not see how this is the
case, however. It seems that one could recover Bohr’s results about the “wobbling” of the
nucleus from the assumption that the electron has a non-trajectory-based presence around
the nucleus but one whose net statistical effect on the nucleus is similar to that of an orbiting
electron. Indeed, this is how the same effect is characterized in modern quantum mechanics.
More recently, Vickers (2018) has proposed a structural realist interpretation of the
essential content of Bohr (and Sommerfeld). Vickers argues that there is structural continuity
between the Bohr / Sommerfeld theories on the one hand and modern quantum mechanics










closely resembles the Hamilton-Jacobi equation and reduces to the latter in the limit ~→ 0.
Moreover, the Bohr-Sommerfeld quantization conditions∮
pdq = nh (11)
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differ from the modern semi-classical quantization conditions merely by a “Maslov term”
1
2
h on the right hand side, which as it turns out plays no role in determining the energy
states for systems of interest to Bohr and Sommerfeld (Vickers 2018, 15 ff.). Vickers thus
draws on a “structural similarity in the limit”3 account to explain the successes of Bohr and
Sommerfeld’s theories.
While I agree with the spirit of Vickers’s solution, I find the talk of “structural similarity”
to be unhelpful. As I will argue in §3.4.1.3, one of the main problems with structural
realism is the fact that the notion of “structure” is too malleable to be contentful. If all one
needs for structural continuity is that after sufficient symbolic manipulation two equations
look partially similar with one having “excess structure” over the other, then structural
continuity would appear too easily achievable. But more on this below. For now, let me
simply point out that there is a less esoteric and less ambiguous reading of the equations
above. The Schrödinger equation, the Hamilton-Jacobi equation, and the Bohr-Sommerfeld
quantization conditions are examples of differential and integral equations. As I have been
arguing throughout this dissertation, such equations are best interpreted as state assignment
rules. This is of course most obvious in the case of the quantization conditions, which
provide a prescription for assigning discrete states to a system. But any equation that
provides final conditions for given initial and boundary conditions can be read as assigning
dynamical states, and all differential equations function that way. Thus, I suggest that
Vickers’s “structural similarity” is better understood as one set of state assignments tracking
another within certain constraints and resolution limits. More on this in §3.3.1.
I have argued that the state assignments were the only posits in the Bohr model that
essentially generated its predictive success, i.e. its essential content. Note that my iden-
tification of essential content did not draw on any historical considerations, pessimistic or
otherwise, and did not rely on any comparison between Bohr’s model and subsequent the-
ories. Selectivism is thus a well-motivated thesis independently of the realist’s historical
anxieties.
I do not believe the Bohr case is special. In the next subsection, I will present general
arguments for the claim that state assignments are the success-generators of dynamical
3See Votsis 2011b, 4.
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theories.
3.2.2 State assignments: the general account
In this section, I will generalize my claim that state assignment rules are the essential
content of dynamical theories beyond the Bohr case.
First of all, Bohr’s focus on state assignments as the essential content was carried over
through Heisenberg’s work to modern quantum mechanics, so much so that modern quantum
mechanics may be considered the quintessential “ontology-less” dynamical theory. Healey
(2017) has extensively argued that non-relativistic quantum mechanics should not be taken
as describing the world, but rather as prescribing credences through its Hilbert states.4 How-
ever, the identification of state assignment rules as essential content goes beyond quantum
mechanical theories as well. I believe it can be generalized to all dynamical theories including
classical mechanics.
Consider how a typical prediction is made in Newtonian mechanics. As explained in
Chapter 1, it goes something like the following. One begins with a master formula such as
F = ma, adds a suitable local empirical mediating principle (LEMP) such as F = −kx, and
then puts the two together to obtain a differential equation such as ẍ = − k
m
x, called the
equation of motion. The equation of motion is an input-output machine that returns final
states of the form (xf , ẋf ) given initial states of the same form: (xi, ẋi). But actually, one
need not label the input “initial” and the output “final”. The equation of motion returns
values of (x(t), ẋ(t)) for all t given (x(t0), ẋ(t0)) for any t0. In the case where the mediating
principle is F = −kx, for example, letting x(t0) = x0 and ẋ(t0) = ẋ0 yields the following
functional dependency of x on t:

















One can use this equation straightforwardly to predict values of x for any given time t.
The exact same steps must be followed when making predictions in cosmology, particle
4Healey’s account therefore appears as a special case of the prescriptive-dynamical view, although Healey
works with a slightly different (more doxastic) notion of prescription.
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physics, solid state physics, thermodynamics, or any other modern physical theory (a table
of examples was provided in Ch. 1). The following summarizes these steps:
Steps to making predictions in modern physics:
1. Write down a master formula (e.g. F = ma).
2. Add a suitable mediating principle (e.g. F = −kx).
3. Obtain an equation of motion (e.g. ẍ = − k
m
x).
4. Plug in initial and boundary conditions (e.g. x(t0) = x0, ẋ(t0) = ẋ0).
















6. Plug in specific values of the independent variable (e.g. t) to make predictions about the
dependent variable (e.g. x(t)).
What is the essential content in such a derivation? What assumption(s) “fuel(s)” this
prediction and what is their essential content? The best way to answer this question is
to start at the bottom, i.e. at the step closest to observation, and move up the chain of
inference to see what is the minimum set of assumptions we would have to keep to preserve
the prediction.5 At the closest level to observation, there is the functional dependency (e.g.
x(t)). This is of course what fuels the predictions for the system to which it applies, but it
only applies to very specific systems that exemplify the specified initial conditions. It would
not make correct predictions for any other systems. As such, the functional dependency
is not a theory. In fact, if one were merely interested in a single system, the functional
dependency could be derived by fitting a trendline to the data; there would be no need for
a theory. The essential content must therefore be not the functional dependency itself, but
whatever fuels the derivation of it.
One level above, we have the equation of motion plus the initial conditions. This is what
entails the functional dependency, but it cannot be the essential content of the theory either,
because insofar as it is characterized by particular initial and boundary conditions, it is just
as specific as the functional dependency itself. Besides, even the equation of motion itself is
too specific. While it would be valid for a wide range of initial and boundary conditions, it
5This is in essence the method recommended by Cordero (2015, 11) for finding the essential content.
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can only be a model for systems that are characterized by a particular mediating principle
(e.g. F = −kx for harmonic oscillators). By contrast, what we are looking for is the essential
content of the general theory, not that of a specific model of a specific (type of) system.
Moving up one more level, we arrive at the conjunction of the master formula and
the mediating principle. Now, this conjunction has no more generality than the equation
of motion, seeing as the cause of specificity of the latter is the mediating principle itself.
However, moving to this level opens the door for generalizing: rather than having a single
mediating principle, one can take the essential content to be the conjunction of the master
formula on the one hand and a massive disjunction of mediating principles, each suitable for
a particular type of system, on the other. For each given system, one chooses the appropriate
disjunct, and things roll from there. It might seem that this is the end of the line; there is
no set of assumptions that can yield the same prediction but is weaker than the conjunction
of the master formula with the massive disjunction of mediating principles. Removing either
premise would render the inference invalid.
However, if my claims in Ch. 1 are true, this is not correct. There is no massive
disjunction that provides an exhaustive list of all physically relevant mediating principles.
Rather, the mediating principle is open-ended and must be “reverse engineered” from local
empirical data under the presupposition of the master formula. Therefore, in my account the
steps above should be revised as follows.
Steps to making predictions in modern physics (revised):
1. Write down a master formula (e.g. F = ma).
2. Fit the master formula to local empirical data to obtain a LEMP (e.g. F = −kx).
3. Conjoin the resulting mediating principle with the master formula to obtain an equation




Since the mediating principle is derivative from the master formula and empirical data,
it is not an essential posit of its own. The only essential posit appears to be the master
formula itself.6
6Note that none of my arguments so far in this section draw on the dynamical systems framework
78
The only question now is: what is the content of the master formula? Consider F = ma
again. One way (perhaps the most straightforward way and certainly the most common
way) to read the content of this formula is as follows. F = ma tells us that there is an
entity called force whose magnitude when acting upon a system stands in such and such a
relationship to two of the system’s properties, namely mass and acceleration. In this way,
the essential content of Newtonian mechanics would contain assertions about the properties
and relations of various entities such as forces, masses, and so on.
But this cannot be right for a number of reasons. First of all, as I argued in Ch. 1,
F = ma (or any other master formula) is quite contentless when taken as a descriptive
statement: as long as the system can be assigned mass and acceleration, surely there will
be some function whose value at each moment equals the product of mass and acceleration.
That statement by itself certainly cannot generate any predictions. Besides, the essential
content of Newtonian mechanics better not involve entities such as forces, for these entities
are absent from Lagrangian and Hamiltonian mechanics, which make the same predictions
as Newton’s laws about most classical systems. It would therefore be much more reassuring
for the selectivist if the essential content of these three theories was the same. But if they
are to be the same, they cannot include forces.
I provided extensive arguments in Ch. 1 and numerous quotes from physics textbooks in
Ch. 2 to the effect that F = ma (and other master formulae) must be read as prescriptions.
This saves the formula from the charge of contentlessness. F = ma is essentially an injunction
that tasks us to form differential equations of the form ẍ = f(x, ẋ, ...) and search for a suitable
f in each local context. The left-hand side of this differential equation fixes what our initial
/ boundary conditions, i.e. our state assignments, must be. In this case, they are (x, ẋ), due
to the fact that the equation is second-order in x. The right-hand side, on the other hand,
is given by a local empirical mediating principle (LEMP) and encodes the transition rules
for states of this form. As said, this part is open-ended and must be reverse engineered from
empirical data by presupposing the prescribed state assignments. So really the only fixed
and essential content of F = ma is that it commands us to assign states of the form (x, ẋ).
Thus, my general claim is the following:
(although they do draw on prescriptivism).
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Claim: The essential content of a dynamical theory is its master forumla, whose essential
(prescriptive) content is a set of state assignment rules.
So far I have based my arguments on how predictions are actually made in the practice
of physics. One can arrive at the same conclusion (that state assignments are the success-
generators) by considering in most abstract terms what one would need in order to make
predictions. Hempel was one of the earliest to study the nature of predictions and the
role of theory in them. Hempel (1958) claimed that the role of a theory is to provide
a “secure link” between “observational antecedents” and “observational consequents”. I
agree with Hempel that predictions paradigmatically consist of going from conditions in
one time and place to conditions in other times and places.7 However, Hempel’s statement
regarding the role of theory in predictions is wrong in a subtle but crucial way. Textual
evidence strongly suggests that for Hempel “observational antecedents” and “observational
consequents” mean initial and final conditions, respectively, and the “secure link” refers to
transition rules. But if that is the case, then Hempel has got it completely backwards: the
role of the theory is not to provide transition rules between observational antecedents and
observational consequents, but rather to tell us what the observational antecedents must be
to begin with. Once this is provided, the transition rules are in fact not theoretical at all
but rather, as I have been arguing, derived from local and empirical data. Indeed directly
reading the transition rules off empirical data is the practice Hempel recommends as a
replacement for the theoretician’s method, namely that of going through theory to make
predictions. This is where the theoretician’s “dilemma” stems from: why keep the theory
around, if you can simply record the transitions between observational antecedents and
consequents directly? But as said, what Hempel calls the theoretician’s method is fictional;
7To be sure, not every prediction directly involves anticipation of a final condition or specification of
initial and boundary conditions. Take, for instance, the “prediction” that every planet sweeps equal areas
in equal amounts of time, which may be derived from Newton’s inverse-square formula. On the face of it,
this is not a prediction of a final state given some initial state, but rather a formula relating swept areas
to times. However, it is clear that the driver of this prediction is Newton’s differential equation ẍ = F (x)m ,
which spits out the position and velocity of a planet at a desired time given its position and velocity at some
other time. It is this dynamics that gives rise to the area law, for it is the dynamics that determines how far
and how fast a planet will travel given various starting points, and it is the regularities in these inputs and
outputs that is distilled into the area law. As such, even if the prediction does not appear dynamical on the
surface, it nonetheless originates in a dynamical rule. Therefore, one would expect a study of input-output
dynamics to be most urgent and most informative in a discussion about predictions.
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no physicist uses the theory to derive transition rules, for those are recorded empirically.
But to derive the transition rules from empirical data, one must know what to keep track of
as the “antecedents” and “consequents”, and for this one needs the theory.
Suppose one is interfacing with a classical system. At each moment the system is char-
acterized by an indefinite number of measurable quantities: x, ẋ, ẍ, (x+ ẋ)ẍ, x...x , and so on.
Which (collection) of these quantities should one keep track of as the appropriate “observa-
tional antecedent”? This is not trivial at all. Many centuries of rigorous investigation were
needed before Newton essentially realized that we must keep track of (x, ẋ). Once this was
discovered, the transition rules were simply a matter of paying careful attention to data (see
my remarks on Newton’s study of gravity in Ch. 1). In short, Hempel seems to assume that
the specification of observational antecedents is trivial, but it is in fact the most important
contribution of a theory.
Once again we arrive at the same conclusion: the state assignment rules are the sole
source of the miracles that dynamical theories pull off. In the following, I will examine the
question of what these posits can be said to “latch on to”.
3.3 Tracking: Realism without Reference
In this section, I will concern myself with how theoretical state assignments of a successful
dynamical theory relate to the true states of the system. As said above, I shall call this
relation tracking and contrast it with its dominant alternative, referential success. Given
that tracking is a systematic relation between the unobservables of the theory and elements
of reality, and one that explains the predictive success of the theory in a non-miraculous
way, this view answers to the No Miracles argument and may thus be considered a form of
“realism”. On the other hand, if by “realism” one intends any view in which the theoretical
unobservables are “real”, i.e. transparently referential, then my view is a form of antirealism.
Labels aside, I claim that privileged epistemic and metaphysical status can be conferred upon
certain unobservable terms without appealing to referential success or any other referentially
transparent notion. As before, I will proceed with a specific case study before presenting a
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general account.
3.3.1 Tracking: the case of the Bohr model
I shall argue that the Bohr case vividly demonstrates the bankruptcy of referentially
transparent notions such as “referential success”, while still allowing for a systematic (albeit
referentially opaque) theory-world relation to explain the theory’s predictive success: Bohr’s
states track the true states of the system, but need not represent or refer to them. To this
end, I will draw on a comparison of two experimental cases, namely the case of the hydrogen
atom (or any single-electron ion such as He+, Li++, etc.) and that of orthohelium, respec-
tively. Importantly, the former was considered a confirmation of Bohr’s theory while the
latter was taken as a disconfirmation. As such, studying the similarities and differences be-
tween the two cases is the best way to get a handle on what makes a false theory predictively
(un)successful.
Before examining the cases, allow me to say a few words about the methodology I
will employ below. My approach is to examine the relationship between the Bohr energy
states and those of modern quantum mechanics, governed by the Schrödinger equation. One
might wonder why we should care about this comparison, given that ultimately we are
interested in how Bohr’s theory relates to the truth, not to any other theory. To be sure, the
Schrödinger equation does not provide us with the “true states” of the system, seeing as it
is ultimately a false theory itself. Nevertheless, if it could be shown that referential success
is the wrong way to characterize the relation between Bohr states and Schrödinger states,
then it would be extremely difficult to argue that the Bohr states refer to anything in reality,
unless one believes that modern quantum mechanics is somehow farther from the truth than
old quantum theory. That is my negative claim. My positive claim is that this comparison
will give us insight into what relationship between the terms of the Bohr theory and those
of Schrödinger allows the former to be successful, despite how radically mistaken it is by
the lights of the latter. If whatever relationship turns out to do the work is generalizable to
other cases, then one would expect the Schrödinger theory to stand in a similar relationship
to quantum field theory, and the latter to whatever future theory replaces it, and so on. And
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if this relationship is a transitive one, then given the right context, Bohr’s theory stands in
the same relationship to quantum field theory, etc., and in the end also to “the ultimate
true theory” (if I may be allowed to use that phrase) which by assumption perfectly mirrors
reality. Thus, assuming a generalizable and transitive relation exists, examining the relation
between Bohr and Schrödinger models would be a promising way to get insight into the
relation between the Bohr model and the truth. As said, I will argue that the relation
in question is tracking (defined below), and it is indeed both transitive and generalizable
beyond this case.
3.3.1.1 The two cases introduced
The two cases are shown below. Figure 1 illustrates the relationship between Bohr and
Schrödinger states for a hydrogen atom (a similar pattern would emerge for any single-
electron ion).8 In such contexts, En =
K
n2
is a decent approximation to the energy levels,
and therefore Bohr states line up pretty nicely with Schrödinger states. I say “pretty nicely”
because there is a fine-structure which, from the contemporary point of view, is due to spin-
orbit interactions and relativistic corrections. This results in some separation between states
of the same principal quantum number n but different azimuthal quantum numbers. And
since these are not accounted for in Bohr’s theory, this causes misalignment between the two
sets of states. Note that while the origin of fine structure was not known at the time, its
existence had been experimentally established since the 1890s, and the inability of Bohr’s
original model to account for them was not in dispute when Bohr proposed his theory (see
Kragh 1985).
Next consider a similar comparison between Bohr and Schrödinger states for an ortho-
helium atom, a neutral helium atom (Z = 2) in the spin-1 mode. This is shown in Figure
2 (note that fine structure has been suppressed in this figure).9 Orthohelium is to be con-
trasted with parahelium, a neutral helium atom in the spin-0 mode. The main difference
between the two is that unlike parahelium, the second electron in orthohelium is exiled to
n ≥ 2 and cannot decay to the ground state. The figure for parahelium would therefore look
8For precise values of the energy layers see Nanni 2015, 60.
9Figure based on Rohlf 1994, 267, Figure 9-11.
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quite similar, except 2s would be pushed 0.8 eV higher, and more importantly there would
be a 1s state, because the second electron in parahelium is allowed to decay into the ground
state where the first electron is. From the contemporary point of view, the latter fact is
due to the relative orientation of the electrons’ spins. The two electrons in an orthohelium
atom have parallel spins and are therefore excluded from the same quantum state due to
fermionic anti-symmetry (the “exclusion principle”). In parahelium, by contrast, the two
electrons have anti-parallel spin and thus prefer to be in the ground state together. One
says that orthohelium’s 2p is meta-stable, which is to say that an orthohelium electron in 2p
does not spontaneously decay to the 1s ground state. In pure samples of orthohelium, the
2p→ 1s transition is not found among the spectral lines. I shall differentiate an orthohelium
state from the analogous parahelium state by writing subscripts o for orthohelium and p for
parahelium, e.g. 2so vs. 2sp, 2po vs. 2pp, etc.
10
3.3.1.2 In search of a difference-maker between the two cases
The crucial question is this: How is the case of neutral orthohelium different from the
case of hydrogen or ionized helium? What difference could explain the fact that one is widely
considered a confirmation of Bohr’s model but the other a disconfirmation? In what sense
were Bohr’s state assignments to single-electron atoms and ions “onto something” but not
his state assignments to orthohelium? What did they “latch on to” in the former case that
they failed to capture in the latter?
First of all, contemporary textbooks of physics and chemistry are of no help here. It
is commonplace in these texts to claim that Bohr’s theory works great for hydrogen and
single-electron (or “hydrogen-like”) ions but fails miserably as soon as it is applied to helium
or any other system with more than one electron. What is not easy to find in these texts
is a good reason for these assertions. Sometimes it is said that Bohr’s theory fails in the
case of helium because it cannot take electron-electron interactions into account (OpenStax
2016, §6.2). This is clearly false: in fact, Bohr discusses such interactions in the second part
10The contemporary notation is 23s for orthohelium and 21s for parahelium, because the former turns out
to have a triplet fine structure while the latter is a singlet with no fine structure. But at the time, 23s was
perceived as a doublet (Gearhart 2017), so the contemporary notation would be too anachronistic here.
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of his famous trilogy (1913), in which he presented his model for the very first time. Or
take Bohr’s letter to Nature titled “Atomic Structure” in which Bohr explicitly considered
electron-electron interactions, including the possibility of orbits penetrating below the lower
shells (Bohr 1921; see also Darrigol, 152-153). And of course the many helium models
around this time gave different results for ionization energy mainly because of differences
in their electron-electron interactions. Other textbooks claim that Bohr’s theory fails for
multi-electron atoms and ions because in this theory the binding energy only depends on
the principal quantum number n whereas experimentally it also depends on the azimuthal
quantum number l which indicates angular momentum, and/or other quantum numbers
such as spin that are missing from Bohr’s theory (Uppal 2006, 426). But this cannot be the
difference-maker either, for two reasons: first of all, one can add further quantum numbers
to Bohr’s n, and this is indeed what was done by Sommerfeld and others immediately after
Bohr’s proposal. Secondly, as we saw above, in the case of hydrogen and ionized helium, too,
the energy levels depend on angular momentum due to fine structure. There is therefore no
meaningful difference between the two cases in terms of lack of further quantum numbers.
Once again, whatever the problem is, it must be one that is present in the orthohelium case
but absent from hydrogen and ionized helium cases.
Let us see if we can find a meaningful difference between the two cases by examining the
two figures. At first glance, the two figures look quite similar. Obviously the Bohr states
do not perfectly match up with any of the Schrödinger states in either case. In both cases
one sees more spectral lines than expected from Bohr’s theory, and one sees them in wrong
locations. For instance, a transition such as 3po → 2so in orthohelium would release more
energy, and thus a higher frequency, than 3so → 2po. Yet both of those transitions would
map onto 3 → 2 for Bohr. This means, in terms of experimental data, that one sees more
spectral lines with more (and different) colors than promised by Bohr’s model. The same
can be said about transitions among the fine structure states. Those are also discernible and
as said above, were accepted at the time as being beyond the margin of error.
So, in both cases, Bohr’s theory “lumps together” physically distinct states. In both cases
it is strictly false but approximately true. To be sure, the approximations are quantitatively
much better in the case of hydrogen. Indeed, the sub-layer separations in Figure 1 are orders
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of magnitude smaller than the average of their energy levels, while the separations in Figure
2 are comparable to the average energy values. However, the difference between the two
cases could not simply be a quantitative matter. First of all, I have only shown the states
according to the original 1913 theory. If one were to add the azimuthal quantum number k to
Bohr’s theory (a la Sommerfeld), the quantitative agreement with data would significantly
improve. Secondly, as I explain in the historical Appendix B, quantitative discrepancies
in helium were considered resolvable at the time. Thirdly and most importantly, as long
as both deviations are considered statistically significant, the mere quantitative difference
cannot explain why one case counts as success and the other as failure. At the end of the
day, if the separations cannot be attributed to experimental error, it does not matter how
big the discrepancy is: in both cases Bohr’s theory strictly contradicts experimental data
in that it has the wrong number of terms and has them at the wrong places. As Kragh
explains:
The observed fine structure could have presented a real problem to Bohr’s theory... .
However, it was not regarded as an anomaly and not allowed to impede the rapid acceptance
of Bohr’s theory. (Kragh 1985, 69)
Yet as we shall see, experiments on helium in the 1910 and 20s were indeed the death knell
of Bohr’s theory. We are back at the question: why did physicists consider the first one a
success and the second a failure?
3.3.1.3 Tracking: the difference-maker
As we saw, in both cases Bohr’s theory “lumps together” what are in reality distinct
states. It defines coarse-grain “equivalence classes” of underlying states, if you will. The
question is what makes the coarse-graining acceptable in the case of hydrogen and ionized
helium but unacceptable in the case of neutral helium. I claim that the two cases cannot be
distinguished unless one pays attention to the underlying transition rules. In other words,
my claim is that the equivalence classes cannot be justified merely in terms of the form of
the vertical mapping between Schrödinger states and Bohr states, i.e. the accuracy with
which Bohr states “line up against” or “approximate” or “represent” Schrödinger states. To
determine which states can belong in the same equivalence class one must also study the
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manner in which those states evolve. In short, my diagnosis is this: the fundamental reason
for the failure of Bohr’s model vis-a-vis helium is that it lumps together states that can be
prepared separately and shown to transition in a distinguishable manner according to the very
same theory. Allow me to explain.
When the spectral lines of sources believed to contain helium were first studied, it was
realized that upon constructing the “term series” (what Bohr later interpreted as energy
levels) for the spectral lines, one obtains two separate sets of terms (energy levels), as it
were belonging to two different elements. That is, one finds no transitions “across” the two
sets of states. The two elements were given different but similar names. One was referred
to simply as “helium” (later “orthohelium”) and the other as “parahelium” or “parhelium”
(Mehra and Rechenberg 1982, 398). What we now know as 23s was at this time considered
the ground state of (ortho)helium. But soon it was realized that the two “elements” are
really two excited states of the same element, now called helium. The experimental findings
were thus reinterpreted as indicating a “no combination rule”: orthohelium and parahelium
states never transition among themselves. For example, while both 2po → 2so and 2pp → 2sp
happen quite frequently, there are never cross-transitions of form 2pp → 2so and the like. It
was accepted that any adequate model of helium must entail the no combination rule.11
I suggest that the problem with Bohr’s theory in the case of helium was precisely that
its state assignments were incompatible with the no combination rule. Extensive historical
arguments for this claim are presented in the Appendix B (see also Darrigol 1992, 177). For
the purposes of this section, we need only the following. Born and Heisenberg showed in 1923
that Bohr’s state assignment rules force us to put orthohelium states in the same equivalence
class as those of parahelium. For instance, the 2p states of orthohelium and parahelium are
lumped together in the same set of stationary states. Since the two states end up having the
same quantum numbers and both belong to the same set of stationary states, Bohr’s theory
does not have the tools to allow para- and ortho-states to transition differently. But as we
saw, they in fact do. In the simplest case, 2po always transitions to 2so while 2pp transitions
to 2sp and frequently to 1s. Therefore, two states that Bohr’s theory lumps together in the
11Recent experimental findings indicate some rare transitions across para- and ortho-states (see NIST
Helium Tables), but the fact that these have such extremely low amplitudes still needs to be accommodated
in the theory.
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same equivalence class, in this case 2po and 2pp, transition to two other states, i.e. 2so and
1s, respectively, that the same theory recognizes as distinct.
Note the difference with the case of hydrogen. The various hydrogen states that Bohr’s
theory lumps together are relatively well-behaved: for the most part, states that Bohr’s
theory lumps together transition to other states that the theory also recognizes as the same.
The only exception to this is the 3 → 1 transition, which is only allowed for 3p → 1s
(suppressing fine structure) but not for the other n = 3 states. But as I shall explain in
§3.3.2.2, this would only be a problem for Bohr’s theory if i) one were not allowed to add the
azimuthal quantum number, and ii) one were able to prepare 3p separately from the other
n = 3 states. Since neither condition was true at the time, the coarse-graining of various
hydrogen states mostly respects the way the underlying states transition.
The failure of Bohr’s theory for helium, I claim, is a special case of why any dynamical
theory might fail to predict: i.e. that there are several states that the theory recognizes as
being in the same equivalence class, but when one prepares them separately, each regularly
transitions to final states that the theory itself recognizes as distinct. This shows that the
initial states should not have been put in the same equivalence class, and therefore that the
theory’s state assignments are faulty. By contrast, when states within the same theoretical
equivalence class cannot be shown to transition distinguishably, I will say that the theory
tracks the true states of the system within the constraints and resolution limits of the context.
Tracking: A set of states S tracks another set of states S’ iff there is a mapping from S’ to S
(inducing equivalence classes on S’) such that members of each equivalence class defined on
S’ transition in a manner that is indistinguishable according to the same state assignment
rules at least within a range of contexts.
Bohr’s state assignments thus do not fail in the case of helium because they fail to
represent something in the system: in one straightforward sense of the term, in both cases
they do represent groups of underlying states with the same n, and in another sense of
the term, namely one-to-one correspondence, they do not represent anything in either case.
Rather, the state assignments fail because they are maps of groups of underlying states
that transition distinguishably according to the very same way of representing them. Put
differently, the problem with Bohr’s theory vis-a-vis helium cannot be cashed out in terms of
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the properties of the “mapping” between Bohr states and true states; the problem rather lies
in the way this mapping interacts with the inherent transition rules of the system. Focusing
on the static referential / representational relation alone will not give us a rich enough
account to explain predictive success or failure of dynamical theories.
I shall have more to say about tracking in §3.3.2. But first let me elaborate on the
last claim I made, namely that referential success is not sufficient for explaining predictive
success and failure.
3.3.1.4 Why referential success is not the difference-maker
Suppose there were something the Bohr states referred to / represented in the case of
hydrogen, something that could be said to have generated the theory’s success. What would
this referent be? The most obvious candidate would be the principal quantum number n.
Bohr’s theory works as much as it does, the idea goes, because it successfully refers to
the principal quantum number, which has been “retained” in subsequent theories as one
member of a larger set of quantum numbers. But this victory would be short-lived for the
proponent of referential success, because this move would make referential success incapable
of explaining the failure of Bohr’s theory. For if Bohr states refer to the principal quantum
number in one case, they must do so in both cases, and of course in both cases n has been
“retained” in the superseding theory. Thus, Bohr’s theory would be referentially successful
in both cases but predictively successful only in one, which means that referential success
cannot explain predictive success.
On the flip side, both in the case of fine structure and in the case of meta-stable helium,
the main cause of deviation from Bohr’s theory (according to current theory) is the omission
of spin. In neither case does Bohr’s theory represent spin in any way, yet it works for
hydrogen and single-electron ions despite its failure to refer. Once again, referential success
/ failure cannot differentiate the two cases.
The only option for the proponent of referential success is to say that, whatever Bohr’s
states refer to, they are referential in Figure 1 but not in Figure 2. One would have to say,












in a helium ion, but that the same state suddenly refers to nothing if the ion acquires a
second electron and becomes neutral. This strikes me as a bizarre manner of speaking, but
regardless, the question would then be: what would account for the fact that Bohr’s states
fail to refer in the case of orthohelium? The proponent of referential success must provide
an independent reason for thinking so, or else this solution is utterly ad hoc. One should
be able to determine, without knowing which case was considered a predictive success and
which a failure, what (entity, property, or structure) the Bohr states refer to in the case
of hydrogen-like systems, and then show that the same entity, property, or structure does
not exist in orthohelium, and hence that Bohr’s terms are non-referential in that case. As I
just argued, this referent most likely cannot be the principal quantum number, for then the
theory would be referential in both cases. The proponent of referential success must come
up with an alternative referent that exists in hydrogen but is absent from orthohelium. I do
not know what that alternative could be, and until one such alternative has been justified,
I see little hope for referential success as an explanation of predictive success.
But let us assume one were able to pull off the claim that Bohr’s states refer to something
in ionized helium but not in neutral helium. Far from helping the referentialist, this would
ironically weaken the notion of referential success significantly. For it would then appear
that whatever Bohr’s theory is representing about hydrogen is a quite volatile and unstable
entity (or property or structure or what have you), seeing as it immediately disappears upon
the second electron’s approach. Thus, I am inclined to conclude, whether the theory is
successful is not determined by whether it represents anything in the system, at least not
anything robust.
3.3.2 Tracking: the general account
In this section, I will discuss the generic properties of the tracking relation and its
relationship to predictive as well as referential success.
90
3.3.2.1 Tracking defined
To generalize, my claim is that the predictive success of a dynamical theory depends on
a kind of “cooperation” or “compatibility” between the coarse-graining procedure and the
underlying dynamics of the system. More formally, predictive success hinges on a form of
compatibility between the vertical mapping that projects the true states onto theoretical
states on the one hand, and the horizontal transitions among the underlying states on the
other. I have been calling this tracking. Let me reproduce the definition here.
Tracking: A set of states S tracks another set of states S’ iff there is a mapping from S’ to S
(inducing equivalence classes on S’) such that members of each equivalence class defined on
S’ transition in a manner that is indistinguishable according to the same state assignment
rules at least within a range of contexts.
The idea of tracking is not an obscure philosophical invention. It has appeared in the
writings of at least one prominent physicist. Let me quote the opening paragraph of Hertz’s
Principles of Mechanics :
In endeavouring thus to draw inferences as to the future from the past, we always adopt
the following process. We form for ourselves images or symbols of external objects; and the
form which we give them is such that the necessary consequents of the images in thought are
always the images of the necessary consequents in nature of the things pictured... We are
thus enabled to be in advance of the facts, and to decide as to present affairs in accordance
with the insight so obtained. The images which we here speak of are our conceptions of
things. With the things themselves they are in conformity in one important respect, namely,
in satisfying the above-mentioned requirement. For our purposes it is not necessary that
they should be in conformity with the things in any other respect whatever. As a matter
of fact, we do not know, nor have we any means of knowing, whether our conceptions of
things are in conformity with them in any other than this one fundamental respect. (Hertz
1894, 1 – emphasis added)
It is not difficult to see how this passage simultaneously describes the process of tracking and
denounces any referential inferences that may be made from it. Taking Hertz’s “imaging”
to be our “mapping” between lower- and higher-level states, and his “necessary consequent”
to be the final state to which a given state transitions, Hertz is basically demanding that if
the initial states are “lumped together” by the theory, then the final states also be lumped
together by the theory.
Actually, what Hertz describes is a necessary but not sufficient condition for tracking,
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which I shall call co-transitioning. This requires only that states within the same equivalence
class also transition to the same final equivalence class. Rosaler (2015a, 61; 2015b, 11) has
recently given co-transitioning a formal definition: let m be the map that takes us from true
states to theoretical states, D the true transition operator that takes us from true initial
states to true final states, and D′ the theoretical transition operator taking theoretical initial
states to final ones. Then co-transitioning can be neatly written as: m[D(S)] ≈ D′[m(S)].
While always necessary, co-transitioning is sufficient for tracking only if i) the underlying
dynamics is deterministic and ii) the differences of magnitude among states of the same
equivalence class cannot be resolved by our instruments. For otherwise two states that co-
transition might nevertheless result in distinguishable processes if the two transitions have
discernibly different amplitudes or magnitudes. But if (i) holds, then the only transition
amplitudes are 0 and 1 and thus there cannot be a difference of amplitude without a failure
of co-transitioning. And if (ii) holds, one need not worry about differences of magnitude.
A note about the generality of tracking: my focus has been the Bohr-Schrödinger case,
but tracking can be applied much more broadly within dynamical systems. Some work in this
area has already been done. A relation much like co-transitioning was introduced in Wallace
(2012, 54), who calls it “instantiation”, and recommends it as the way to think about the
quantum-classical relationship (essentially showing that classical mechanics tracks quantum
states in the appropriate context). The concept has since been popularized by Rosaler (2015a;
2015b), who refers to it as “DS reduction” (or occasionally “tracking”), and argues that it
serves as a better account of theory reduction than the traditional alternatives. Yoshimi
(2012) has recently argued that this “compatibility condition” is helpful in addressing the
relation between brain-theories and higher-level psychology. See also Giunti’s discussions of
this form of reduction under “emulation” (2006).12
But the idea of tracking applies even more broadly. One can show, for example, that
spin states track Dirac spinors under suitable constraints and resolution limits. I also believe
that many of the most prominent historical examples in the literature can be analyzed in the
manner above: one could interpret theories of phlogiston, caloric, and ether, for instance,
12While all of these authors have appealed to this restricted notion of tracking as a promising inter-theory
relationship, I have argued that it can be put to use also as a theory-world relationship and a much better
alternative to referential success.
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as assigning states to chemical substances, thermodynamic systems, and light, respectively,
and following their transitions under the guidance of these state assignments. One can
then explain the success of these theories by saying that, within certain constraints and
resolution limits, these state assignments were compatible with the underlying transitions of
said systems, i.e. that they tracked them. A detailed treatment of these cases is beyond this
chapter. So while more work needs to be done to explore further applications of tracking, I
hope my arguments have at least shown the promise of the idea.
Hertz’s passage implies that tracking is necessary and sufficient for predictive success.
As we shall see in the next section, this is on the right track but not quite accurate (even
if tracking were reduced to co-transitioning). In the following, I will examine the necessity
and sufficiency of tracking for predictive success.
3.3.2.2 Tracking and predictive success
First of all, tracking is sufficient for the predictive success of a dynamical theory. To test
a prediction, one prepares the system in a state recognized by the theory, allows the state to
evolve, and then detects the final state also in accordance with what the theory assigns. Now,
unless one has arrived at “the ultimate true theory”, the procedure the scientist considers
to be the preparation of “the same state” is bound to prepare several states that are in
reality distinct but assigned the same state by the theory. If, however, a tracking relation
obtains between the true and theoretical states, then the scientist will never have to know
that they are preparing different states under the same label, because whenever they prepare
“the same initial state”, they will also get “the same final state”. Equipped with these state
assignments and the empirically recorded transition rules, one can then use the theory in
the future to predict, reliably and without contradiction, what final product will result from
a given preparation procedure. Tracking is therefore sufficient for predictive success.
But tracking is not always strictly necessary for success. In some cases failure of track-
ing amounts to direct disconfirmation, while in others it indicates potential problems and
suggests the possibility of better alternatives for the theory. In the latter cases, if such
better alternatives are found, then the theory will be superseded; otherwise, it will remain
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in practice. What determines whether failure of tracking is truly devastating for predictive
success or merely indicates potential problems? In most cases the answer is simple: it de-
pends on whether individual states in the same equivalence class can be separately prepared
and observed.
To see this, consider two underlying (“true”) states S1 and S2 that fail to co-transition.
That is, suppose both S1 and S2 are mapped to the same theoretical state ST , and let the
transition rules be S1 → S3 and S2 → S4, and suppose S3 maps to some S ′T and S4 to some S ′′T
such that S ′T 6= S ′′T . Since the two states fail to co-transition, tracking fails. Is this a problem
for the theory? First of all, it certainly will be a problem if S1 and S2 can transition between
themselves, for instance if S3 = S2, for in that case there will be a transition that the theory
simply cannot accommodate. Consider for example the bare 1913 theory of Bohr with just
the principal quantum number. This theory would not be able to account for orthohelium’s
2p→ 2s decay, because the two states would both be mapped to Bohr’s n = 2, and there is
no 2→ 2 in this theory (certainly not one that can release energy).
What if there are no such in-class transitions? In that case, the failure of tracking would
only be problematic if the experimenter is able to prepare S1 and S2 separately through
different procedures. This is because in that case one could easily demonstrate that what
the theory designates as ST is in fact not a unique state of the system, for it can be reliably
shown to transition differently depending on how it is prepared: namely to S ′T in one case
and S ′′T in the other. Note that the experimenter does not need to be aware that two distinct
states are being prepared. In fact, if the experimenter is an adherent of the theory in
question, then they would probably not know this, as they are inclined to lump both states
into one. The point is that if there are two prescriptions for preparing ST but each way
actually results in a different initial state, and if the two states thus prepared transition
distinguishably, then the theory is clearly coarse-graining too much.
For instance, given the relatively large difference of energy between them, it may be
possible to prepare an orthohelium atom one time in 4s and another time in 4f in two
separate experiments by applying different amounts of excitation energy in the discharge
tube. Even if the experimenter does not already know this, the data will prove that two
distinct states are being prepared in the two experiments because one would transition to
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2p while the other would show no spectral line indicating a 4→ 2 transition (NIST Helium
Tables).
But now let us assume the experimenter is not able to prepare S1 and S2 separately.
That is, suppose every preparation procedure at our disposal will be equally likely to bring
the system to either S1 or S2. In that case, and as long as there are no in-class transitions
(S1 6↔ S2), the data will show that ST has indeterministic transition rules : sometimes ST
transitions to S ′T and sometimes to S
′′
T . The experimenter will be able to record the individual
amplitudes for each transition and construct a probability matrix for the various possible
transitions. This will not be a refutation of the theory, for one might always chalk it up to
the fundamental indeterminacy of the underlying dynamics.
As an example, consider again a theory similar to Bohr’s 1913 model that allows no more
than one quantum number. As we touched on in §3.3.1.3, 3p can transition to 1s whereas the
other n = 3 states cannot (Nasser 2012, 5; see Jitrik and Bunge 2004 for detailed transition
amplitudes). So there is failure of tracking. Now suppose an experimenter does not have
the tools to prepare the states separately according to azimuthal quantum number (which
was probably true at the time). As a result, it would simply appear to such an experimenter
that n = 3 states sometimes transition to n = 1, though they often do not. This would
make the theory “more indeterministic than it needs to be”, but that would not amount to
disconfirmation unless a more deterministic set of state assignments can be demonstrated.
To be clear, the real theory proposed by Bohr in 1913 did not prohibit one from introducing
other quantum numbers to account for the finer distinctions (as Sommerfeld immediately
set out to do). But my cases are easier to illustrate with a fictional version of Bohr’s theory
that allows for no quantum numbers besides n.
In fact, even if a deterministic alternative were found, it would not incline the scientist to
abandon the current theory unless the more fine-grained states could be separately prepared.
Indeed, this is precisely where things stand with modern quantum mechanics. Imagine for a
moment that the world is as the de Broglie-Bohm theory claims. That would mean that what
standard quantum mechanics calls a single Hilbert state is in fact an equivalence class of a
large number of distinct states, corresponding to the same wavefunction but different initial
positions. From this point of view, the indeterminacy of quantum mechanics is because it
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lumps together several states that do not co-transition. What is a matter of fundamental
indeterminacy for one theory is thus due to inadequate coarse-graining in the other. How-
ever, since one cannot in fact prepare the individual Bohmian states separately, the more
deterministic state assignments are of no use. Quantum mechanics might be forever sus-
pect due to its indeterminism, but it will not be disconfirmed unless the states that fail
to co-transition (if there are such) can be prepared separately. I suggest that this is the
real reason why the de Broglie-Bohm theory is unpopular among physicists, and why it is
claimed, somewhat confusingly, that it is unverifiable. From a descriptive-ontological point
of view, Bohm’s theory is as verifiable as its rivals, but from a prescriptive-dynamical view,
its state assignment rules are experimentally useless.13
To sum up, tracking is sufficient and “almost necessary” for predictive success. In those
cases in which tracking is not strictly necessary (i.e. when individual states within a given
class cannot be prepared separately and there are no in-class transitions), failure of tracking
always at least arouses a suspicion in the scientist that perhaps a more fine-grained set of
state assignment rules is called for.14
3.3.2.3 Tracking and referential success
I made the case above that tracking cannot be reduced to referential success in the case
of Bohr’s theory. I will flesh this out in more general terms in this section.
At first glance, one might be tempted to say that tracking is a form of referential success.
After all, does tracking not imply that the higher-level states refer to those lower-level states
that transition indistinguishably? In other words, are the theoretical terms not picking out
certain natural groupings of the underlying states that evolve similarly? The answer is no.
There is nothing natural or inherent about the groupings, because the equivalence classes
do not share any property that could be described purely at the level of truth and without
13The above arguments apply to cases where tracking fails due to failure to co-transition. Similar consid-
erations would apply to cases in which tracking fails due to difference of magnitude and amplitude.
14Note: In the foregoing, I always assumed the mapping from true states to theoretical states to be many-
to-one. This is because as long as the mapping is one-to-one or one-to-many (but never many-to-one), and
as long as transition rules are read off empirical data as I claim they must be, the theory will be retained. I
will leave it to the reader to convince themselves of this. (Hint: for the case of one-to-many mapping, think
of gauge freedom.)
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reference to the higher-level theory. To see this, first note that successful state assignments
are not unique. Consider a deterministic system with four true states S1, ..., S4 and let the
transition rules be S1 → S3 and S2 → S4, and suppose the characteristic magnitudes of
the two transitions are roughly equal. Now consider the following three ways of mapping
(“lumping”) the underlying states into equivalence classes of theoretical states:
1) Assign {S1, S2} ↔ ST , {S3, S4} ↔ S′T
2) Assign {S1, S2} ↔ ST , {S3} ↔ S′T , {S4} ↔ S′′T
3) Assign {S1} ↔ ST , {S2} ↔ S′T , {S3} ↔ S′′T , {S4} ↔ S′′′T
It is easy to verify that the coarse-grainings in (1) and (3) result in a set of state assignments
that track (co-transition), whereas the ones in (2) fail to track (co-transition). Now compare
the assignment {S1, S2} ↔ ST in (1) to the same assignment in (2). Both assignments lump
the same underlying states into the same equivalence class, yet one is successful and the
other is not. Clearly, the success of (1) is not due to the fact that ST “picks out a real
property” of the system, or else the same assignment would not fail in (2). The proponent
of referential success might try to attribute this to the fact that (2) fails to lump S3 and
S4 together. Perhaps by failing to put the latter two states in the same equivalence class,
(2) fails to represent an important property that they share and thus fails to predict. In
other words, perhaps (2) is being too fine-grained for its level. But this cannot be right,
because the same fine-grained assignment works perfectly well in (3). In short, the success
and failure of state assignments cannot be decided in isolation. It is the entire set of state
assignments that either tracks or fails to track as a whole.
Thus, “the common attribute”, if there is any, that is supposedly shared by all the states
in the same class cannot be cashed out in terms of any properties that reside entirely at
the level of true states. For this would require describing an inherent, theory-independent
property that S1 and S2 have in common, but no such property is forthcoming: without
reference to the theoretical equivalence classes, there is no natural description of S1 and S2
that unites them together. In short, predictive success is not a matter of each higher-level
state picking out an inherent property of some lower-level states, but a matter of how the
entire set of coarse-grained state assignments as a whole cooperates with the dynamics.
Similarly, “transitioning indistinguishably” cannot be cashed out without reference to
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our resolution limits. For instance, the Schrödinger theory only tracks the true states if one
ignores hyper-fine structure, which is due to quantum field theory corrections and cannot be
accounted for in Schrödinger’s theory. Classical mechanics only tracks natural systems as
long as we do not (or do not care to) have the resolution to distinguish the myriad underlying
states that it lumps together as the same state. Nature does not recognize these lumps; they
only make sense for a being that has a limited resolution limit.
What about structural representation? Can we not say that Bohr’s theory represents part
of the structure of the underlying dynamics? This might seem promising at first, because one
of the many definitions of “structure” is relational properties, and it might seem that while
tracking is not about individual theoretical states representing specific entities or properties,
it does have to do with the relations among the theoretical states “mirroring” the relations
among the underlying states. My response to this line of reasoning is to say, first of all,
that I would not be surprised if out of the plethora of ways “structure” has been cashed
out, some of them would fit the bill here. Once a concept is so flexible as “structure” is in
philosophy of science, its successful application is hardly impressive. That being said, I am
not sure that even the “relational properties” view of structure would apply here, because
the only “relations” at play here are the transition rules. That is, one must define a relation
that obtains between two states when one transitions to the other. But what about all
the other relational properties that one could define among the underlying states? Take for
instance the most obvious one: the relative differences in their characteristic magnitudes
(e.g. difference of binding energy between various atomic states). As we have seen, Bohr’s
theory does not represent the “structure” of these relations, unless one abstracts a coarse-
grained structure from it, which can only be defined by taking the transitions into account.
Now, perhaps the proponent of referential success is willing to narrow “structure” down to
something like “transitional structure”, and perhaps one could then say that Bohr’s theory
represents this structure in some way, but at that point the structuralist would simply be
saying precisely what I have been saying, except in a convoluted and confusing language.
The language better suited for this context is that of dynamical systems, which has been my
instrument throughout.
As we have seen, tracking is irreducible to referential success because it is the result of a
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confluence of four factors: the way the underlying states are mapped to theoretical states, the
underlying dynamics, our experimental resolution limits, and the (un)availability of various
preparation procedures. “Referential success”, if at all relevant, at best captures something
about the first component, namely the mapping between true and theoretical states, but it
leaves out all the other crucial factors.
The unknown admixture of the above factors means that tracking is a referentially opaque
relationship, because the mapping cannot be “inverted” to find the true states unless the
other factors can be eliminated from the mix. And this brings me to the last but not least
difference between tracking and referential success.
3.3.2.4 Tracking and referential transparency
I have used the phrase “referential transparency” on several occasions. It is time to clarify
the concept. One way to formulate the idea of referential transparency is as follows: certain
components of successful theories give us direct knowledge of the ontology of the world. In
other words, if a theory is related to reality in a referentially transparent manner, then one
can “read off” the ontology of the world as soon as one knows which component of the theory
to believe. To put it in yet another form, referential transparency means that identifying
the essential content requires demarcation, but never reformulation or reconstruction: the
privileged components are simply “sitting there” somewhere in the theory, ready-made for
us, and all we need to do is carefully draw a line around them to separate the wheat from
the chaff.15 Formally speaking, if one thinks of theory-world relations as mappings that
take us from elements of reality to theoretical terms (such as the map that takes us from
Schrödinger states to Bohr states), referential transparency means that this mapping is a
“partially invertible” one.
Referential transparency also implies that identifying the essential content allows one to
predict (parts of) the ontology of future theories.16 This is because referential transparency
15Note that referential transparency does not mean separating the wheat from the chaff would be easy.
16Peters (2012, 139) and Leconte (2017, 3263) both mention this as a problem for current accounts of
essential content, for it would imply that we could predict the future of our current best theories, which
is presumably absurd. I am sympathetic to this objection, but my criticisms below will be based on other
considerations.
99
implies that one must expect the essential content to survive revolutionary theory change
more-or-less intact. For if a theoretical constituent directly corresponds to an element of
reality, no alteration in its content is to be expected when it reappears in future theories:
it will simply be “carried over” to the superseding theory. Thus, adherence to the idea of
referential transparency sends one searching specifically for theoretical constituents that have
been retained. Conversely, the assumption that essential content is always retained in future
theories more-or-less intact implies that those posits transparently refer to some element
of reality, for otherwise they would be expected to be substantially reformulated in future
theories. Therefore, referential transparency and retention mutually imply each other.
Referential transparency: The ontology of the world (and that of future theories) can be
directly read off the essential content, which must simply be demarcated (but not reformu-
lated) and which will be retained in future theories more-or-less intact.
The long-standing notions of “representation”, and “reference” are the canonical exem-
plifications of referentially transparent theory-world relations.17
Bohr’s theory is doubly referentially opaque. First of all, as said above, its entities,
properties, and structures are not reflected in reality as we know it. There are no point
particles resembling tiny grains of dust with mass and charge, and there are no entities
that orbit the nucleus in elliptical paths, etc. But the second – and in my opinion more
interesting – sense in which Bohr’s theory is referentially opaque is that even its states do
not transparently represent or refer to the true states of the system, despite the fact that
we have identified the state assignments as the essential content. Put differently, although
Bohr’s state assignments as a whole “latch on to” certain aspects of unobservable reality,
the mere fact that an individual Bohr state has been correctly assigned to a system tells us
very little about the actual state that the system is in at the time of assignment.
More generally, from the mere fact that a theory successfully tracks a system one can
infer very little about the true entities, true properties, true structures, or even true states
of the system. That is, as pointed out by Hertz, nothing except that they transition in
such a way that is compatible with whatever unknown mapping our theory is imposing
17And insofar as one accepts Laudan’s (1981, 33) argument – and it is typically accepted by both sides –
that the central terms of a truthlike theory must refer, truthlikeness also implies referential transparency.
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on them. Further, the fact that a theory tracks a system does not imply that anything
from the theory will be recognizably retained in subsequent theories. Of course tracking
does mean that there is a robust, systematic relationship between the unobservables of the
theory and those of reality, and this systematic relationship explains the empirical success
of the theory. Moreover, this explanation goes beyond antirealist explanations, such as van
Fraassen (1980, 40) and Wray’s (2007; 2010) evolutionary explanation, Laudan’s (1984)
methodological explanation, Fine (1986) and Lyons’s (2002, 78; 2003) “as if” explanation,
and Stanford’s (2000) predictive similarity. The former two types of explanation assume no
relationship between theory and reality at all, while the latter two assume a relationship
between theory and world, but a rather superficial one that is not systematic at the level of
unobservables.
Therefore, the prescriptive-dynamical view can be considered a form of selective realism,
but a rather novel one. It is selective in that it urges us to ignore the ontology (entities, prop-
erties, and structures) and only take the state assignments seriously as the essential content
of the theory. And it is realist in the sense that it supports the idea of a systematic relation-
ship between theoretical state assignments and the true dynamics of the system, and claims
that the theory’s predictive success can be explained non-miraculously through this system-
atic connection to reality. However, the prescriptive-dynamical view is not a realist position
insofar as “realism” is taken to involve the claim that the systematic theory-world relation
must be referentially transparent, i.e. that the essential content must be approximately true,
or that they refer to or represent objects in reality. Therefore, the prescriptive-dynamical
view provides a middle ground between the polar positions of realism and antirealism. As
such, whether the prescriptive-dynamical view is “realist” or “antirealist” might be to some
extent a matter of terminology. In any case, the exact relationship between my view and
the realism / antirealism divide is the topic of Chapter 4. For this chapter, I will leave it at
that.
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3.4 Assessing the Existing Accounts of Essential Content
In this section, I will firstly provide a general taxonomy and list of accounts that currently
exist, and secondly highlight the extent to which the (implicit) assumption of referential
transparency has affected the cogency and coherence of these accounts. Recall that referential
transparency implies and is implied by the assumption that the essential content must be
retained in future theories more-or-less intact. I will argue that most existing accounts are
unsatisfactory because of their insistence on retention.
But in fact my objection applies to both proponents and critics of selective confirmation.
I shall argue that the critics also share the (implicit) assumption of referential transparency,
and that this assumption is the reason why these critics miss the mark about selective
confirmation in general. To be clear, I find many of their critiques effective against the extant
accounts of selectivism, but I would argue that many of the same criticisms are ineffective
against a version of selectivism that relaxes the assumption of referential transparency, such
as the one I have offered.
Note: In the interest of brevity, I will not provide an exposition of the existing accounts in
this section. But since I am making substantial claims about what each account presupposes,
I must provide arguments and/or textual evidence. I have done this in Appendix C.
3.4.1 The presumption of referential transparency among the proponents of
selective confirmation
3.4.1.1 Synchronic indispensability accounts
The first and most natural way one might choose to tackle the issue of selective confir-
mation is through the idea of indispensability or ineliminability. The essential or working
posits are those constituents that cannot be eliminated without damaging the predictive
inferences of the theory. In a way, that is the very definition of essential content. However,
this definition can also be made into a criterion for choosing essential content, if one assumes
that dispensable posits can be directly detected as such by examining the flow of concrete
predictive derivations. The idea is that one can start eliminating various components of a
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given derivation until one reaches a bare-bone argument from which no further component
can be eliminated without undermining the conclusion. Whatever is left in this bare-bone
argument is then taken as the essential / working part of the theory.
The idea has been attributed, among others, to the original founders of selectivism,
namely Kitcher (1993, 143-149) and Psillos (1999, 110). The view attributed to Kitcher
entails retention of entities and/or properties, while that of Psillos presupposes retention
of hypotheses. Vickers (2013) sketches an algorithm for finding the essential content that
also assumes retention of hypotheses. And finally, Saatsi (2005) and Egg (2016) have offered
synchronic indispensability accounts which require retention of properties. (See Appendix C
for details.)
Specific considerations may be and have been raised against each of the above accounts
(see e.g. Lyons 2006; Stanford 2006; 2009; Chang 2003; Peters 2012; 2014). But I would
like to focus on a general problem that I believe affects all of the views above. This problem
stems from their common assumption of retention, which as said above is equivalent to
referential transparency. Synchronic indispensability accounts claim that there is a hidden
gem in every theory that will be preserved through all manner of theory change. This
may be an entity, a property, or a hypothesis, which will in the future find itself within
a radically different ontological environment but nevertheless manage to survive. Theory
change involves ontological implants, as it were. For instance, the assumption of an elastic
solid being the medium of light did not survive theory change, but certain properties of ether
did, for instance that it produces transverse vibrations.
What is rarely disucssed is whether and how such ontological implants are possible. If
a property is to be transferred to the ontological framework of a successor theory, the host
theory’s nexus of inter-related entities and properties must be “receptive” to the implant.
For instance, many properties of the electron, such as charge, have survived many episodes of
violent theory change since Thomson’s experiments despite the fact that our understanding
of the entity as a whole has radically changed (cf. Norton and Bain 2004). This is because
the new ontologies to which properties such as charge were transferred contained entities
that were capable of carrying charge.
The problem is that this is not always or even often the case. For any given entity or
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property, it is often the case that if one waits long enough, along comes a successor theory
that is simply ontologically too different to receive that particular entity or property without
jeopardizing its internal coherence. For instance, the concept of force, taken seriously, cannot
exist in general relativity without making nonsense of the latter theory. By “taken seriously”
I mean force in its full glory as it appears in classical physics: an entity of its own that
emanates from an object and acts on another to deflect its otherwise inertial path. No such
thing exists in general relativity, and more importantly, no such thing can exist in this theory.
For according to general relativity, all objects at all times follow their geodesics. Nothing
ever acts on an object and nothing ever “deflects” the object from its geodesic path. Further,
the gravitational effects that we recognize as such, for example the earth going around the
sun, are not the result of anything emanating from the sun, but rather due to the local
spacetime curvature that the earth feels. To be sure, this curvature is influenced by the
presence of the sun, but there is no vectorial quantity whose point of impact is on earth with
its direction pointing towards the sun’s center of mass and its magnitude proportional to
earth’s acceleration. Nor is there a gravitational potential, as the very concept of potential
energy is often ill-defined in general relativity.
It seems to me that situations akin to gravitational force in GR are more common in
the history of science that those like charge in quantum mechanics, and they become more
likely as more revoultions take place in the theoretical lineage. This should not strike one as
surprising given that theories are often substantially reformulated and reinterpreted in light
of subsequent developments. What made an old theory successful often has to be cashed out
in terminology radically different from the language used to formulate it originally. What is
surprising is that despite these truisms about theory change, philosophers have universally
insisted on the rigid concept of retention.
Indeed, I believe the fate of ether theories presents one such case of substantial refor-
mulation. As said above, selective realists have repeatedly claimed that the entity called
ether did not survive but some of its properties did. But since a property needs an entity as
a vessel to carry it, the property in question must now be carried by an entity other than
ether in the new theory. Now, this new entity must be very different from ether: that is
presumably why we are inclined to say that ether itself was not preserved. But the more dif-
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ferent this new entity is, the less reason we have to hope that this new entity can accept the
properties of ether without destablizing the new ontological framework. Take the property
of vibration, for instance. If we take the meaning of “vibration” seriously and in the way
it was intended in ether theory, then there cannot be vibrations in the modern theory, as
there is nothing to vibrate. The undulations in the electromagnetic field values in different
spatiotemporal locations are not vibrations. The very concept of vibration implies material
bodies that are rapidly and repeatedly moving to and fro around an equilibrium position. No
such thing is happening according to modern electromagnetism. Sure, E and B field values
vascilate in space in such a manner that if one fixed the frame of reference (since E and
B trade magnitudes upon change of frame) and went on to interpret each maximum as a
material body being the fartherst from its mechanical equilibrium and each minimum as the
body returning to its equilibrium, then one could present the vascilations as “vibrations”.
But apart from the fact that the fixing of reference frame would be totally arbitrary and
unphysical, the peaks of E and B fields are not bodies stretched farthest from the equilib-
rium for there is no “restorative force” inclining them to return, and when the field values
become zero, that is not a case of the body returning to its resting place for the value zero is
not special for E/B fields whereas the equilibrium point is special for a harmonic oscillator.
Moreover, vibration implies that the same body is going back and forth, but when the E/B
field acquires a non-zero value again, having momentarily vanished at some point along the
wave front, there is no sense in which it is “the same” field acquiring non-zero value again.
Stanford (2006, 171 ff.) has famously objected to Kitcher and Psillos’s treatment of the
ether case in part by arguing that such ontological selectivism would have been unintelligible
to contemporaneous scientists. He produces quotes from Maxwell, for example, to show that
he did in fact consider vibrations without a medium and judged it to be nonsensical. Stanford
brings this up as a way of showing that such butchering of ontology does not make sense
except in hindsight. But as I see it, hindsight is irrelevant to this problem: such ontological
butchering does not make sense, period. It did not make sense during Maxwell’s time, and
it does not make sense now. That is an analytic fact, and has nothing to do with hindsight
or historical context. There can be no vibrations without something that vibrates. End of
story. Thus, the problem with these accounts is not that they are retrospective, but that
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they are retentionist.
To be clear, I am not denying that there is some kind of abstract similarity between
vibrations of an infinite system of oscillating molecules in an elastic solid and the undulations
of continuous E and B fields18, but my point is that if one is being metaphysically honest,
ether’s property of vibration, as such, has not been preserved; it has rather morphed into
something that it was not. In a way, there is often a confession to the same effect in the
strange language that realists use to talk about retention. Having claimed that entities,
properties, structures, or hypotheses of past theories have “survived” theory change, the
realist immediately goes on to say that successor theories “converge” or “degenerate” to older
theories as “limiting cases” (see, e.g. Peters 2012, 45 ff.; Votsis 2011b, 4). But converging to
something in the limit is not the same as containing or retaining it. It is true that general
relativity goes over to Newtonian gravity if we assume slow motion of bodies as well as a
static and nearly flat metric, but that is a far cry from saying that gravitational forces are
retained in general relativity, which as I argued above, they certainly are not. If one insisted
on the language of retention in such cases, retention would be far too easy to come by to
have any significance (see Lyons 2016, 103 for similar complaints about the idea of similarity
“in the limit”).
In summary, it is often impossible to rip away a given posit from its home ontology and
force it to migrate into a new web of concepts in which it has no place. Usually, if the dis-
placed posit is to maintain its essence, the new framework must be awfully similar to the old
one, rendering the case of theory change less interesting. If the new framework is not similar
to the old one, on the other hand, then the old posit will most likely render it incoherent.
Cordero has expressed this elegantly: “Scientific theories are tight constructs, and breaking
them into parts is generally not doable... .” (2011a, 24) I conclude that synchronic accounts
of essential content that rely on a notion of retention (of entities, properties, or hypotheses)
are unlikely to succeed.
18A structuralist would call this a “structural similiarity”, but I believe there is a more meaningful way to
describe this similarity, namely in terms of state assignments tracking each other. See below.
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3.4.1.2 Diachronic indispensability accounts
The indispensability accounts we reviewed above are synchronic in the sense that they
claim to identify the essential content of a theory while the theory is still in place. More
recently, many diachronic accounts of indispensability have been proposed. The idea be-
hind these accounts is that one cannot know the essential content of a theory until it has
been thoroughly dissected, modified, and/or replaced in light of future investigation. Unlike
Psillos (1999, 112), who claims that contemporaneous scientists are often reliable judges of
indispensability, the proponents of diachronic accounts typically argue that scientists who
know what is (in)essential about a theory are those who investigate ways to modify or replace
the theory.
Note that although diachronic accounts are “retrospective” in the sense that they suggest
we find the essential content of a theory by examining subsequent theories, they are not
vacuous or question-begging in the way that Stanford worries all indispensability accounts
will be (see below). The reason is that diachronic accounts do not ask us to consider what has
been retained in current theories, but typically in immediately succeeding theories. Diachronic
accounts are therefore fully testable (assuming they provide unambiguous selection criteria)
and hence cannot be vacuous. To test a diachronic account of essential content, simply apply
the diachronic recipe to identify the essential content of a theory by examining its immediate
successors, and then see if the same content has been preserved in our current best theories.
If it has, then the diachronic account gets a boost; if it has not, the account gets refuted.
Harker (2010; 2013) proposes a diachronic account that adheres to retention of entities
and hypotheses. The same goes for Cordero (2011a; 2011b). Peters (2012) has suggested a
way of identifying essential content that may also be categorized as a diachronic account,
and it presupposes retention of entities and/or structures.19 (See Appendix C for details.)
As before, I am interested in a very general problem that all of the above-mentioned
accounts have: namely their insistence on “retention” and “preservation”. In the previous
section, I argued that synchronic accounts must play fast and loose with the latter concepts,
19Other diachronic accounts include Badino’s (2016) criterion of long-term entrenchment in “reliable sym-
bolic practices”, Onishi’s (2017) reliance on scientists’ long-term consensus, and Sakellariou’s (2011) account
of theory maturation.
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primarily because they overlook the fact that a theory must often be substantially reformu-
lated and reinterpreted in light of future theory before its essential content can be identified. 
Diachronic accounts are more promising in this regard, since they claim that one must wait 
for future theories to extract the essential content of a successful theory. This seems to 
suggest awareness of the need for reformulation. Unfortunately, such awareness has not been 
expressed so far.
If the theory need not be couched in radically new language in order to identify its 
essential content, then why is it that, in order to find it, we must wait for a tortuous process 
of distillation that according to the diachronic selectivist might take centuries? Why can we 
not simply look at the old theory while it is still practiced and find the essential content?
Stanford (2009, 385) challenges the selectivist to explain why contemporaneous scientists 
ever believed anything more than the working posits unless, as he argues, it is impossible to 
discover such posits except in retrospect. Cordero (2011a; 2011b) provides a possible answer: 
because there is often too much metaphysical prejudice among contemporaneous scientists. 
But Cordero’s answer is not satisfactory. It is not as though the successor theory’s only role 
is to disabuse us of prejudice, and as soon as that is done, suddenly our eyes are opened to 
the obvious working posits in front of us that we had so stubbornly refused to see. Rather, 
the successor theory allows us to see the working posits because, along with disabusing us 
of prejudice, it also reformulates the old theory in radically new language. Thus I believe 
that there is an answer better than either Stanford’s or Cordero’s to the question raised by 
the former: contemporaneous scientists often fail to see the essential content for what it is 
because the theory often needs to be substantially reformulated before this can be done. I 
therefore find Stranford’s objection forceful against the diachronic retentionist accounts such 
as above, but not against selectivism in general.
3.4.1.3 Structural realism
Structural realism is also considered a form of selective realism, as it urges us to ignore the 
“content” of a successful theory and focus on its “structure” instead. This view was brought 
to the contemporary scene by Worrall (1989), in a seminal paper in which he argued that
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structural realism would address the forces of both No Miracles and Pessimistic Induction.
Worrall’s idea struck the fancy of many philosophers of science, who have since advocated
various versions of it (see Ladyman and Ross 2007; French and Ladyman 2003; 2011; French
2006; Votsis 2011a).
Our concern is specifically with structuralist views regarding selective confirmation.
These include Worrall (1989; 1994), Ladyman (2011), and Votsis (2007; 2011a; 2011b).
All three selectivists presuppose retention of structure. (See Appendix C for details.)
Apart from specific objections to specific versions of structural realism (e.g. the Newman
objection against Ramsification), there are two major objections against structural realism in
general: i) that the notion of “structure” is too vague to be contentful, and ii) that structural
realists have not provided a reason to think that structures are success-generators.20 I suggest
that both of these problems can be traced back to the assumption of retention / referential
transparency.
The vagueness objection is by now fairly common in the literature. Harker (2010, 198),
for instance, complains that the definition of structure is “disconcertingly vague”; Lyons
(2016, 96) argues that structuralist responses to counterexamples have increasingly weak-
ened the notion of “structure” so much as to make it “vacuous”. See also Vickers (2016,
7), Saatsi (2017, 3238-3239), and van Fraassen (2006, 290) for similar considerations. The
situation is so bad that Votsis (2011b, fn. 2), a robust advocate of structural realism him-
self, admits that at a workshop featuring most structural realists, the participants could
not find one thing that their various notions of structure had in common. This is not
at all surprising, given that upon a quick survey of the literature, one finds “structure”
variously identified with: the mathematical equations themselves (Worrall 1989, 158), Ram-
sey sentences (Worrall 2007), set-theoretic / model-theoretic objects (French 2011; French
and Ladyman 2011), category-theoretic objects (Landry 1999; Bain 2013), frame-theoretic
objects (Votsis and Schurz 2012), group-theoretic symmetries (French 1999), whatever is
20In Ch. 2, I also objected to structuralism on the ground that theories do not have fixed structures due
to their open-ended nature. It has been shown for instance that the structure of the phase space depends in
part on the specific Hamiltonian being used, and according to my view Hamiltonians encode transition rules,
which are local and empirical (LEMPs) and hence open-ended. Cf. Lyons 2016, 101 for a similar objection
in the context of general relativity. Note that Lyons seems to view this open-endedness as a peculiar feature
of general relativity, while I have argued it is quite generic of physical theories.
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invariant under coordinate transformations (van Fraassen 2006, 291; North 2009), second-
and higher-order properties (Maxwell 1970, 18), relations21 among objects (Ladyman 2007;
French and Krause 2006, 172), relations among phenomena (Ladyman 2011, 98-99), modal
relations (Ladyman 1998; 2004; French and Ladyman 2003, 46), and a combination of state
space, dynamics, and symmetries (Reutsche 2002, 200; Bain [manuscript], 24). What one
never finds is whether and how any of these definitions are equivalent or even compatible.
In his attempt to clarify the notion of structure, for instance, Votsis (2007, e.g. 58-59, 62-
63) ironically moves swiftly between many of the above definitions, often within the same
paragraph, without commenting on their possible equivalence. As Lyons (2016, 96) has put
it: “there are more variants of structuralism than there are structuralists”!
The vagueness problem is rooted in the structural realist’s insistence on retention. Since
the latter commits one to finding something that can readily be recognized in both theories
as the same structure, and since as I argued above such things are very difficult to come
by, the structuralist’s strategy is often to look at the two theories’ central equations and
find something that looks similar between the two, and claim that that something is the
“structure” of the theory. For instance, consider two supposedly lucid examples Ladyman
and Ross (2007, 94-95) introduce in two consecutive paragraphs as a way to ease the reader
into the idea of structural realism: the first is a comparison between Galileo and Lorentz
transformations22, and the second between Newton’s F = ma and a similar-looking formula
that can be produced from the principles of quantum mechanics using Ehrenfest’s theorem.
It is not clear under what definition of structure these examples are both cases of structural
similarity. After all, the two pairs of equations are of radically different nature.
For one thing, one pair contains equations governing coordinate transformations which
say nothing about dynamics, while the other contains dynamical differential equations per-
taining to how objects move. The only thing the two pairs have in common is that both are
mathematical equations that look similar. This would perhaps be acceptable for those who
define structure as bare mathematical equations (never mind that those people are more-or-
less extinct these days, see Votsis 2007), but Ladyman and Ross are certainly not among
21Even the concept of “relations” is murky in this literature, as it is sometimes meant to exclude monadic
properties and others to include them. Cf. Votsis 2007, fn. 6
22Votsis 2011b, 6 also uses this example in service of structuralism.
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those people.
Secondly, the manner in which the two equations are similar is quite different. In the
case of Galileo vs. Lorentz transformations, the similarity consists in the fact that the two
sets of equations look the same except for a multiplicative factor of γ = 1√
1− v2
c2
. In the case of
classical vs. quantum mechanics, however, the similarity is that one can convert one equation
into the other by substituting symbols representing the expectation value of the position
operator with symbols representing classical position. And as we saw in §3.2.1.2, Vickers
finds structural similarity between two equations that differ by an additive term that becomes
small in the limit. One gets the impression that all there is to the structuralist’s claim is an
excited exclamation: “Look at them! See how similar they look!” As Stanford (2009, 387)
puts it in another context, the structuralist seems to be happy as long as “something [...]
somehow [...] somewhere” is preserved. This is of course to be expected if one’s ultimate
goal is to find something, anything, that looks similar in the two theories, rather than fixing
beforehand what one is looking for and then test to see if they are indeed similar.
The brings me to the second problem with structural realism, namely that it does not
explain how structures bring about predictive success. Following Psillos’s (1999, 146-161)
objections to structural realism, Harker (2010, 197) remarks: “A further argument is needed
to the effect that, if a theory correctly describes structural aspects of the world, then it
can be successful... .” After all, the aim of the selectivist is to identify those posits that
are responsible for success, not simply to find something or another that has been retained
(Harker 2013, 84-85). Pashby (2012, 470) points out that it is not enough to point to struc-
tural continuities through theory change, because there are often structural discontinuities
as well. One has no reason to point to the continuities as the source of success unless the
discontinuities have also been examined and shown to be irrelevant. Saatsi (2009, 333; 2017,
3238-3239) makes similar remarks.
The two examples provided by Ladyman and Ross signal the root of this problem as well:
as said above, one pair of equations designates coordinate transformations while the other
provides dynamical laws and, moreover, in the former case the similarity is due to difference
by a multiplicative factor, while in the latter it is due to the existence of a substitution
procedure that turns one into the other. One needs to hear a story about how each of these
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equations brings about success and why what they have “in common” is indeed the part that
generates success. On the contrary, the alarming truth is that in each case study, structural
realists all agree that the two theories have a structure in common, but they cannot agree on
what the two theories have in common (cf. Votsis 2011b, 3). Once again, this seems to be
due to the fact that the structuralist insists on finding something that has been retained, not
something that is resopnsible for success. As I argued above, essential content is typically
not retained. Nevertheless it is not surprising to find several strings of mathematical symbols
in some formulations of two empirically overlapping theories that look kind of similar to /
continuous with each other (cf. Pashby 2012, 465; Vickers 2016, 7). These two facts lead
to the structuralist identifying a different aspect as the “structure” every time. I therefore
agree with Lyons’s diagnosis: “the structuralist’s need for the retention of structure compels
the structuralist toward increasingly vacuous conceptions of ‘structure’.” (Lyons 2016, 96)
As a concluding remark, I would venture to guess that in those cases where the struc-
turalist has successfully identified the essential content, the “structural similarity” is better
described as a compatibility of state assignment rules. Indeed, Wallace (2012) has shown this
in the case of Ladyman and Ross’s example of classical vs. quantum mechanics. The situa-
tion with Fresnel and Maxwell is also a case in point. It is true that the success-generators
of Fresnel’s theory were his differential equations which carried over to Maxwell’s theory.
But since differential equations are input-output machines that take initial states to final
ones (see §3.3.2), it seems much more helpful to say that Fresnel’s theory was successful
because its state assignments, as captured in the differential equations, track those of the
modern theory. Similarly, I would argue that the state assignments of phlogiston and caloric
theories track certain transitions seen in processes of oxydation / reduction and heat trans-
fer, respectively. But a satisfactory treatment of the cases of caloric and phlogiston in the
prescriptive-dynamical view is beyond this chapter.
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3.4.2 The presumption of referential transparency among the critics of selective
confirmation
Critics of selective realism are just as guilty of presupposing retention / referential trans-
parency as its proponents. In this section, I will argue that this limits the scope of validity
of such criticisms.
Lyons (2002; 2006; 2009; 2016) marshals many interesting and potentially devastating
counter-examples to selectivism, but all of his counter-examples assume that selectivism
presupposes retention of hypotheses. Stanford (2006; 2009), one of the fiercest critics of
selectivism, similarly assumes the centrality of retention of entities in selectivism. (See
Appendix C for details.)
I suggest that Lyons and Stanford’s criticisms are valid but only against versions of se-
lectivism that adhere to referential transparency. Consider Stanford first. He objects that
selective realist views are bound to be retrospective (and thus uninteresting and/or totally
uninformative), as they require moves that would have been as much as unintelligible to
contemporaneous scientists. But the fact that identifying the essential content prospectively
is often difficult and the fact that the resulting selective picture is often incoherent / unin-
telligible are both rooted in the referential opacity of physical theories. Take the issue of
retrospectiveness. Because of referential opacity, the theory must be substantially reformu-
lated before its essential content becomes apparent, and it may be hard to find a footing
for this reformulation without help from successor theories. As we saw above, this does
not necessarily mean drawing on current theories, as Stanford claims. Retrospective does
not automatically mean question-begging or vacuous.23 Therefore, taken as a criticism of
all retrospective criteria (taking “retrospective” to include diachronic accounts), Stanford’s
objection is a straw man. But there is a valid point hidden in Stanford’s apparent overstate-
ment: the essential content is not just some subset of the theory’s posits as formulated; it is
often buried deep within the theory. This is the root of Stanford’s retrospectiveness objec-
tion. Similarly in the case of the uninformativeness objection, which is rooted in Stanford’s
claim about the unintelligibility of the proposals. In §3.4.1.1 above, I argued extensively that
23This point has been made in the literature: cf. Saatsi 2009, 361-362; Saatsi 2017; Sakellariou 2011, 121;
Votsis 2011a, 1230-1231; Peters 2012, 135 ff.; Onishi 2017, 8.
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this unintelligibility is due to insistence on retention, which results in the “butchering” of
the theory’s ontology. This is because of referential opacity: the fact that the theory needs
substantial reformulation to reveal its essential content means that the entities, properties,
etc. featured in the original formulation need not have any straightforward connection to
elements of reality. This means that one cannot hope to find the essential content by simply
isolating one component out of a theory and claiming that it represents something real that
will survive in future ontologies. Insisting on doing so often gives nonsensical results, not just
to contemporaneous scientists, but to anyone who adheres to the law of non-contradiction.
This is the root of Stanford’s uninformativeness objection.
Next consider Lyons. Lyons argues that it is impossible to find anything truthlike among
the premises that Kepler used to derive his area law, or those used by Laplace and Haüy to
derive the fixity of the rate of expansion of dilute gases. Nor does it seem that any of the
weaker implications of these premises can be claimed to be even approximately true. Now,
I do not contest this claim, but it seems to me that this is devastating to the selectivist
only if one insists on examining each premise individually. That is to say, if the procedure
is to choose one premise at a time and inquire about its essential content and then move
on to the next premise, one might well come back empty-handed. But this procedure is
only appropriate for someone who subscribes to referential transparency. On the contrary,
as I argued above, the theory might need substantial reformulation before its essence can be
brought out, and this reformulation need not contain any of the premises in their original
form. As a familiar example, consider how the reformulation of Lagrange’s variational theory
as a dynamical system does not contain the principle of least action. Lyons’s cases are only
knock-down arguments if it has been shown that there is no reformulation of the theory
that contains respectable essential content. As soon as one realizes this, Lyons’s objection
becomes much less conclusive. I do not pretend that this solves Lyons’s cases, but my point
is that Lyons’s arguments have a loophole that goes back to the (implicit) assumption of
retention / referential transparency. Therefore, the possibility of reformulations that could
save referentially opaque accounts of selectivism must be explored before one can pass a
verdict about these case studies.24
24That being said, it is possible that some historical examples may just be rare anomalies that were
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As such, Lyons and Stanford’s are legitimate objections to every account reviewed above,
but they are not legitimate objections to selectivism in general, for it is possible to be a
selective realist without endorsing retention / referential transparency. Of course Lyons
and Stanford might retort that they are not to blame for this assumption because they are
evaluating positions that make that assumption. But in that case they should not present
their arguments as if they are general.
3.5 Conclusion
I have argued that selectivism (i.e. the belief that the success of a scientific theory is
due to an essential subset of its posits) is motivated independently of the realism debate,
both through general arguments and through a case study of Bohr’s atomic theory. More
specifically, I have argued that the essential content of dynamical theories (such as Bohr’s
and most any other theory in physics) consists of their state assignment rules. Finally, I have
argued that the appropriate form of connection between a theory’s state assignments and
the true states of the system is captured in the tracking relationship. Unlike other accounts
of theory-world relations, tracking is referentially opaque and does not require retention of
essential content in future successful theories.
successful due to luck. Consider for instance Lyons’s (2006, 551-552) example of the Titius-Bode law, which
made novel predictions about the position of Uranus and some other celestial bodies, but which from the
contemporary point of view is an arbitrary constraint on initial conditions, which are unconstrained in
modern theory. It seems to me that even the antirealist cannot explain the success of this formula beyond
luck.
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Figure 1: Bohr vs. Schrödinger for hydrogen (fine structure exaggerated)
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Figure 2: Bohr vs. Schrödinger for orthohelium (fine structure suppressed)
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4.0 Chapter 4: Escaping the Fundamental Dichotomy of Scientific Realism
4.1 Introduction
My aim in this chapter is to provide an explanation of the success of physical theories from
a dynamical systems standpoint.1 As such, my focus is on dynamical theories and theories
that can be given a dynamical formulation, which includes virtually every predictive theory
in physics as well as theories outside of physics which are governed by differential or integral
equations. I will not argue for extending my thesis beyond this realm.
My explanation will be both realist and antirealist, or depending on one’s taste, neither
realist nor antirealist. It is realist in the sense that it explains the success of a dynamical
theory through intricate and robust connections between the theory’s theoretical terms and
unobservable reality, but it is antirealist in the sense that it does not require any sort of
referential transparency of theoretical terms (to be clarified below).
In Section 4.2, I will introduce a distinction between robust and unrobust explanations
of success and outline their use. In Section 4.3, I will elaborate on the notion of “referential
transparency”, and go on to highlight a widespread assumption which I call the Funda-
mental Dichotomy, according to which referentially transparent explanations are the only
robust explanations of success. I will provide textual evidence for my claim that the Fun-
damental Dichotomy has been assumed by realists and antirealists alike and has therefore
dominated the realism literature. I shall then proceed to provide criticisms of the Funda-
mental Dichotomy and the sketch of a third alternative called the “middle path”. In light
of this, Section 4.4 presents a Modified No Miracles argument that is liberated from the
Fundamental Dichotomy and naturally opens up the middle path. Finally, Section 4.5 is de-
voted to fulfilling the promise of the middle path by demonstrating robust yet referentially
opaque relationships between dynamical theories and unobservable reality under the rubric
of “tracking”.
1A dynamical system consists of a set of state assignments and a set of transition rules among those
states, provided the transition operator satisfies certain basic conditions. See (Giunti [2006]) for elaboration.
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4.2 Robust and Unrobust Explanations of Success
What explains the impressive, unparalleled success of science? One finds two types of
explanation for the success of scientific theories in the literature, which I shall call robust and
unrobust explanations, respectively. The former group of explanations appeal to particular
intrinsic features of the theory’s unobservable elements and their relationships to reality
in order to explain why the theory works. The latter group of explanations, on the other
hand, bracket any deep relationship the theory might have to unobservable reality, and
instead appeal to the methodology through which such adequate theories are constructed
and selected. Metaphorically speaking, if theories were extremely successful athletes, a robust
explanation of their success would appeal to muscle mass, lung capacity, bone structure, and
so on, and how these physiological features relate to the objective demands of the task; an
unrobust explanation, on the other hand, might suffice it to point out that the athletes have
gone through the federation’s stringent and competitive program that has selected the most
successful ones over time.2
Let us define these terms more precisely. The notion of “robustness” is inspired by the
invariance-based account of natural laws, which as Woodward ([2018]) has recently charac-
terized,
links laws of nature to invariance (aka stability, robustness). Laws are generalizations
about repeatable relationships that are invariant over variations in initial and other sorts
of conditions, at least within an appropriate range of such variations—invariant in the
sense that laws will or would continue to hold under such variations. Alternatively, laws
are generalizations that exhibit a certain sort of independence from initial conditions [. .
.] (Woodward [2018], p. 158)3
Woodward draws on some of Wigner’s ([1979]) musings on physical theories, according to
which the physicist’s central strategy is to separate out certain aspects of reality as initial
conditions and the rest as invariant regularities. This is in perfect agreement with a dy-
namical systems framework, for the latter takes the essential content of a theory to be state
assignment rules, which in effect tell us what variables to keep track of as the initial and
2This example is due to Leplin ([1997], p. 9).
3See also (Woodward [2003]; [2013]); (Mitchell [2000]); (Lange [2009]) for other formulations of the
invariance-based account of laws.
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boundary conditions (aka states), and what variables to record as transitions rules among
such states.
Although my concern in this chapter is with explanations of scientific success, not the
nature of laws, the notion of robustness is pivotal to my arguments below. For what is
impressive—or “miraculous” if you will—about the success of mature scientific theories is
not their success in making particular predictions, but rather the robustness of this success.
A false theory might get lucky with a series of predictions made under a specific set of
conditions, which in itself need not require much of an explanation beyond coincidence or
intentional design (example below); but if and when a theory continues to show resilience
in making correct predictions across a tremendously wide range of initial, boundary, and
external conditions, that would be surprising unless the theory had in some sense “latched
on to something”. Therefore, I urge, the challenge posed by the No Miracles argument is
not to explain success per se, but to explain the robustness of success in the case of mature
scientific theories.
Using the notion of robust success, I would like to define a notion of robust explanation of
success, which is simply an explanation that actually explains the robustness of the theory’s
success. To be robust, the explanation must first and foremost be intrinsic, that is it must
require mentioning at least some of the unobservable content of the theory as part of the
explanation of its success. Secondly, to be a robust explanation, the account must establish
a robust relationship between theoretical terms and unobservable reality that holds up under
a range of systems and conditions.
Robust explanation of success: An intrinsic explanation that establishes a robust formulaic
relationship between theoretical terms and unobservable reality.
Let me elucidate the above definitions through some examples. During the eighteenth
century, several astronomers including Titius and Bode realized that the semi-major axes of
solar planets follow a regularity captured by the equation a = 0.4 + 0.3× 2n, where a is the
semi-major axis in astronomical units and n can be −∞ (for Mercury) or an integer. This
“law” produced empirically adequate results for the positions of all known planets at the
time, and furthermore, resulted in novel predictions of the locations of Uranus and Ceres
prior to their discovery.
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How should one explain the novel predictive success of the Titius–Bode law? First of all,
an extrinsic explanation might draw on the process of discovery of the formula and claim
that the law was arrived at through a long numerical exercise and many trials and errors
(probably a historically inaccurate claim!), and thus that its success is not surprising. If
one should want to attempt an intrinsic explanation, on the other hand, one would have to
compare the content of the theory and its predictions with the truth. Now, by contemporary
lights, we do not know of any law or regularity that governs the locations of the planets, or of
a coherent way to assign probability measures to initial conditions for that matter. As such,
according to contemporary physics, initial conditions of the planets must be treated simply
as matters of brute historical fact, and any pattern among them is likely a mere coincidence.
If this is correct, then “the true theory” would not contain any formulaic procedure for
deriving the same predictions as the Titius–Bode law. One would simply have to show that
the specific numbers obtained through observations of planets’ locations (excluding that of
Neptune) happen to line up with the first few terms of the Titius–Bode sequence. There can
be no deeper explanation that penetrates the level of unobservable reality. Therefore, the
best explanation for the success of the Titius–Bode law is probably an intrinsic but unrobust
explanation.4
By contrast, consider Niels Bohr’s atomic theory. This theory was robustly successful: it
returned correct predictions for all single-electron systems (neutral hydrogen atom, ionized
hydrogen molecule, once ionized helium, twice ionized lithium, and the like) and in a wide
range of conditions including in different excitations (initial states) as well as in the presence
of external electric and magnetic fields (Stark and Zeeman effects, respectively). Bohr’s
theory broke down, however, as soon as spin came into play, which included phenomena
related to helium and heavier elements, the hydrogen molecule, and the anomalous Zeeman
effect. Nevertheless, as said above, the success of Bohr’s theory was robust enough with
respect to a fairly wide range of conditions, so much so that it provided the foundation for
its extremely successful successor, non-relativistic quantum mechanics. As such, the success
of Bohr’s theory likely calls for a robust explanation. I will present one such explanation in
§4.5 below.
4See (Lyons [2006], pp. 551–2) for further discussion of the Titius–Bode law.
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How does one generally provide a robust explanation of the success of a given theory?
First off, suppose we knew the true “God’s eye” account of the nature of the physical system
of interest, that is a (the?) theory all of whose terms correspond to objects of reality one-
to-one—call it “the true theory”—and suppose we are attempting to explain the success of
a given false theory through our knowledge of the true theory. A robust explanation of this
success would begin by specifying a concrete range of conditions, typically in the form of
constraints and resolution limits, and proceed to show that there is a formulaic relationship
between the laws of the false theory and those of the true theory that remains stable to
variations within said conditions.
In the absence of access to “the true theory”, one may still provide a working explanation
of the robustness of a false theory’s success by comparing the theory to a much better
successor. In such an exercise, one takes the successor theory to be a surrogate for the true
theory (that is, one imagines a world in which the successor theory is literally true) and goes
through the same procedure as above. Next, one examines whether the robustness of the
successor theory can in turn be explained by appealing to its successors, and so on. That is,
one would repeat the steps, this time taking what was surrogate truth as a false but robustly
successful theory and one of its superior successors as the surrogate truth. Since robustness
is transitive, if this cascade of robust relationships can be demonstrated, it would strongly
suggest the existence of a robust relationship between the original false theory and elements
of unobservable reality. To be sure, this cannot be established with complete certainty unless
one arrives at “the Truth”, but it can suffice to convince us of a robust relationship in the
meantime.
My overall aim in this chapter is to argue that, contrary to the antirealist, a robust
explanation is typically available for the success of dynamical theories, but one that, contrary
to the realist, does not appeal to referentially transparent notions such as truthlikeness,
representation, and structural similarity. The possibility of such a compromised explanation
has been either ignored or outright denied by both realists and antirealists alike, which brings
me to the next section.
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4.3 The Fundamental Dichotomy and the Middle Path
4.3.1 Referential transparency
Metaphorically speaking, “referential transparency” is typically characterized by the idea
of “reflecting” or “mirroring” reality. The reflection may be of entities, properties, structures,
or what have you, but the point is that the way things truly are is transparently carried over
to the way things are in the theory. Less metaphorically, I am speaking of the assumption
that the hidden ontology or structure of the world can be read off the essential posits of at
least some formulation of the theory.
Referential transparency: There is some formulation of the theory such that the ontology
or structure of (unobservable) reality can be read off the essential posits of the theory in
that formulation.
A few clarificatory notes on referential transparency are in order. First of all, referential
transparency does not imply that a unique ontology must be read off the theory. Consider the
different interpretations of quantum mechanics such as Everettian and Bohmian QM.5 Realist
adherents of all these different interpretations disagree on which formulation is correct, but
they do not disagree on whether the correct formulation of the theory—whatever it may
be—is referentially transparent, which is to say the ontology or structure of the correct
interpretation of QM reflects the ontology or structure of the world.
Secondly, even considering a single formulation of a given theory, different adherents
of that formulation can disagree on the true ontology of reality if they disagree on what
the essential posits of the theory are. The idea of essential posits (originating in Kitcher
and Psillos) is that every theory comes with a set of core assumptions (“essential posits”)
to which the theory owes its empirical success, plus potentially other extra baggage (“idle
posits”) that play no role in the success of the theory. For instance, Kitcher ([1993], p.
143) argued that the existence of luminiferous ether was inessential to the empirical success
of nineteenth-century electromagnetism, and therefore that a realist commitment to those
theories does not commit one to the existence of the ether. Kitcher still assumes that the
5I am indebted to an anonymous reviewer for this example.
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theory is referentially transparent: that whatever part of the theory is responsible for its
empirical success does enable us to directly read off the (unobservable) ontology of the
world; the disagreement is simply on which part is responsible for empirical success.
Truthlikeness, which is closely associated with all manner of scientific realism (including
structural realism), represents the most common and arguably strongest form of referential
transparency. As Chakravartty explains: “Epistemologically, realism is committed to the
idea that theoretical claims (interpreted literally as describing a mind-independent reality)
constitute knowledge of the world” ([2017], §1.2). Boyd similarly argues that approximate
truth involves interpreting scientific theories “realistically” ([1983], p. 45) and “at face
value” ([2002], §1).6 The thesis of semantic realism thus implies a particularly strong form
of referential transparency: it states that there is some formulation of the theory – namely
the literal formulation – from which the ontology or structure of (unobservable) reality can
be read off.
4.3.2 The Fundamental Dichotomy
4.3.2.1 Statement of the Dichotomy
It has been (tacitly or explicitly) assumed throughout the literature that there is only
one way to provide a robust explanation for the success of a theory: by appealing to some
referentially transparent notion such as truthlikeness, representation, or structural similarity
between the theory and the unobservable world. Consequently, the literature is characterized
by a widespread presupposition that if realism in the sense of referential transparency turns
out to be unacceptable, then one has no choice but to default to unrobust explanations and
bracket any discussion of how the intrinsic features of the theory compare to features of
unobservable reality. I shall call this the Fundamental Dichotomy:
Fundamental Dichotomy: Referentially transparent explanations are the only robust expla-
nations of success. Any explanation of a theory’s success must either appeal to referentially
transparent relations, or to no robust world–theory relation at all.
6See also (van Fraassen [1980], §1.2); (Psillos [1999], p. xix); (Liston [2016], §5) on the role of literal
interpretations in scientific realism.
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Interestingly, as said above, the Fundamental Dichotomy is taken for granted by both realists
and antirealists a claim I will defend in the following.
4.3.2.2 The Fundamental Dichotomy: the case of realists
What Musgrave ([1988]) refers to as “the Ultimate Argument” for scientific realism states
that unless a predictively successful theory is approximately true and its theoretical terms
referentially successful, the predictive success of the theory would have to be seen as an
implausible sort of “miracle” or “cosmic coincidence”. Since a reasonable explanation must
avoid such cosmic coincidences, the argument goes, the best explanation for the predictive
success of the theory is that it is approximately true and referentially successful.
The most commonly quoted passage in this context is from Putnam’s Mathematics,
Matter and Method, where he characterizes truthlikeness as “the only philosophy that doesn’t
make the success of science a miracle’ (Putnam [1975], p. 73). The following, less commonly
quoted passage from Meaning and the Moral Sciences is more elaborate:
And the typical realist argument against idealism is that it makes the success of science
a miracle [. . .] And the modern positivist has to leave it without explanation (the
realist charges) that “electron calculi” and “space-time calculi” and “DNA-calculi” correctly
predict observable phenomena if, in reality, there are no electrons, no curved space-time,
and no DNA-molecules. If there are such things, then a natural explanation of the success
of these theories is that they are partially true accounts of how they behave [. . .] But if
these objects don’t really exist at all, then it is a miracle that a theory [. . .] which speaks
of curved space-time successfully predicts phenomena. (Putnam [1978], pp. 18–9)
One can also find very similar passages in earlier writings by Smart (see ([1963], p. 39);
([1968], p. 150)), who in addition to “miralces”, often speaks of “cosmic coincidences” and
“innumerable lucky accidents’ as alternatives to realism.
These passages by Smart and Putnam are puzzling to say the least. In uncharacteristic
fashion for a piece of analytic philosophy, no explicit argument is offered. One rather finds
a series of rhetorical questions sandwiched by mere assertions. And to make matters worse,
the assertions themselves involve several mysterious, undefined terms such as “inexplicable”,
“without explanation”, “coincidence”, and “miracle”. One is left wondering: what is bad
about coincidences and miracles that disqualifies them as explanations? And what is the
connection between all these terms that licenses moving from one to another?
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Let us start with “inexplicable”. Since the argument is typically couched in a framework
of inference to the best explanation, these assertions are typically interpreted as saying that
the best explanation of scientific success is approximate truth. Under such an interpreta-
tion, when Smart and Putnam claim that barring realism, scientific success would be left
“inexplicable” or “without explanation”, one must read them as meaning to say “without
plausible alternative explanation”. After all, a coincidence (or a “miracle” for that matter)
is an explanation, too. In fact, in some cases coincidence is the best explanation (say if
I run into an old friend while thinking about them). However, the idea goes, in the case
of scientific success, mere coincidence is not a good explanation. Under this reading, all
that matters about terms such as “coincidence” and “miracle” is that they are extremely
improbable events, which I take it is why they are bad explanations.
The above reading would remove part of the puzzle about these passages, but one is
still left wondering: what justifies the swift move between “without (plausible alternative)
explanation” on the one hand, and “coincidence” or “miracle” on the other? Are Smart
and Putnam equating “coincidence” with “inexplicable event”?7 Clearly, not all implausible
alternative explanations of success must draw on coincidences. Here is one implausible expla-
nation of the success of science that does not draw on coincidences in the sense of extremely
unlikely events: God had arranged the world in a pre-established harmony to make sure that
the false theories appealing to human psychology are also predictively successful, without
the theories having any intrinsic relationship to unobservable reality. And of course less
outlandish examples are found in the methodological explanations advocated by antirealists
(see below). This becomes even more puzzling once one realizes that Putnam himself was
aware of methodological explanations of success, and spent considerable effort to critically
evaluate them in other contexts (Putnam [1981], p. 195; [1963a/1975], p. 280; [1963b/1975],
p. 295).
The fact that Putnam makes no reference to methodological explanations in the context
of No Miracles suggests that he does not see methodological explanations as rivals to the
type of explanation he is looking for in the passages above. Putnam must be demanding
7Van Fraassen assumes this reading: “it is illegitimate to equate being a lucky accident, or a coincidence,
with having no explanation” ([1980], p. 25).
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“explanation” in a specific sense that cannot be substituted by any amount of methodological
explanation, for it does not compete with it. This special sort of explanation, whatever it
may be, must be “non-coincidental”. This would explain Smart and Putnam’s apparent
jump from “inexplicable” to “coincidental”.
This makes the passages above much more plausible, but at one cost: one must assume
that approximate truth is the only non-coincidental explanation of success. Now, although
the aim of this chapter is precisely to argue against the latter assumption, one can see how
Smart and Putnam would have been led to it. They take the essential content of a scientific
theory to be a static description of entities, properties, and/or structures. And the most
obvious—arguably the only—robust relation a static description can have with the thing it
describes is for the description to be (approximately) true of the thing described, and/or for
the terms of the description to somehow mirror the thing described.
The assumption that referentially transparent explanations are the only robust explana-
tions of success has subsequently become far more explicit in the realist literature. Niiniluoto,
who has perhaps made the most significant attempts at rigorously defining truthlikeness8,
puts it most unequivocally:
[A]n explanation of the ability of a scientific theory to yield successful predictions . . . has
to refer to some permanent property of the theory, which describes its relation to the world.
Truthlikeness is the best—even the only—property I know that could serve this function.
(Niiniluoto [1999/2002], p. 198)
In my terminology, the requirement that the explanation of success “refer to some [. . .]
property of the theory” is the requirement that the explanation be intrinsic. More specifi-
cally, the condition that the explanation of success refer to a “permanent” property which
“describes [the theory’s] relation to the world” entails a robust explanation. Under this
reading, the last sentence of the quote above effectively asserts a version of the Fundamental
Dichotomy.
The Dichotomy is also implied when realists swiftly move from some theory–world re-
lationship to truthlikeness specifically. For instance, Leplin implies that the only way to
“capture” some features of natural processes is to “reveal some significant truth” about
them ([1997], p. 104). The situation is similar with Worrall:
8See (Niiniluoto [1987]; [1998]; [2003]).
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How, it seems natural to ask, could Fresnel’s theory correctly make a prediction [of the
bright spot at the centre of the shadow of a disk] that is so at odds with what “background
knowledge” would lead us to expect, unless it had somehow or other latched on to the way
that light really is? The theory, it seems natural to conclude, must be at least approximately
correct if it can get such a striking prediction right. (Worrall [2007], p. 126)
There is a very quick transition in this passage between the idea that the theory “latches
on to” the inner workings of light and the idea that the theory makes correct descriptive
assertions about light (in Worrall’s case, about the “structure” of light). This creates the
impression that except through truthlikeness, there is no way to flesh out this relation of
“latching on to”. Once again, if we let phrases such as “latch on to” and “capture” be
metaphors for robust theory–world relationships, Worrall and Leplin’s statements amount
to saying that the only way for the theory to have a robust relationship with the world is
truthlikeness, which is a version of the Fundamental Dichotomy.
Incidentally, this highlights the stark contrast between my middle path proposal and
structural realism, which was also introduced as some sort of “third way” or “the best of
both worlds”: the structuralist insists on keeping some (attenuated) notion of truthlikeness
and referential transparency. In essence, the structural realist takes the lesson of the No
Miracles argument to be truthlikeness, and that of Pessimistic Induction to be a denouncing
of entities. However, I argue that we should take the lesson of No Miracles to be the necessity
of a robust theory–world relation (of which truthlikeness is a special case), and the lesson
of Pessimistic Induction to be a denouncement of all referential transparency, whether it
pertains to entities, properties, structures, or states.
One can infer the tacit assumption of the Fundamental Dichotomy from many other
realist texts, but the point has been made.9
In the next section, I will argue that the presupposition of the Fundamental Dichotomy
has been as prevalent among antirealists as it is among realists.
9See (Park [2001], Ch. 3), (Niiniluoto [2018], p. 163), (Alai [2014]). Recently, Williams has proposed
what he calls effective realism, which cautions against simplistic or literal readings of theories. Nevertheless,
Williams continues to hold on to referential transparency for a select group of entities picked out through
renormalization techniques (see (Williams [2019], p. 221)).
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4.3.2.3 The Fundamental Dichotomy: the case of antirealists
The methodological explanation of scientific success, pioneered by van Fraassen ([1980]),
Wray ([2007]; [2010]), and Laudan ([1984]), goes something like the following. It is a brute
fact that occurrences in our world exhibit regular, repeatable patterns. Some of these reg-
ularities are bound to percolate up to the level of observables and generate patterns of
observable regularities. A theory that captures all these observable regularities is called
empirically adequate. Since these are brute facts, the only question left to address is: how
do we come up with such successful theories? The answer according to the methodological
view is that our successful theories are successful because they have gone through a brutal
process of modification with very high selection pressure—“a jungle red in tooth and claw”
(van Fraassen [1980], p. 40). New modifications of our ideas are being presented all the
time and the ones that ever so slightly deviate from observable results are discarded. It is
no surprise, then, that the ones that survive turn out to be pretty empirically adequate.
The mark of the Fundamental Dichotomy can be found in the classic passages in which
van Fraassen introduced the idea of an “evolutionary” explanation of success:
I can best make the point by contrasting two accounts of the mouse who runs from its
enemy, the cat. [The first is:] the mouse perceives that the cat is its enemy, hence the
mouse runs. What is postulated here is the “adequacy” of the mouse’s thought to the
order of nature: the relation of enmity is correctly reflected in his mind. But the Darwinist
says: Do not ask why the mouse runs from its enemy. Species which did not cope with their
natural enemies no longer exist. That is why there are only ones who do. (van Fraassen
[1980], p. 39)
As the passage above makes clear, van Fraassen envisions two possibilities: either something
in the mouse’s brain accurately reflects something in the world, or else there is nothing to
be said about what is on the mouse’s mind. The former option represents a referentially
transparent explanation, with the word “reflect” signifying the idea of mirroring unobservable
reality in a transparent manner. The quietist option, on the other hand, represents giving up
on trying to find any robust relationship between the mouse’s mental goings on and facts of
reality. This false dichotomy serves to hide the third, middle path option: that something in
the mouse’s brain robustly tracks something in reality within the typical contexts in which
the mouse finds itself, without that “something” having to “reflect” anything in reality.
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Laudan also reveals his commitment to the Fundamental Dichotomy in the course of
discussing his own methodological explanation of success:
When we ask why scientific theories work so well, we might be asking [. . .] to be told
what semantic features theories possess in virtue of which they have such an impressive
range of true consequences. Alternatively, when we ask why science is successful, we might
be asking an epistemic and methodological question about the selection procedures which
scientists use for picking out theories with such impressive credentials. If, as I suspect, it
is generally the latter which we are driving at, then the realist response becomes even less
availing than it already appears to be [. . .] (Laudan [1984], pp. 91–2)
Laudan seems to be presenting us with the following choice: either a semantically defined
property of the theory explains its success (which will lead to the truthlikeness thesis), or the
explanation must draw on no world–theory relationship at all, but only on a theory–theory
relationship (namely having been arrived at through stringent testing of a former hypothesis).
Once again, we are told that if truthlikeness doesn’t work, then the world–theory relation
must remain mysterious.10
Stanford ([2000]) does not directly appeal to methodological explanations, but rather to
the notion of predictive similarity.11 Nevertheless, Stanford also relies on presupposing the
Fundamental Dichotomy. He writes:
[There is] no clear reason to expect a successful novel prediction to be much more likely (if
more likely at all) to come from an approximately or partially true theory than to come
from a false theory that has nonetheless managed to make predictions sufficiently similar
to the theoretical truth of the matter [. . .] (Stanford [2000], pp. 281–2)
[T]he proposal offered here does not appeal to a relationship between a theory and the world
at all; instead it appeals to a relationship of predictive similarity between two theories. (p.
276)
Granted that there is no reason to assume successful novel predictions to come from ap-
proximately or partially true theories, why should the alternative on offer give up on all
world–theory relationships altogether? Once again, it is the Fundamental Dichotomy at
work.
Other examples can be proliferated ad nauseum12, but the above should suffice to show
that antirealists have been committed to the Fundamental Dichotomy.13
10See (Wright [2002]; [2014]) for a slightly different methodological explanation of success.
11See (Psillos [2001]), (Park [2003]), (Musgrave [2007]) for discussion.
12See (Lyons [2003]); (Hoyningen-Heune [2011]); (Dawid [2018]).
13Arthur Fine has famously suggested that we break free from both realism and antirealism, but as far as
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I have argued that both realists and antirealists widely adhere to the Fundamental Di-
chotomy. Next let us see why the Dichotomy must be rejected.
4.3.3 Problems with the Dichotomy and the prospect of a middle path
There are many problems with the assumption of the Fundamental Dichotomy. In par-
ticular, there are three reasons for rejecting it.
For one thing, existing philosophical theories which rely on the two horns of the Di-
chotomy are notoriously inadequate in meeting the demands of both No Miracles and Pes-
simistic Induction arguments: many robust explanations that rely on referentially transpar-
ent notions (for instance entity realism) are too demanding to pass the test of history; others
involve technical terms that are so watered down and fragmented (for instance “structure”
in structural realism) that it is unclear what substantive commitments are entailed by the
view. On the other hand, unrobust explanations allow that the matching regularities of
observable and theoretical terms be taken as “merely a brute fact” (van Fraassen [1980],
p. 24; see also (Boyce [2018])). This dodges the historical counterexamples, but leaves one
deeply unsatisfied on No Miracles grounds.
Secondly, the Dichotomy does not exhaust the logical space. For while a referentially
transparent theory–world connection is sufficient for removing the appearance of miraculous
success, it is not necessary. A robust formulaic connection, on the other hand, is arguably
both necessary and sufficient for the same purpose. On the flip side, while denouncing all
robust theory–world relations is sufficient for avoiding historical counterexamples, it is not
necessary. A referentially opaque relation, on the other hand, is arguably both necessary
and sufficient for the same. Consequently, insofar as “realism” requires commitment to
referential transparency and “antirealism” requires bracketing of all robust theory–world
relations, realism and antirealism do not exhaust the space of logical possibilities.
Thirdly and most importantly, I maintain that the Dichotomy can be shown to be demon-
strably false through case studies. One can present examples from the history and practice
explaining the success of scientific theories goes, Fine resorts to a form of “quasi-realism” or “surrealism”
(Leplin [1987]), according to which the world behaves as if the theory is true (Fine [1986], p. 160), which is
an unrobust explanation of success.
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of physics where a robust but referentially opaque relationship can be demonstrated between
the theory and a much better successor, and between the successor and its successor, and
so on, which given transitivity strongly indicates a robust-yet-opaque relationship to “the
true theory”. Such case studies thus serve to motivate a middle path between realism and
antirealism from both directions: they show both that a theory’s success is owed to intri-
cate connections to unobservable reality and that these connections fall short of referential
transparency.
Consider the example of Bohr’s atomic theory. Bohr ([1913]) posited that an atom is
analogous to a mini-solar system, the nucleus being the “sun” and the electrons orbiting it
being like “planets”, but with one important restriction: of all the orbits that are classically






where E is the binding energy of the electron, R is the Rydberg constant, and n is an integer
known as the principal quantum number, which labels the discrete energy levels. Bohr called
these discrete permissible states “stationary states”. Bohr further posited that the electron
does not emit radiation unless it “jumps” from one stationary state to another, in which




(En − Em). (14)
Using these state assignment rules, Bohr was able not only to explain the line spectra of
hydrogen, but also to make impressive, novel predictions about the spectral lines of once
ionized helium, twice ionized lithium, and other single-electron ions. These successes report-
edly prompted Einstein to say “the theory of Bohr must then be right!” (See (Pais [1991],
p. 154).)
The empirical data to which Bohr responded was spectral lines—little bands of light
emitted from stimulated atoms and molecules. Since these lines are characterized by fre-
quency and intensity, and since frequencies and intensities can be inferred from suitable
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state assignments, Bohr’s theory owed its success solely to its state assignments.14 In par-
ticular, the ontological assumptions about the mini-solar system and the Kepler orbits play
no more than a heuristic role in the theory (see (Norton [2000], pp. 86–7)).15
Importantly, the source of Bohr’s success is not inferred from comparison with successor
theories or otherwise through the benefit of hindsight. Indeed, as early as the 1920s, the idea
of dispensing with classical orbits and focusing on state assignments was gaining popularity
among physicists including Bohr himself. Van Vleck discussed whether this “bold proposal”
would “invalidate” the successes of Bohr’s theory and concluded in the negative (Van Vleck
[1926], pp. 108–9). Similar arguments regarding the dispensability of ontology and essential-
ity of state assignments for Bohr’s success were made by Born ([1925], pp. 113–4), Kramers
([1924], p. 311), and Heisenberg (letter to Kronig 6/5/1925).
Thus, one can directly demonstrate that the success of Bohr’s theory was not due to the
referential success of its mini-solar system ontology. Hindsight, while unnecessary, certainly
confirms this: if our current theories are on the right track, then the ontological descriptions
of Bohr’s theory were completely unreferential: there are no such things as little grains of
charged dust swirling around the nucleus in classical multi-periodic orbits much like a mini-
planetary system. Consequently, there is no interesting sense, and certainly no transparent
sense, in which Bohr’s theoretical entities, properties, or structures refer to or represent
unobservable reality. This rules out one horn of the Dichotomy.
At the same time, one can also show that Bohr’s stationary states have a robust (albeit
referentially opaque) connection to the Schrödinger state assignments, and the latter to
quantum field theory, and so on (see §4.5 for proofs). The success of Bohr’s model is therefore
not a “coincidence” or simply due to the meticulous process of theory selection: there is an
intrinsic reason why Bohr’s state assignments work, namely that they are connected to
the true state assignments in the right way. As I explain below, this connection is called
“tracking”.
As such, my explanation of the success of Bohr’s theory goes beyond traditional antirealist
14Spectral lines were also found to have polarization and phase. These features can easily be derived from
Bohr’s state assignments as well.
15For further discussion, see (Vickers [2012]; [2018]).
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explanations of success and falls short of traditional realist explanations.16
We are now ready to revisit the No Miracles argument in light of the above considerations.
4.4 Taking Stock: a Modified No Miracles Argument
Traditionally, the No Miracles argument is characterized along the following lines (from
(Niiniluoto [2018], p. 159)):
P1: Many theories in science are empirically and pragmatic [sic] successful.
P2: The truth or truthlikeness of scientific theories is the best explanation of their empirical
and pragmatic success.
C: Hence, conclude that such successful theories are truthlike.17
I find this formulation unhelpful, in part because the way P2 is phrased, it says nothing
about the implicit demand that the explanation be intrinsic and robust, and it masks the
tacit assumption of the Fundamental Dichotomy. To remedy these defects, I propose that
the original No Miracles argument be formulated as follows:
Q1: Mature scientific theories are robustly successful.
Q2: Unless the theory were referentially transparent, the success of the theory would be a
confluence of countless coincidences (a “cosmic coincidence”).
Q3: Cosmic coincidences are extremely improbable events (“miracles”).
C: In all probability, mature scientific theories are referentially transparent.
To be clear, in this reading “coincidence” is not defined as an unexplained or extremely
unlikely event, but rather as the line-up of two events that have no intrinsic or robust
relationship to each other. A “cosmic coincidence” is simply defined as a confluence of
numerous coincidences. A “miracle” is then defined as an extremely unlikely event. With
that in mind, Q2 follows from the fact that our theories are robustly successful (hence the
“confluence”) plus the assumption of Fundamental Dichotomy. Q3, on the other hand, is
proposed as an empirical claim (not a matter of definition).
16The false character of the Fundamental Dichotomy has recently been recognized by Kyle Stanford in a
2017 talk in honour of Philip Kitcher’s seventieth birthday in which he introduces the phrase “middle path”
(Stanford [unpublished]; see also ([2018])).
17See also (McCain and Kampourakis [2019], pp. 246–7) for a similar formulation.
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As the textual evidence above indicates, all efforts on the antirealist side have been
focused on refuting Q3: antirealists have argued that the cosmic coincidence of robust success
is not improbable at all, either because history presents us with many clear cases of it
or because science follows a rigorous methodology that is designed precisely to produce
such cosmic coincidences. As I have been arguing, however, the bigger problem with the
traditional No Miracles argument is Q2 (not Q3), because it presupposes a false dichotomy.
In light of this, I propose the following, Modified No Miracles argument:
R1: Mature scientific theories are robustly successful.
R2: Unless the theory were robustly related to unobservable reality, the success of the
theory would be a confluence of countless coincidences (a “cosmic coincidence”).
R3: Cosmic coincidences are extremely improbable events (“miracles”).
C: In all probability, mature scientific theories are robustly related to unobservable reality.
In this argument, R2 follows directly from the fact of robust success (expressed in R1) plus
the definition of “coincidence” (which is defined as lack of robust relationship). Thus, unlike
the deeply problematic Q2, R2 is indisputable (indeed it can be removed from the argument
as it adds no new information). R3, on the other hand, maintains the same status as Q3:
it is put forth an empirical claim. Therefore, as long as one accepts that science is robustly
successful, the entire force of the Modified No Miracles argument stands and falls with R3.
Perhaps there are reasons to doubt R3. But my goal here is not to question that premise.
Rather, I wish to argue that one can comfortably take Modified No Miracles as a forceful
argument and respond to its force without positing problematically transparent notions of
reference. The task is therefore to find an explanation of success that makes sense of the idea
that the theory “gets something right” or “latches on to” or “captures” something about the
inner workings of the system, and yet avoids commitment to referential transparency. This
is the topic of the next section.
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4.5 Tracking: Robust but Referentially Opaque
4.5.1 The basic features of the tracking relationship
4.5.1.1 Tracking defined
I propose that the dynamical systems framework allows us to solve the problem of success
by providing a robust world–theory relation that explains success but without referential
transparency (even of the retrospective kind). This relationship is called tracking. Given
two dynamical systems DS1 = (S,Dδ) and DS2 = (S
′, D′δ), where S and S
′ are sets of states
and Dδ and D
′
δ transition operators, we have:
Tracking: DS1 tracks DS2 if and only if there is a mapping from S
′ to S (inducing equiv-
alence classes on S′) such that members of each equivalence class defined on S′ transition
in a manner that is indistinguishable according to the same state assignment rules at least
within a range of contexts.18
More formally: if we denote the mapping by m : S → S ′, we say that DS2 tracks DS1 if and
only if the mapping and the transition operators “cooperate” (or “commute”) in the sense
that
∀s ∈ S,m(Dδ(s)) ≈ D′δ(m(s)). (15)
In other words, DS2 tracks DS1 if and only if the result of evolving an S-state and then
mapping it to S ′ is the same as mapping to S ′ first and then evolving the S ′-state.19
Tracking means that these equivalence classes are dynamically preserved within the ap-
propriate range of contexts, which means that all states that are in the same equivalence
class as each other will transition to other states that are also in the same equivalence class
as each other. In other words, if two “lower” states are mapped to the same “higher” state,
18The term “tracking” appears in a few other places, including the title of Psillos’s book: Scientific Realism:
How Science Tracks Truth and “tracking theories” in epistemology associated with Dretske, Nozick, and
others (see: (Dretske [1970], [1971], [1980]); (Nozick [1981]); (Roush [2005])). The similarity in terminology
is purely linguistic: Psillos is a straightforward entity realist who believes in the strongest form of referential
transparency, and the “tracking theories” in epistemology concern tracking the truth value of propositions,
not dynamical states.
19Variants of tracking have been defined by Wallace ([2012]), Rosaler ([2015a]), Yoshimi ([2012]), and
Guinti ([2006]).
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then the “lower” dynamics takes the two lower states to other states that are also mapped
to the same higher state.
I will showcase a few examples of tracking below, but first let us briefly explore some of
the unique features of tracking that set it apart from other explanations of success.
4.5.1.2 Tracking is referentially opaque
One might be tempted to say that tracking is a form of referential success. After all, does
tracking not imply that the higher-level states refer to those lower-level states that transition
indistinguishably? In other words, are the theoretical terms not picking out certain natural
groupings of the underlying states that evolve similarly?
The answer is no. Since tracking depends on the interaction between the underlying
transitions and the mapping between the two sets of states, it cannot be reduced to any static
or atomistic referential relationship. There is nothing natural or inherent about the groupings
themselves: the equivalence classes do not share any property that could be described purely
at the level of truth and without reference to the higher-level theory. To see this, first note
that successful state assignments are not unique. Consider a deterministic system with four
true states S1, ..., S4 and let the transition rules be S1 → S3 and S2 → S4, and suppose
the characteristic magnitudes of the two transitions are roughly equal. Now consider the
following three ways of mapping (“lumping”) the underlying states into equivalence classes
of theoretical states:
1) Assign {S1, S2} ↔ ST , {S3, S4} ↔ S′T
2) Assign {S1, S2} ↔ ST , {S3} ↔ S′T , {S4} ↔ S′′T
3) Assign {S1} ↔ ST , {S2} ↔ S′T , {S3} ↔ S′′T , {S4} ↔ S′′′T
It is easy to verify that the coarse-grainings in (1) and (3) result in state assignments that
track the underlying dynamics, whereas the ones in (2) fail to do so. Now compare the
assignment {S1, S2} ↔ ST in (1) to the same assignment in (2). Both assignments lump the
same underlying states into the same equivalence class, yet one is successful and the other is
not. Clearly, the success of (1) is not due to the fact that ST “picks out a real property” of
the system, or else the same assignment would not fail in (2). The proponent of referential
success might try to attribute this to the fact that (2) fails to lump S3 and S4 together.
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Perhaps by failing to put the latter two states in the same equivalence class, (2) fails to
represent an important property that they share and thus fails to predict. In other words,
perhaps (2) is being too fine-grained for its level. But this cannot be right, because the same
fine-grained assignment works perfectly well in (3). In short, the success and failure of state
assignments cannot be decided in isolation. It is the entire set of state assignments that
either tracks or fails to track as a whole.
As we have seen, tracking is irreducible to referential success because it is the result of a
confluence of many factors including the way the underlying states are mapped to theoretical
states and the underlying dynamics, not to mention the constraints on the system and our
experimental resolution limits.
4.5.1.3 Tracking is stronger than empirical adequacy
I have argued that tracking is weaker than referential success. For it to be a genuine third
option, tracking must also be stronger than mere empirical adequacy. This is indeed the case:
tracking is a relation involving theoretical states, and the latter are typically unobservable.
To use the Bohr example again, what one directly observes (measures) are little bands of
light called spectral lines. According to Bohr’s theory, the frequency of each line is given
by the difference of two energy states: νnm =
1
~(En − Em). Thus, one always observes νnm,
but never En or Em itself. Since the theoretical states are unobservable, tracking expresses
more than a relationship among observables and is therefore stronger than mere empirical
adequacy.
Indeed, tracking would be stronger than empirical adequacy even if the theoretical states
were directly observable. Consider a theory of macroscopic objects in which the state of the
system simply consists of the position of the object (an observable). Is tracking distinct from
empirical adequacy in that case? The easy answer would be yes, because in addition to the
theoretical states, the relation described in a tracking claim has the true states as one of its
relata, and the true states are presumably unknown to us.
Granted their conceptual possibility, what can we say about the actual existence of
theories that are empirically adequate but do not track? The Titius–Bode law discussed in
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§2 above provides an example: it is empirically adequate insofar as it predicts the locations
of solar planets up to Neptune, but one that likely tracks no underlying reality insofar as it
imposes law-like restrictions on what we now recognize as brute initial conditions with no
deeper dynamics to track.
What if there is a deeper dynamics to track and the theory does posit a state space?
Could such a theory be successful without its states tracking the true states of the sys-
tem? The answer is yes. Consider the case of blackbody radiation. In the latter half of
the nineteenth century, the quest was on to explain the spectrum of radiation from perfectly
absorbing materials known as “blackbody objects” (typically a dark cavity with a hole) when
in thermal equilibrium with the environment. More specifically, the focus was on experimen-
tally derived relations that expressed the power irradiated as a function of temperature and
frequency of radiation. The phenomenologically accurate formula for blackbody radiation
was later discovered by Planck and is known as the “Planck distribution law”:




where ν is the frequency of radiation, P is the power radiated per unit solid angle per unit
area per unit frequency, and α is a temperature-dependent constant. However, a few years
before Planck introduced his complete formula, Wien as well as Planck himself derived the
following formula for blackbody radiation from classical thermodynamic considerations20:




It is easy to see that for sufficiently large frequencies (αν  1), the −1 term in the denom-
inator can be ignored and Planck’s distribution law reduces to Wien’s formula. As such,
Wien’s formula is empirically adequate at predicting radiated power for higher frequencies
of radiation (in agreement with experimental results by Paschen and others at the time),
although it breaks down in the low-frequency region.
However, Wien’s theory does not track the true underlying dynamics of blackbody radi-
ation even in the region in which it is empirically adequate (higher frequencies). The reason
20For a brief account of how Wien and Planck derived their respective formulae, see (Mehra and Rechenberg
[1982], p. 24); (Crepeau [2009]).
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is that the higher frequencies correspond to electron transitions near the nucleus, which is
the proper realm of quantum mechanics. Wien, on the other hand, assumed a classical state
space in accordance with Maxwell’s molecular theory.21 Taking quantum mechanics as the
surrogate truth, one can see that the continuous state space of classical physics simply fails
to track the discrete state space of the electron in this region.22 Contrast this to a hypo-
thetical theory QM* which prescribes the same state assignments as quantum mechanics for
transitions near the nucleus but diverges from the latter for higher orbits. Such a theory
would be as empirically adequate as the Wien formula, but unlike the latter, it would also
track the true dynamics of the system in the high-frequency regime.
To summarize, I have argued that tracking is stronger than empirical adequacy both on
conceptual grounds and on the basis of concrete examples.
This concludes my general remarks on the properties of tracking. In the following, I will
explore several concrete examples of tracking.
4.5.2 Fulfilling the promise: some examples of tracking
In this subsection, I will explore several examples where a theory tracks a successor.
The examples show the simultaneous rigour and flexibility of the notion of tracking, and
exemplify my assertions above regarding the cascade of robust relationships.23
One can provide a general format for tracking explanations as follows:
Steps to providing a tracking explanation of the success of a (dynamical) theory:
1- Specify constraints and resolution limits that delineate the context / range of robustness
of successful theory.
2- Demonstrate a mapping between the state assignments of the (surrogate) true theory
and those of the theory in question.
21Note that the phrase “Wien’s approximation” can be misleading: the formula was theoretical, not
approximate or phenomenological.
22I will not go into the proof of the latter statement, but the argument is roughly as follows: For the
continuous state space of classical mechanics to track the discrete state space of quantum mechanics, certain
constraints must be met (see (Rosaler [2015b]) for details). One of these constraints is that the fluctuations
in the force field be negligible within the spread of the wave packets in the system: 〈∂V∂x 〉 ≈
∂V (〈x〉)
∂〈x〉 . This
condition fails near the nucleus where the Coulomb force varies dramatically from one orbit to another,
which is the source of the higher frequencies.
23One example that I shall not explore due to limited space is that of classical mechanics tracking non-
relativistic quantum mechanics. The main elements of the proof of this relation can be found in (Rosaler
[2015b]). See also (Wallace [2012]).
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3- Show that the mapping from step 2 is dynamically preserved by (aka “commutes with”)
the underlying “true” transition rules within the constraints and resolution limits specified
in step 1.
Let us see how this works.
4.5.2.1 Old quantum theory tracks non-relativistic quantum mechanics
Let the nth Bohr energy state be denoted by Sn and let the quantum mechanical states
be Hilbert states of the form |ψn〉 = |φn〉 |s〉 (where |φn〉 is the spatial part and |s〉 the spin
part of the Hilbert state with principal quantum number n). Taking quantum mechanics
as the surrogate truth, we have the following robust explanation for the success of Bohr’s
theory:
1.1. Constraints: The system contains no more than one electron.
1.2. Resolution limits: Spin-related splittings are ignored.
2. Mapping: Let m(|ψn〉) = 〈ψn|H∗ |ψn〉 = En, where H∗ is a Hamiltonian operator
from which all spin-related terms have been eliminated, and En is the energy contained in
the spatial part of the state.
We must show that Sn = En, or that the mapping indeed takes us from Hilbert states
to Bohr states. In the case of a central Coulomb force (which was the primary source of
Bohr’s success in terms of spectral lines and most other experiments of interest), the mapping
can be demonstrated directly by calculating the states in both theories and showing that
Sn = En =
~R
n2
, where R is the Rydberg constant and n the principal quantum number. More
generally, one can convince oneself that the two theories lead to similar state assignments
for systems with one degree of freedom and no spin, by noting that the quantum mechanical
commutation relation [q, p] = i~ can be obtained from the Bohr–Sommerfeld quantization
condition
∮
pdq = n~ through Heisenberg’s substitution recipes. However, it is not possible
to provide a rigorous formal proof that the two sets of states coincide, and they may not for
many potential functions other than that of the Coulomb force.
3. Robustness: We must show that within the relevant constraints and resolution limits
(1.1 and 1.2 above) if Si = Ei then Sf = Ef where the subscript i denotes initial states and
f final states. The following considerations should reassure us that this is the case. First
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of all, since there is only one electron in the system (condition 1.1), the energy of the bond
between the single electron and the nucleus is the only relevant quantity in the experiments
to which Bohr’s theory answers. Thus, there are no extra degrees of freedom to which the
energy of the electron can be transferred as a result of time evolution. Moreover, since
spin-related interactions are ignored (condition 1.2), the Hamiltonian which generates the
evolution operator will contain no spin-related terms, which means that states of the same
spatial character but different spin would transition similarly within the accepted resolution.
Therefore, the energy of the one spatial degree of freedom encodes all of the transition rules
of interest in these contexts.
Secondly, since time evolution is linear in quantum mechanics, the transitions are fully
deterministic, which implies that any two initial states with the same spatial energy content
will transition to two final states with the same spatial energy content24. Since Bohr’s states
pick up the spatial energy content, this means that any two initial states that map to the
same Bohr state will transition to two final states that also get mapped to the same Bohr
state. This indicates that the mapping from surrogate truth to unobservable theory is robust
within the constraints and resolution limits above. This completes our tracking explanation.
The above argument is admittedly rather qualitative and leaves out a direct comparison
between the transition rules of the two theories. Normally one would show the robustness
of the relation by appealing to the compactified versions of the two theories’ transition
rules (see examples below). However, this cannot be done in this particular case, because
neither theory actually provides any way to compactify the transition rules of interest. Old
quantum theory notoriously struggled with compactifying the intensity rules that provide
the transition probabilities between pairs of Bohr’s stationary states; and non-relativistic
quantum mechanics cannot accommodate particle creation (or annihilation), which means
that it has no transition rules for going from a state without a photon (the electron’s initial
state) to one in which a photon is emitted (the electron’s final state). Therefore, one could
not hope for a formal proof.
24By “spatial energy content” I mean the quantity En = 〈ψn|H∗ |ψn〉, where H∗ is a modified Hamiltonian
without spin.
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4.5.2.2 Free, spinless non-relativistic quantum mechanics tracks quantum field
theory
Next let us consider the relationship between non-relativistic quantum mechanics and
its successor quantum field theory. Let the “higher-level” states be spinless wavefunctions












Fock space of a free Klein–Gordon field with the transition rules
∂
∂t
|φ〉 = − i
2
∫
d3y[π̂2 + (∇ξ̂)2 +m2ξ̂2] |φ〉 , (19)
where ξ̂ is the Hilbert operator associated with the Klein–Gordon field and π̂ its conjugate
momentum. Taking the latter theory as the surrogate truth, we have the following robust
explanation of the success of the former theory:
1.1. Constraints: The spectrum of |φ〉 quickly drops beyond a certain momentum pmax,
given by α(k ≥ pmax) 1.
1.2. Resolution limits: Fluctuations of order pmax
m
are ignored; that is: O(pmax
m
) ≈ 0.
2. Mapping: Let m(|φ〉) = e−i(m+E0)t 〈0| ξ̂(x) |φ〉, where E0 is the vacuum energy.
Like before, we show the coincidence of the two sets of states simultaneously with the
proof of robustness, which shows that e−i(m+E0)t 〈0| ξ̂(x) |φ〉 satisfies the same equation of
motion as ψ(x, t).
3. Robustness: Using the above conditions and the transition rules (19) for the free
Klein–Gordon field, we can show the following robustness result:
∂
∂t
[e−i(m+E0)t 〈0| ξ̂(x) |φ〉] ≈ i
2m
∇2(e−i(m+E0)t 〈0| ξ̂(x) |φ〉). (20)
A proof of (20) is provided in (Rosaler [2015a], Appendix). Comparison of (18) and (20)
completes our proof that a free Schrödinger particle tracks a free Klein–Gordon field within
the conditions above. The case of an interacting (as opposed to free) quantum field theory
is substantially more difficult and will not be discussed here.
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Note: the foregoing is an illustration of the “cascade” of tracking relations discussed in
§4.2 above: Bohr’s atomic theory tracks non-relativistic quantum mechanics, but the latter
theory itself tracks relativistic quantum field theory. Thus, since tracking is transitive, Bohr’s
atomic theory also tracks quantum field theory.
However, the argument above only deals with spinless states. We need a separate argu-
ment to show that non-relativistic spin states also track relativistic quantum mechanics.
4.5.2.3 Spin states track relativistic quantum mechanics





whose transition rules are given by the Pauli equation:
∂
∂t




(~σ.(p̂− qÂ))2 + qV̂ I2
]
|s〉 , (22)
where ~σ is a vector whose components are the three Pauli matrices, q is the electric charge
of the system, Â is the electromangnetic vector potential operator, V̂ the scalar potential















































































































where N is a normalization constant and c1−4 depend on the initial conditions. These states





γ0(i~γ.~∂ − qγµAµ −mI4)
]
|φ〉 . (24)






), and I4 is the 4×4
identity matrix. Einstein notation has been used, which means repeating indices are summed
over, with µ = 0, 1, 2, 3. Expression (24) is essentially the Dirac equation, but rewritten to
make it explicitly a set of temporal transition rules. Taking the Dirac theory as surrogate
truth, one can robustly explain the success of spin states as follows:
1.1. Constraints: a) Only states of positive energy have interactive modes, which means
one can effectively set ∀k c3(k) = c4(k) = 0. b) The spectrum of |φ〉 quickly drops beyond a
certain momentum pmax, given by c1(k ≥ pmax) 1 and c2(k ≥ pmax) 1.
1.2. Resolution limits: Fluctuations of order pmax
m
are ignored; that is: O(pmax
m
) ≈ 0.
2. Mapping: Let m(|φ〉) = e−imtP+ |φ〉, where P+ is a projection operator from the



















(~σ.(p̂− qÂ))2 + qV̂ I2
]
(e−imtP+ |φ〉). (26)
A proof of relation (26) can be found in (Holland and Brown [2003]). The robustness is
evident from comparing (22) with (26).
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4.6 Conclusion
In this chapter, I argued against the prevalent assumption that the only robust explana-
tions of scientific success are referentially transparent explanations (truthlikeness, referential
success, structural similarity), which I called the Fundamental Dichotomy. I argued that it
is possible, at least in the case of dynamical theories, to provide robust explanations of the
success of a false theory without appealing to referentially transparent notions. This type of
explanation for dynamical theories is called tracking. Tracking provides a middle path be-
tween realism and antirealism, such that, in agreement with the realist, the theoretical terms
are systematically related to unobservable reality so the theory could be said to be successful
as a result of “latching on to something unobservable”, but in agreement with the antirealist,
this latching does not require representing unobservable reality in any transparent fashion.
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5.0 Chapter 5: A Reinterpretation of Umdeutung in Prescriptive-Dynamical
Terms
5.1 Introduction
In this chapter, I will argue that the history of the creation of modern quantum mechan-
ics is a perfect lesson in the making of a prescriptive-dynamical theory. More specifically,
the transition from Bohr to Heisenberg can be characterized as a struggle to break free
from descriptive-ontological constraints and focus on the prescriptive-dynamical aspects in
creating a theory.
In the following, I will begin Section 5.2 by introducing the puzzle of Heisenberg’s cryptic
reasoning in his groundbreaking paper of 1925 based on two vague principles of Correspon-
dence and Observability. I will discuss some technical preliminaries in Section 5.3 that are
needed for understanding the issues that motivated Heisenberg, then go on to discuss the Cor-
respondence Principle (Section 5.4), the Observability Principle (Section 5.5), and finally how
Heisenberg put the two together to make quantum theory into a fully prescriptive-dynamical
theory (Section 5.6).
5.2 Heisenberg’s Sketchy Principles
Heisenberg’s renowned Umdeutung paper of 1925 (“A Quantum-theoretical Reinterpre-
tation of Kinematic and Mechanical Relations”) marks the advent of modern matrix me-
chanics. It is a truism among historians of quantum theory that Heisenberg was led to
his “reinterpretation” of quantum theory by means of two principles: the Correspondence
Principle (CP) as proposed by Bohr, and the Observability Principle (OP) as promoted by
Pauli and Born. Heisenberg himself speaks of “sharpening the correspondence principle”
(Heisenberg 1925a) and using “only relations between observable quantities” (1925b) as his
guiding philosophies. However, both principles are notoriously vague and versatile, and that
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has made it difficult to determine the exact role played by each principle in the development
of Heisenberg’s project. Some authors (Darrigol 1992, 273 ff.; Mehra and Rechenberg 1982,
vol. II, 284 ff., Beller 1999) consider CP as the fundamental principle at work in Heisen-
berg’s Umdeutung and chalk up Heisenberg’s references to observability as reflections after
the fact and mostly a matter of lip service to appease the two staunch advocates of Machian
empiricism, namely Born and Pauli; other historians (Hendry 1984; Beller 1983; cf. Holton
1984, Ch. VII) find OP and the influence of Pauli to have played a much more central role.
Apart from the obscurity of the two principles themselves, Heisenberg makes things more
difficult by concealing much of his reasoning and mostly presenting the conclusions.1
My aim in this chapter is to argue that Heisenberg’s utilization of both the Correspon-
dence Principle and the Observability Principle serve the same purpose: to turn Bohr’s quan-
tum theory into a fully prescriptive-dynamical theory by removing the descriptive-ontological
elements. As we shall see, in old quantum theory, CP served to provide the transition rules
among Bohr’s stationary states; these transition rules were to be computed through some
sort of “averaging” of the Fourier coefficients that resolve the electron’s initial and final
orbits, and often also of the orbits in between. This meant that the transition rules were
partially open-ended and partially fixed: they were open-ended insofar as the exact “aver-
aging” procedure was left to be determined locally and empirically; but they were fixed, i.e.
constrained, insofar as the transition amplitudes had to add up to a Fourier expansion of a
classically allowed orbit.
However, much of the physics community at the time came to the conclusion that one
must get rid of the orbits altogether. Heisenberg was the first to execute this in what
shortly after came to be known as matrix mechanics. By removing the description of orbits
from the theory, Heisenberg achieved two simultaneous goals: firstly he freed the transition
amplitudes from descriptive (orbital) constraints, which eliminates the fixed part of the Cor-
respondence Principle and leaves only the open-ended part, thus making the theory truly
prescriptive; secondly he purged the theory of all quantities other than states and transi-
tion amplitudes, i.e. of all non-dynamical quantities (which he confusingly referred to as
1Heisenberg’s omission of his reasoning includes both the philosophical and the mathematical arguments.
But while the latter has been largely unpacked by subsequent readers (see Aitchison et. al. 2004), the former
remains somewhat mysterious and is the subject of this chapter.
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“unobservable quantities”), thus making the theory truly dynamical. Thus, what Heisen-
berg means by “sharpening the correspondence principle” essentially amounts to making CP
fully open-ended, while what he means by using “only relations between observable quan-
tities” amounts to making CP fully dynamical (both goals being achieved through removal
of descriptive constraints). Therefore, the prescriptive-dynamical view is perfectly suited for
understanding both of Heisenberg’s principles as well as this episode of history more gener-
ally. As I’ve explained in the other chapters regarding the prescriptive-dynamical view, the
descriptive aspects of theories are considered inessential or even detrimental to the predic-
tive power of the theory, and the transition rules in particular should not be constrained by
global descriptive requirements, as they are open-ended and local. And that is indeed the
hard-earned lesson of Bohr and Heisenberg in the early 1920s.
In summary, I shall argue that Heisenberg’s “reinterpretation” can be reinterpreted as the
first direct attempt at constructing an explicitly and purely prescriptive-dynamical theory
at the expense of the (inessential) descriptive-ontological aspects. Let us begin by studying
some technical aspects of Bohr’s framework that will prove crucial in our historical journey.
5.3 Preliminaries of Bohr’s Atomic Theory
The story of Bohr’s atomic theory begins in 1913 with Bohr’s trilogy “On the Constitution
of Atoms and Molecules”, in which Bohr introduced the notion of discrete energy states
known as stationary states, and ends in 1925 with Heisenberg’s “A Quantum-theoretical
Reinterpretation of Kinematic and Mechanical Relations”, which is commonly taken as the
birth of modern quantum mechanics. One crucial struggle that ran through this twelve-year
journey, and bookended it by looming large in both of Bohr and Heisenberg’s works, was
the issue of determining and compactifying the probabilities (or amplitudes2) of transitions
among various pairs of stationary states. Making the transition rules manageable is why CP
2A transition amplitude is a complex number whose modulus squared gives the transition probability:
|Cnm|2 = Pnm. One of Heisenberg’s discoveries was that one needs the complex phase for the calculations
to work out, and thus that solutions to the dynamical equations must always be transition amplitudes, not
transition probabilities.
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was introduced, and why Heisenberg invented his matrix mechanics (as a “sharpening” of
CP). To see why transition rules were such a major source of grievance for quantum theorists
between 1913 and 1925, we need to review some basics of Bohr’s theory.
By the time Bohr entered the scene, experimentalists working on hydrogen and other
elements had already found rigorous empirical regularities in the frequencies of spectral lines3.
In particular, it was known that one could find a series of terms such that each observed
frequency can be written as the difference of two terms in the series. These were called term
series (Kragh 2012, 57-58). It was known, for instance, that the frequencies of hydrogen







where R is the Rydberg constant and n and m are natural numbers and n ≥ m. The series
were typically given names for each choice of m: the case of m = 1 was called the Lyman
series, m = 2 was referred to as the Balmer series, and so on.
Bohr’s primary aim in his 1913 paper was to derive the Rydberg formula above. While
his initial calculations follow a rather convoluted path, Bohr eventually provided an elegant
way to deduce Rydberg’s formula as follows. In any standard Kepler problem with the
central force F = − k
r2





where E is the energy of an orbiting object of mass m, and J is the object’s angular momen-
tum. Given this, Bohr’s innovation was essentially to make the following two assumptions:




(En − Em) (30)
where ~ = h
2π
is Planck’s constant and En and Em are the energy contents of the initial and
final orbits, respectively. The first assumption amounts to the claim that only a discrete
subset of all classically allowed Kepler orbits are permitted in quantum theory, i.e. that the
3Line spectra are bands of light of discrete frequencies emitted when a dilute sample of an element is
stimulated (usually through electricity).
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electron can exist permanently only in a set of stationary states, while the second assumption
amounts to stipulating that the electron emits no radiation unless it “jumps” from one
stationary state to another, in which case it emits a monochromatic radiation carrying an
amount of energy equal to the difference of energy between its initial and final states, which
implies the frequency relation (30) once we recall Planck’s relation E = ~ω. The two formulae
(29) and (30) together entail the Rydberg formula (27).
In this way, Bohr provided clear rules for assigning states to the atom and interpreted each
spectral line as the result of a transition between two states. The fundamental assumption
that allowed Bohr to provide state assignment rules was that the angular momentum of
the electron must be an integer multiple of Planck’s constant, i.e. J = nh. Since Bohr
had originally assumed that electrons follow a two-dimensional orbit (staying on the same
plane throughout), there was only one component of angular momentum to quantize. But
what if there are more than one degrees of freedom, e.g. if the electron follows a three-
dimensional trajectory? In that case, one would hope that a similar quantization condition
can be imposed on every component of angular momentum. In Hamiltonian mechanics for




where Ji is the ith component of angular momentum, qi the ith generalized coordinate and
pi the corresponding conjugate momentum, and the integral is taken over a complete period.
One would therefore hope for a quantization rule such as:
Ji =
∮
pidqi = nih (32)
where ni is the ith quantum number. However, this procedure is ambiguous, for with more
than one degree of freedom, one can describe the system in any number of different coordinate
systems (Cartesian, spherical, hyperbolic, etc.), and equation (32) would result in different
quantizations depending on the choice of coordinates. So in what coordinate system should
one quantize the angular momentum? The solution to this problem was provided by the
action-angle formulation of Hamiltonian mechanics, which is designed to find the preferred
coordinate system in which the total action is separable into a sum of actions for each
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coordinate: S(q1, q2, ..., qd) = S1(q1) + S2(q2) + ...+ Sd(qd), where d is the number of degrees
of freedom. The action-angle formalism was therefore perfect for Bohr’s quantum theory.
However, the quantization condition (32) is still very limited in scope, since it only applies
to exactly periodic orbits, and thus rules out many promising orbits that are not exactly
periodic. The action-angle formalism came to the rescue again: another great advantage of
this formalism is the fact that it allows one to decompose non-periodic orbits into a sum
of terms, each of which is periodic, with each term corresponding to a distinct frequency.
This was known as the theory of multi-periodic orbits, which remained at the foundation
of old quantum theory until 1925. With the help of action-angle variables and the theory
of multi-periodic orbits, one could write almost any orbit that remains confined to a finite













~τ cos[(~τ .~ω)t+ α
(n)
~τ ] (34)
where the superscript (n) designates the nth stationary orbit, ωi is the frequency correspond-
ing to the ith preferred coordinate, the Rs are real numbers which may be function of the ωs
themselves, and the αs are called phases. For the sake of simplicity, we will drop the vector



















In order for x(t) (or whatever function is being decomposed) to be real, we must have
C−τ = C
∗
τ , where ∗ indicates complex conjugate. As we shall see shortly, decomposing the
orbit into a Fourier series expressed in separable coordinates was crucial for the consistency
and applicability of Bohr’s theory and for the formulation of the Correspondence Principle.
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Two aspects of Bohr’s proposal were puzzling, if not shocking, to his contemporaries:
first of all, Bohr’s theory flew in the face of the longstanding empirical fact that the frequency
of a wave, and in particular that of an electromagnetic wave, is identical to the mechanical
frequency of oscillation at the source which generates the wave. A charged harmonic oscillator
with a mechanical frequency ν, for instance, would generate electromagnetic radiation of
frequency ν. Similarly, according to classical electromagnetism, a particle following an orbit
such as equation (35) would simultaneously radiate waves of frequency τ.ω for all values of τ
for which the Cτ coefficients do not vanish. According to Bohr’s theory, however, the electron
emits no radiation while following x(n) above, and instead radiates only when jumping from
x(n) to some lower orbit x(m) (assuming n is greater than m); the frequency of radiation
emitted during this process has in principle nothing to do with the ωi, seeing as it is given
by the difference of energy between x(n) and x(m) in accordance with equation (30) above.
The fact that Bohr’s theory completely divorced the radiated frequency from the mechanical
(orbital) frequency was not only surprising, but also potentially inconsistent with the results
of classical electromagnetism.
The second puzzling fact about Bohr’s theory was that it said nothing about the in-
tensities of spectral lines: in any given spectrum, some lines appear brighter than others,
suggesting that transitions corresponding to the brighter lines occur with higher probabil-
ity than those of the fainter lines. Classically, the intensity of each mode of radiation of
frequency τ.ω is proportional to |Cτ |2 (Larmor’s formula). But Bohr’s original proposal
provided no guidelines for how to approach the question of the regularities of intensities.
Now, from a prescriptive-dynamical point of view, the fact that Bohr’s theory does not
predict intensities is not only unproblematic, but actually desirable, because the prescriptive-
dynamical view requires that transition rules (“LEMPs”) be open-ended and determined
locally and empirically. This means that the theory cannot possibly predict what the tran-
sition rules are going to be, and any theory that puts restrictions on the transition rules can
get in trouble in new contexts of application. In Hamiltonian mechanics, for instance, the
Hamiltonian encodes the transition rules, and the Hamiltonian is not a theoretically-fixed
quantity: it simply depends on the system of interest. In diffusion theory, the diffusion
function is not theoretically predicted or restricted, and is simply read off the local data
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pertaining to the fluid under study (see Chapter 1 for elaboration of this point).
Nevertheless, a good dynamical theory provides a procedure for compactifying the transi-
tion rules. Hamiltonian mechanics encodes the transition rules in the Hamiltonian function,
FLRW cosmology encodes them in the equation of state, and so on. Without a compactifi-
cation technique, the transition rules will be a massive table of unorganized numbers. One
could in principle read off the transition probabilities of different quantum jumps in Bohr’s
theory from the empirical data pertaining to the intensities of the lines, and these lines did
in fact follow certain rather simple regularities such as ∆k = 0,±1 for the azimuthal quan-
tum number in many cases. But there were too many exceptions and irregularities, and the
procedure would often prove cumbersome and unsatisfactory. It was nonetheless practiced
to some extent: for instance, Sommerfeld was in close collaboration with Paschen, whose
experiments informed Sommerfeld’s continual updating of his intensity rules (Kragh 1985;
2012, 162). But this was always a source of dissatisfaction with Bohr’s framework.
Bohr attempted to get a handle on both troubling aspects of his theory by visiting a
particular classical limit which I have referred to as the low-frequency, high-quantum number
regime in Kaveh 2014. If the initial and final orbits are characterized by quantum numbers
n and m, respectively, this regime amounts to the condition that n − m  n,m. First of
all, it can be proven (Van Vleck 1924, ft. 4) that in this limit, the radiated frequency ωnm
is related to the mechanical frequency of motion ω through ωnm ≈ (n − m)ω. If we now
let τ := n − m, we recover the classical fact that the radiated frequencies are harmonics
of the mechanical frequency as expressed in equation (35). This helps alleviate the first
concern, for it shows that at least in some classical limits, the longstanding principle of
the coincidence of mechanical and rediative frequencies can be salvaged. This is sometimes
called the correspondence theorem, not to be confused with the Correspondence Principle.
At the same time, the correspondence theorem hints at a solution to the second puzzling
aspect of Bohr’s theory, namely the problem of intensities. If each term τ.ω in the Fourier
decomposition corresponds to a transition n → n − τ with frequency ω(n, n − τ), then one
would expect each coefficient C
(n)
τ to be related to the probability Pn,n−τ of the transition
n→ n−τ . The reasoning is as follows. First of all, as said above, the coefficient C(n)τ provides
the intensity amplitude for the mode of frequency τ.ω in classical electromagnetism. Now,
154
classically, all modes are radiated simultaneously, whereas in Bohr’s theory only one mode is
emitted in each jump. However, if the probabilities of the jumps are adjusted appropriately,
one would get the appearance of classical radiation from an ensemble of individual jumps.
This implies that the transition probabilities of Bohr’s theory must be related to the square
of coefficients of the Fourier decomposition of the electron’s orbit. The determination of the
Fourier coefficients and their precise connection with transition probabilities drove much of
the research in the following decade, and remained unsolved until the very end. As Born
expressed one year before Heisenberg’s Umdeutung in his “Über Quantenmechanik” (1924),
The problem of the determination of the [|Cτ |2] is closely related to the investigation into
the intensities of spectral lines, and is of greatest importance for the further development
of quantum theory. (Born 1924, quoted from van der Waerden 1967, 191)
The first problem was establishing a unique, quantitative relationship between the tran-
sition probabilities and the Fourier coefficients. In the low-frequency, high-quantum number
regime, the initial and final orbits are very nearly the same, and their Fourier expansions
are therefore nearly identical. This allows one to associate each mode of radiation with
exactly one Fourier coefficient. In Bohr’s theory, however, each mode of emission is associ-
ated with two orbits. The Fourier coefficients of which orbit should feature in the transition
probability? A simple proposal would be to include the initial orbit only and simply let
Pn,n−τ ∝ |C(n)τ |2, where Pn,n−τ denotes the probability of the jump n→ n− τ , Although this
prescription was used at times, there were various physical and metaphysical considerations
that hinted at the possibility that the Fourier coefficients of the final orbit, and perhaps even
those of the disallowed intermediary orbits, should also be taken into account.4 In its most
general form, then, the transition probabilities would be given by some weighted average of
C
(i)
τ , where m ≤ i ≤ n.
The averaging procedure was open-ended: for instance, Kramers, who devoted his disser-
tation to the question of Intensities of Spectral Lines (1919), suggested a logarithmic average,
while Van Vleck (1924) recommended a polynomial average. There were two restrictions on
the resulting transition probabilities, however: i) the formula for the average must be such
that it goes over to a simple proportionality in the low-frequency, high-quantum number
4I shall not elaborate on these considerations. See Kaveh 2014, §2.
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regime, thus recovering Larmor’s radiation formula; ii) while the average of C
(i)
τ is taken
“vertically” over m ≤ i ≤ n for a fixed τ , the coefficients must also satisfy the “horizontal”
requirement that each complete set of C
(i)
τ for 0 ≤ τ ≤ ∞ and fixed i specifies the ith
classically allowed orbit (see Figure 3). As we shall see in §5.4, it was precisely the latter
constraint that became the target of Heisenberg’s attack.
The above considerations suggest the following prescriptions for “translating” classical
quantities into their “corresponding” quantum mechanical ones:
τ.ω(n) → ω(n, n− τ) (37)
C(n)τ → C(n, n− τ) (38)
where C(n, n− τ) is the quantum theoretical amplitude for the transition n→ n− τ , or at
least one of such amplitudes featuring in the grand average. (The arrows indicate substi-
tution, not a mathematical or physical relation.) Moreover, following a series of promising
results between 1924-1925, starting with Kramers’s dispersion theory (1924a, 1924b) and
Kramers and Heisenberg’s follow-up paper (1925), and continuing with Born’s (1924) and
Born and Jordan’s (1925) systematization of the Kramers-Heisenberg strategy, the following






(F (n)− F (n− τ)) (39)
where J is the action variable. Prescription (39) is sometimes referred to as (Born’s)
differential-to-difference rule.5 I will refer to prescriptions (37), (38), and (39) collectively
as the Born-Kramers-Heisenberg translation scheme.
In the following section, I will summarize the correspondence arguments above in terms
of a Correspondence Principle with four components, and argue that it was the orbital
constraints (manifesting in Figure 3 above) that Heisenberg found problematic.
5A more intuitive but less useful formulation of the differential-to-difference rule could be obtained by
letting J = nh and τ = n − (n − τ) = ∆n, which yields: ∂F∂n →
∆F
∆n . This is of course mathematically
problematic, for n is not a continuous variable, and otherwise unhelpful because n does not feature in the
classical theory.
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5.4 Making the Correspondence Principle Prescriptive
The idea of the Correspondence Principle (CP) did not appear until Bohr’s musings
in 1918 and was not given its legendary title until Bohr’s address to the German Physical
Society in 1920. However, the germ of the idea was in the air from the very beginning and
was used by Bohr and others in many different contexts. Future uses of the concept did
not help with the ambiguity in meaning, as many physicists used the principle in ways that
had very thin connections to Bohr’s meaning (Kragh 2012, 219). Together with the inherent
vagueness of the principle, this fragmentation in usage led to a widespread lack of clarity on
what exactly CP was supposed to be. More specifically, one could identify four components
to the Correspondence Principle:
CP-i: Statistics: Intensities correspond to transition probabilities of individual modes in
such a manner that in the appropriate limit, the statistical sum of these probabilities
results in the same proportions as in classical radiation, in which all modes are emitted
simultaneously.
CP-ii: Analogy: The rules governing quantum transition probabilities follow a systematic
analogy with the classical case.
CP-iii: Open-endedness: While the state assignments are fixed, the exact form of the
intensity formula is partially open-ended and must be determined empirically.
CP-iv: Orbital Constraint: The intensities are partially fixed for they must be obtained
from (some sort of averaging of) the Fourier coefficients that form the harmonics of a
classical orbit.
The first component (Statistics), which Darrigol (1992, 220) calls “the narrowest form”
of CP, was the most uncontroversial and secure one. The idea that intensities correspond to
transition probabilities is a straightforward consequence of the assumption that only one unit
of ~ω is emitted in each transition, and therefore that the intensity must indicate the number
of times a unit of ~ω is emitted: the brighter lines must correspond to transitions that occur
more often, i.e. with higher probability. Further, the assumption that the statistical sum
of these probabilities in an ensemble must add up to the classical intensities is the only
way to make Bohr’s theory (in which each mode is emitted separately) compatible with
classical electromagnetism (in which all modes are emitted simultaneously but in different
proportions). As Bohr remarked:
In the limiting region of large quantum numbers there is in no wise a question of a gradual
diminution of the difference between the description by the quantum theory of the phe-
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nomena of radiation and the ideas of classical electrodynamics, but only of an asymptotic
agreement of the statistical results. (Bohr 1924, 23)
Note that CP-i is not the simple requirement that the predictions of quantum theory be
congruent with those of classical mechanics in the appropriate limit. Rather, it consists of
two statements, one of which links intensities with transition probabilities and the other
demands that the quantum-classical agreement in the limit be statistical, not exact. This
is more specific than the generic condition that predictions of a successor theory go over to
those of its predecessor in those domains in which the predecessor was successful. The latter
condition, which I have called the Congruence Requirement elsewhere (see Kaveh 2014), was
emphatically denied by Bohr as a component of CP: for instance, he is reported to have told
Rosenfeld that “the requirement that the quantum theory should go over to the classical
description for low modes of frequency is not at all a principle. It is an obvious requirement
for the theory.” (Rosenfeld, 1973, 252, quoted from Kragh, 2012, 197)
Considering the statistics in the low-frequency limit was often the starting point of cor-
respondence arguments, and many physicists in this period (including Bohr and Heisenberg)
occasionally used the phrase “Correspondence Principle” simply to refer to CP-i above. Som-
merfeld, for instance, tended to use the term in this manner: in a 1924 letter to Kramers, he
insisted that “the correspondence principle is a (highly valuable) limiting theorem of quan-
tum theory, but not its foundation” (Mehra and Rechenberg 1982, vol. II, 155). Pauli was
more explicit: “The correspondence principle demands only that these intensities [of classical
and quantum theory] must become asymptotically equal for large k [i.e. large momentum].”
(Mehra and Rechenberg 1982, vol. II, 158). Even Kramers and Heisenberg, who were most
sympathetic to CP and understood it as more substantial than a mere limiting theorem
still occasionally spoke of “satisfying the ‘correspondence’ requirement that the scattered
radiation ... should coincide in the limit of large quantum numbers with ... classical theory”
(Kramers and Heisenberg 1925, 707).
The second component, namely Analogy, was the most obscure one, for it was never
entirely clear what was meant by an “analogy” between classical and quantum theory. Bohr
often spoke of such analogies or “natural generalizations” of classical mechanics with a
characteristic Bohrian ambiguity. For example, in a letter to Rutherford of 1917, a year
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before his attempt at the first systematic development of the principles of quantum theory,
Bohr wrote that an “analogy between this [quantum] theory and the ordinary theory of
electrodynamics” has enabled him to “overlook the theory with all its different applications
from a uniform point of view” (Kragh 2012, 191). Even as late as 1925, Bohr spoke of CP
in this way:
We must resort to symbolic analogies to an even higher degree than before. Just lately I
have been racking my brain to dream up such analogies. (Bohr to Born 5/1/1925)
Physicists and physical chemists such as Reiche and Heurlinger who worked on applying
Bohr’s theory to molecular spectroscopy often made the “analogy principle” an axiom in
their work (see Kragh 2012, 242). The analogy that Bohr himself seems to have chosen
concerned the role of the Fourier coefficients in the two theories.6 As we shall see below,
Heisenberg’s innovation was to relocate the analogy to the level of the dynamical equations
governing the Fourier coefficients, as opposed to the solutions of said equations, namely the
coefficients themselves.
The third component, i.e. Open-endedness, was the most implicit and amorphous aspect
of CP, as it was rarely stated as a principle of its own; but in practice it was the source of
some of the most fruitful applications of CP. As Darrigol explains:
[T]he precise expression and the scope of the correspondence principle depended on the
assumptions made about the electronic motion. Whenever this motion was a priori de-
termined, the “correspondence” aided in deducing properties of emitted radiation. In the
opposite case, characteristics of the electronic motion could be induced from the observed
atomic spectra. This ambiguity made the correspondence principle a very flexible tool that
was able to draw the most from the permanent inflow of empirical data. (Darrigol 1992,
83)
What Darrigol calls the “inductive side” of CP corresponds to the open-ended component:
rather than making an a priori assumption about the orbit of the electron (which would
then be decomposed into its Fourier harmonics to give the transition amplitudes), physicists
often reverse-engineered the orbits from the empirical transition rules obtained in local ex-
periments. This was especially helpful in the case of atoms with several electrons, whose
6Bohr later distanced himself from the “analogy” talk on the ground that “such an expression might cause
misunderstanding, since ... the Correspondence Principle must be regarded purely as a law of the quantum
theory” (Bohr 1924, 22).
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Kepler problem yielded a formidable range of possible solutions, many of which were not
(multi-)periodic. The open-ended aspect of CP allowed one to prune the set of possible
orbits by appealing to the observed intensities and reading back the Fourier decomposition
from them (see Darrigol 1992, 151).
This “reverse-engineering” of the quantities that encode transition rules from local em-
pirical data perfectly fits the prescriptive-dynamical framework introduced in Chapter 1,
according to which the state assignments are fixed, but the transition rules must be read
back from the data by presupposing the state assignments and “fitting” the observed transi-
tion rules to them. For example, I argued in Chapter 1 that force formulae such as F = − k
x2
and F = −bv2, which encode the transition rules of Newtonian mechanics, are inexhaustible
and therefore cannot be tested against data, but must be derived from them by presuppos-
ing F = ma and measuring F empirically. One then plugs the reverse-engineered transition
rules back into the theory to make predictions about the future behavior of the system. For
instance, one puts together F = −kx and F = ma to get ẍ = − k
m
x, which provides final
conditions for initial conditions of the form (x, ẋ). This is precisely the procedure followed
in applying the open-ended aspect of CP. Here is Darrigol again:
Bohr also used the correspondence principle in an inductive way, to infer features of the
atomic motion from observed characteristics of spectra. This procedure, despite appear-
ances, increased the predictive power of the theory, because the properties of motion induced
from some spectral regularity could be used, in combination with a priori constraints on
the motion, to deduce other phenomena, both physical and chemical. (Darrigol 1992, 283)
If my claims about the locality and open-endedness of transition rules are correct, then a
full-blown prescriptive-dynamical theory would provide a way to compactify transition rules,
but no way to infer them from a priori principles. This brings me to the fourth and last
component.
The fourth component, Orbital Constraint, was the most specific and concrete aspect of
CP, and it corresponds to Darrigol’s “deductive side” of the principle, for it allows one to
deduce the transition rules from assumptions about the shape of the orbit. One would begin
by solving the classical Kepler problem, proceed to apply the Bohr-Sommerfeld quantization
conditions (equation 32) in the appropriate action-angle coordinates, decompose the resulting
orbits into their Fourier harmonics, and finally average the relevant coefficients of the orbits
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between (and including) the initial and final states. As said above, the averaging procedure
was left unspecified and was subject to speculation. In special cases, such as when all the C
(i)
τ
corresponding to a given transition vanished, the exact form of averaging was unimportant
and one could infer that the transition is forbidden. In most other cases, however, the
averaging was a matter of guesswork.
The procedure was applied with mixed results. As the title Intensities of Spectral Lines
makes clear, Kramers devoted his dissertation (1919) under Bohr to calculating the transition
probabilities for the hydrogen atom especially in the case of fine structure and the Stark effect.
Kramers’s results were quite encouraging: not only did Kramers recover known facts about
the relative intensities of lines in the case of fine structure and the Stark effect, he even
made novel predictions about certain unexplored transitions in Stark effect experiments,
which were later confirmed (Kragh 2012, 206). Similarly, in a coauthored paper of 1922,
Sommerfeld and Heisenberg derived several selection rules and intensity ratios for multiplets
and the Zeeman effect, also in good agreement with experiment (Sommerfeld and Heisenberg
1922).
Other applications of the “deductive side” of CP were not as successful. Frank Hoyt
(1923; 1924; 1925) made copious calculations for the intensities of X-ray and Balmer series
using several different averaging methods, but none of his results were even close to the
experimental values (Kragh 2012, 214). Richard Tolman (1925) made similar attempts at
calculating the probability of an electron falling into the nucleus, and got divergent results
depending on the averaging method. Moreover, the application of CP to the Zeeman effect
implied that each line must split into three finer lines (Darrigol 1992, 124). This was mostly
but not always true. The splitting of certain lines into more than three components was
dubbed the anomalous Zeeman effect, which remained a major obstacle for the success of
Bohr’s theory throughout. More generally, orbital constraints could only be applied to the
problem of intensities in the case of multi-periodic systems, which as Darrigol points out,
“covered hardly more than the hydrogen atom” (Darrigol 1992, 283). Dismayed by such
unreliable success, Sommerfeld remarked:
A correspondence treatment of the intensity problem yields only approximate values, in a
way which does not seem to be very appropriate in view of the simplicity of the empirical
facts. (Sommerfeld 1924, 1048)
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The mixed success of the fourth component of CP is hardly surprising from a prescriptive-
dynamical standpoint, for this component is the most problematic one if one accepts that
transition rules are open-ended and should not be fixed in an a priori fashion. The “deduc-
tive” component violates open-endedness by imposing the requirement that the transition
amplitudes must be obtained from coefficients that decompose a classical orbit. This is es-
sentially what Figure 3 above illustrates: while the transition rules are calculated through a
“vertical” average of the coefficients, the latter are also required to form a Fourier series of a
classical orbit when arranged “horizontally”. Therefore, the orbital constraints (CP-iv) par-
tially fix the transition rules in an a priori manner. According to the prescriptive-dynamical
view defended in this dissertation, this usually causes trouble for the theory down the line
as soon as it is applied in localities in which those constraints are violated. Bohr introduced
the orbital constraints to get a handle on compactifying the transition rules, but his strategy
simultaneously prevents the transition rules from being fully local and empirical. If I am
correct, the orbital constraints must be eliminated from Bohr’s theory in order to make it
a fully-fledged prescriptive-dynamical theory. And indeed, this is precisely what happened
subsequently. As Darrigol explains:
In the general process of freeing atomic motion from classical preconceptions, the deductive
side of the correspondence principle shrank, until nothing seemed to be left of it, at least
in the eyes of Bohr’s most open critic, Wolfgang Pauli. (Darrigol 1992, 83)
“Freeing” the transition rules from orbital constraints is precisely what the prescriptive-
dynamical view recommends to a theory such as Bohr’s.
Heisenberg was the one to bring the “liberation” process to fruition. In a letter to
Pauli (who shared Sommerfeld’s skepticism about CP), Heisenberg effectively distinguished
between CP-ii and CP-iv, embracing the former and denouncing the latter in one breath:
[I]f one understands, as you, the correspondence principle to signify the wrong assertion
that one may derive the quantum-theoretical intensity by averaging over the classical one,
then you are right, and in that case one cannot obtain Ornstein’s [empirical intensity] rule
through correspondence principle; if, however, one understands it as signifying an analogous
logical connection to the classical theory, then I am right. (Heisenberg to Pauli 10/8/1924)
The “wrong assertion” Heisenberg refers to is precisely the content of CP-iv, while the
“analogous logical connection” is what is promised / demanded in CP-ii. The letter to Pauli
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was written in 1924, a few months before Heisenberg’s Umdeutung paper, when Heisenberg’s
ideas had not yet settled down. Years later, in an interview with Thomas Kuhn, a mature
Heisenberg reflected on his thinking at the time as follows:
So the whole thing was a program which one had consciously or unconsciously in one’s
mind. That is, how can we actually replace everywhere the orbits of the electrons by the
Fourier components and thereby get into better touch with what happens? Well, that
was the main idea of quantum mechanics later on. One could see, more and more clearly,
that the reality were the Fourier components and not the orbits. The Fourier components
were more real than the orbits and still somehow their connection was similar to their
connection in classical mechanics. So one tried to look for those connections between the
Fourier components which were true in classical mechanics and to see whether or not similar
connections are also true in quantum mechanics... . So this was the whole trick. (Kuhn’s
4th interview with Heisenberg, 1963)
Heisenberg’s project, then, was to find a way to maintain the analogy with classical transition
rules but remove the orbital constraints. This “sharpening” of CP would thus make the
transition rules fully open-ended, and the Correspondence Principle fully prescriptive. We
shall see in §5.6 how exactly Heisenberg carried this out.
Note Heisenberg’s talk of the Fourier coefficients as “more real than the orbits”. What
should be considered “real” and thus legitimate to use in building a physical theory was
another running theme for Pauli, Born, Heisenberg, and Bohr, and it constituted the second
stream of thought that eventually flowed into Heisenberg’s “reinterpretation” of quantum
theory in 1925. This stream of thought was discussed under the rubric of the Observability
Principle.
5.5 Making the Observability Principle Dynamical
The Observability Principle (OP) – advocated in particular by Pauli and Born in the
context of quantum theory – was an influential idea in early 20th century to the effect that
only “observable” quantities can figure in the formalism of a physical theory, i.e. that theories
should be purged of all “unobservable” variables. What exactly was meant by “observable”
was not as clear, however.
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OP is often traced back to Ernst Mach, who was Pauli’s godfather7 and a major source of
influence on him. Both Pauli and Born were also well-versed in general relativity and Klein’s
subsequent field theory, and often mentioned OP in that context, which was also under heavy
Machian influence. Pauli’s adherence to OP has also been linked to his encounters with
Oppenheimer who, being Bridgeman’s student, maintained a strong American operationalist
attitude (Holton 1984, 173 ff.). The term “observability” is therefore commonly understood
along positivist / operationalist lines, i.e. as referring to the property of being detectable
by the five senses or at least being measurable. Under this reading, OP demands that any
variable that does not stand for a collection of sensory inputs or measurements must be
eliminated from theory.
The positivist / operationalist reading has been heavily criticized by various commenta-
tors (Beller 1999; Camilleri 2009; Lacki 2002; Wolff 2014; cf. Wüthrich 2016). I will shortly
join this group of commentators to argue that the positivist reading is not at all how Heisen-
berg understood and applied OP, although my alternative interpretation of the principle will
differ from the abovementioned commentators. Nevertheless, let us begin by recognizing that
the positivist reading is not entirely unjustified. This is not only due to the personal and
historical connections between Pauli and Born and major positivist / operationalist figures,
but also because of various assertions made by them which hint in that direction.
One finds the most positivist-sounding characterizations of OP in Born’s remarks, who
would often link the idea to Einstein’s relativity theory. For instance, in their co-authored
paper “Zur Quantentheorie aperiodischer Vorgänge”, Born and Jordan explain the idea as
follows:
A principle of great range and fruitfulness states that in the true laws of nature only those
quantities enter which are in principle observable and determinable. (Footnote: Thus rela-
tivity theory came about as a result of Einstein’s recognition of the in-principle impossibility
of determining the absolute simultaneity of two spatially separated events.) When we ap-
ply this principle to optical problems, we arrive at the presumption [Vermutung] that the
phase differences between the motion of electrons of one atom and those of another belong
to these in-principle indeterminable quantities. (Born and Jordan 1925, 493)
To understand this passage, recall that classically, the C
(n)







τ . The modulus of the complex amplitude |Cτ |2 = R2τ gives the
7See Mehra and Rechenberg 1982, vol. I, 377.
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power radiated (i.e. intensity), while the ατ s specify the relative phases of the different modes
of radiation. Since classically speaking all modes are emitted simultaneously, the relative
phases are important, as they affect the composition of the radiation: the same two modes
may be radiated in-phase or out-of-phase with each other, and those would be two different
beams. Now, in the quantum case, one must use the Born-Kramers-Heisenberg translation
schemes (37) and (38) to obtain the C(n, n − τ) for each mode of radiation of frequency
ω(n, n − τ). The quantum theoretical C(n, n − τ) will therefore also be complex numbers
characterized by a modulus and a phase, but according to Born and Jordan the phase has lost
its meaning in this case, for the different modes of radiation are not emitted simultaneously
but rather one at a time. Since the different quantum modes are not superposed in a single
beam, the relative phase between them seems irrelevant.8 The only thing that matters is
the probability of each individual transition, which is determined by the modulus squared of
the coefficients, not by their phase. Born had also similarly declared in an earlier paper that
he only considers transition probabilities P (n, n − τ) = |C(n, n − τ)|2, not the amplitudes
C(n, n − τ) themselves, to have “quantum-theoretical meaning” (Born 1924, 388, quoted
from van der Waerden 1967, 191).9. On the basis of their observability principle and the
claim that the phases are unobservable in the quantum case, Born and Jordan attempted to
devise a theory that dealt directly with the transition probabilities, rather than amplitudes,
which of course could not and did not succeed (for as we know from quantum mechanics,
the phases are indispensable).
By linking the idea to Einstein’s objections to absolute simultaneity, Born and Jordan
give OP a very Machian feel. This Machian spirit seems to have been a Göttingen phe-
nomenon. As Heisenberg later recalled:
The idea of having a new theory in terms of observables did indeed originate in Göttingen
and was closely connected with the interest in relativity theory that existed there. (Heisen-
berg, Conversations, 174, quoted from Mehra and Rechenberg 1982, 274)
Jordan also recalled discussions of observability in Göttingen to have been under Mach’s
influence (Jordan, AHQP Interview, Second Session, 31).
8One might think that the relative phases would matter if two systems encountered each other, but Born
and Jordan argue that the relative phases could only be determined through an interference pattern, which
does not happen for incoherent radiation from two different sources. See ibid.
9See also Born 1955, 258-259.
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In any case, whatever the Göttingen gang might have meant by “observability”, it is clear
that Heisenberg did not adhere to it. An observability principle truly in the spirit of Born
would have led to a theory in which transition probabilities (as opposed to the amplitudes)
appear directly in calculations10, which Heisenberg clearly violated. As far as amplitudes
are concerned, Heisenberg was very clear:
At first sight the phase contained in [the transition amplitude] would seem to be devoid of
physical significance in quantum theory... . However, we shall see presently that also in
quantum theory the phase has a definite significance that is analogous to its significance in
classical theory. (Heisenberg 1925c, 264)
In any case, outside of Göttingen, the “Observability Principle” seemed to have nothing
to do with observability per se, whether in its formulations by various physicists or its
application by Heisenberg. Even Pauli, Mach’s godson and the prophet of observability in
quantum theory circles, does not seem to have used the term “observable” consistently in
a positivist / operationalist sense. Pauli originally raised the observability principle as an
objection to Einstein and Klein’s field theories in particular, and all continuum theories in
general. The most commonly quoted passage in this regard is the following:
There is a physical-conceptual objection that should not be forgotten. In Weyl’s theory we
constantly operate with the field strength in the interior of the electron. For a physicist,
however, the field strength is only defined as a force on a test body; and since there are
no smaller test bodies than the electron itself, the concept of the electric field strength
in a mathematical point seems to be an empty meaningless fiction. One should stick to
introducing only those quantities in physics that are observable in principle. (Pauli 1919,
749-750)
This passage is fascinating. First of all, note that Pauli is not objecting to the use of field
variables per se, but only to the practice of assigning values to them in the interior of
an elementary particle. But the problem with this cannot be that humans are incapable
of observing the field inside the electron, because as a matter of fact, in the epistemic /
physiological sense of the word, the field is unobservable whether in the interior or the
exterior of the electron. Fields are simply not the kind of thing that can be available to the
human senses. Perhaps by “observable” Pauli simply means measurable, which would make
the passage above more plausible. However, as Pauli himself explains, the field values must
10Not to mention that according to Born, OP implied that classical space and time themselves would have
to be replaced by a “discrete” space (Beller 1983, 488).
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be inferred from measurements, and so must other presumably “observable” quantities such
as stationary states. But if any quantity that can in principle be inferred from experimental
measurements is fair game, then electron orbits would arguably be “observable” as well, for
as we saw above, the “inductive side” of CP was used precisely to that end.11 Rather, Pauli
seems to be concerned about quantities that are assigned without an interaction that justifies
the assignment. Pauli makes this more explicit in a letter to Eddington:
Indeed one can only define [the path of an electron] through the action of the electron on
other elementary particles... . [T]he field concept only has a meaning when we specify
a reaction... . (Pauli to Eddington 9/20/1923, quoted from Hendry 1984, 21 – emphasis
added)
The hesitation thus seems to be about quantities that do not correspond to any interaction,
i.e. a process of change of one thing under the influence of another. As I would like to
say, Pauli is objecting to non-dynamical quantities which cannot be detected through the
observation of a transition. This becomes even clearer once Pauli applies his Observability
Principle specifically to the case of quantum theory: in a letter to Bohr, Pauli writes:
I think that the energy and momentum values of the stationary states are something much
more real than the “orbits”. The (not yet reached) aim must be to deduce these and all
other physical and real observable properties of the stationary states from the (integral)
quantum numbers... . (Pauli to Bohr 12/31/1924)
Two crucial points can be gleaned from this passage: first of all, Pauli says he thinks that
stationary states are real. This already shows that he cannot be under the impression that
the stationary states (or the energy, momentum, etc.) are observable or directly measurable,
for one would not need to think about the existence of observable things: if stationary states
were observable, there would be no doubt about their reality. The fact that Pauli hedges
his claim by using “I think” and “much more real” (as opposed to simply “real”) indicates
Pauli’s full awareness of the fact that the stationary states themselves must be inferred from
observations. Indeed – and this is the second point – this is confirmed in the very next
sentence, where Pauli speaks of deducing “physical and real observable properties”. Since
observables need not be “deduced”, the privilege given to the stationary states seems to be
about something other than observability. As the previous passage indicates, this privilege
11Cf. Wolff 2014 for another argument against the “measurability” reading of OP.
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comes down to the fact that the states are interactive or dynamical, while the orbits are
ontological.
In fact, it is not clear to me that even Born himself used “observability” in the positivist
sense. For again, the quantities that Born considers “observable”, such as the energy of the
stationary states, transition probabilities, and relative phases of the same radiation, must all
be inferred from the data, sometimes through laborious calculations (see, e.g., Cassidy 1979,
202). And whenever he explicitly listed those quantities which he considered “observable”,
he would always list dynamical quantities. Here is an example:
Besides frequencies, the emitted light possesses the observable properties of intensity, phase,
and state of polarization, which are only approximately accounted for by the theory (§17).
These exhaust the observable properties of the motion of the atomic system. However, our
computation assigns additional properties to it, namely orbital frequencies and distances,
that is, the course of motion in time. It seems that these quantities are, as a matter of
principle, not accessible to observation. Therewith we arrive at the following judgement,
that for the time being our procedure is just a formal computational scheme which, for
certain cases, allows us to replace the still unknown quantum laws by computations on a
classical basis. Of these true [wahren] laws we would have to require, that they only contain
relations between observable quantities, that is, energy, light frequencies, intensities, and
phases. (Born 1925, 113-114)
Perhaps one could argue that light frequencies and intensities are observable, seeing as
frequency manifests itself in the color of the light and intensity in its brightness. This would
already be a stretch, not only because the color and brightness are only truly observable
for the visible spectrum, but also because observing color and brightness is not the same
as observing frequency and intensity, which are highly theoretical concepts (an adherent of
the particle theory of light would see the colors as well as the next person but would not
associate them with frequencies). But let us grant that frequencies and intensities of light
are observable. We are still left with the puzzling statement that the energy and phase of the
stationary states are also observable. This is clearly false, for the energies are given by Bohr’s
frequency condition (eq. 30): ωnm =
1
~(En − Em), in which ωnm is the only measurable (or
“observable”) quantity; En and Em must be inferred from those measurements. As for the
observability of phases, Born is simply changing his verdict from a year ago, which perhaps
suggests an evolution of the concept of observability during this period.
Other passages in which reference to OP is made confirm the theory that “observable
168
quantities” is best replaced by “dynamical quantities”. For example, Kramers prided himself
on the purity of his derivation of his dispersion formula (which proved to be a stepping stone
to Heisenberg’s Umdeutung) with the following words:
[I]t contains only such quantities as allow of a direct physical interpretation on the basis of
the fundamental postulates of the quantum theory of spectra and atomic constitution, and
exhibits no further reminiscence of the mathematical theory of multiple periodic systems.
(Kramers 1924b, 311)
What quantities appear in “the fundamental postulates of the quantum theory of spectra
and atomic constitution”? Stationary states and transition probabilities. Thus, Kramers is
in essence saying that his theory contains nothing but dynamical variables.12 Note, by the
way, that Kramers associated the derivation of his formula with the recent Bohr-Kramers-
Slater theory (1924), which spoke of many truly unobservable quantities such as “virtual
oscillators” and “virtual fields”.
Finally, Heisenberg himself used OP in a similar manner, i.e. as the principle that only
dynamical variables (states and transitions) can figure in a theory. For instance, he wrote
to Pauli about his conviction that
In calculating any quantities, like energy, frequency, etc., only relations between those quan-
tities should occur, which can be controlled in principle. (Heisenberg to Pauli 6/24/1925)
Heisenberg’s use of “control” is intriguing. Wolff (2014) argues partly on the basis of this
passage that what Heisenberg really meant by “observability” was “causal efficacy”, where
“causal” is understood in a manipulationist / interventionist manner. This does not seem
quite right, however. First of all, the orbits are causally efficacious in Bohr’s theory in
the sense that the Fourier coefficients of the orbit determine which transitions will and will
not occur. Secondly, since in Bohr’s theory the states correspond to orbits in a one-to-one
manner, insofar as the states are casually efficacious, then so must be the orbits. Therefore,
it would be odd if “causal efficacy” ruled out orbits but not states. It is true, however,
that what one directly controls, or as I would like to put it, what one directly interfaces
with (prepares, detects), are the states. In other words, the prescriptions of the theory are
prescriptions for preparing and detecting the system in a particular state, not in a particular
12See also Kramers and Heisenberg 1925, in van der Waerden 1967, 234 for virtually identical statements.
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orbit. To be sure, as said above states and orbits correspond to each other one to one, but the
human interface is with the states, not with the orbits. One prepares / detects the system in
a particular state, and then infers the orbit from what one assumes the prepared / detected
state to be. Once again, I suggest that we make sense of things by letting “controllable”
mean “dynamical”.
Incidentally, the idea of a human interface also explains why the term “observability”
would have been used. While both states and orbits must be inferred from more basic
observations / measurements, the nodes at which experimental interface occurs are the states.
In other words, the orbits are as it were two steps removed from measurement: one infers
(prepares, detects) the states based on direct measurements, then records the transition
rules among the states, and only then infers the orbits on the assumption that the transition
amplitudes add up to a Fourier decomposition of an orbit. Put differently, while dynamical
variables are not observable / measurable themselves, they are the closest point of interface
with the system to observation / measurement.
The requirement that only dynamical quantities (states and transitions) be allowed is con-
sistent with Heisenberg’s occasional pronouncements that all physical quantities of interest
can be deduced from transition amplitudes. Shortly before arriving at his “reinterpretation”,
Heisenberg wrote to Kronig:
In classical theory the knowledge of the Fourier series for the motion is sufficient to calculate
everything.
[A]lso in the quantum theory everything is determined by the knowledge of the transition
probabilities or the corresponding amplitudes.
What I like in this scheme is that one can really reduce all interactions between atoms and
the external world ... to transition probabilities. (Heisenberg to Kronig 6/5/1925)
Therefore, I conclude, one must interpret Heisenberg’s Observability Principle as a “Dy-
namicity Principle”, i.e. the requirement that a theory only involve states and transitions,
and dispense with ontological constructs that must be inferred from the dynamical quantities.
In the final section, I will combine all of the considerations above to present a prescriptive-
dynamical reinterpretation of Heisenberg’s Umdeutung.
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5.6 Umdeutung: the Making of a Prescriptive-dynamical Theory
In this section, I will present my prescriptive-dynamical reinterpretation of Heisenberg’s 
groundbreaking paper “A Quantum-theoretical Reinterpretation (Umdeutung) of Kinematic 
and Mechanical Relations”. My exegesis does not add anything to our current understanding 
of the formal / mathematical aspects of Heisenberg’s work13, but merely revisits them in 
light of the arguments advanced above.
To begin, I propose that the following principles are at work in Heisenberg’s Umdeutung :
(I) Only dynamical quantities (i.e. states and transition amplitudes) can feature in the
theory (the “Observability” Principle).
(II) The quantum theoretical frequencies and transition amplitudes correspond to their
classical counterparts in accordance with the Born-Kramers-Heisenberg translation scheme
(relations (37), (38), and (39)) in such a way that in the appropriate limit, the statistical
sum of the amplitudes generates the classical spectrum.14
(III) The transition amplitudes satisfy analogous dynamical equations to their classical
counterparts.15
(IV) The Bohr-Sommerfeld quantization condition (eq. (32)) appropriately translated in
accordance with the Born-Kramers-Heisenberg scheme.
(V) The transition amplitudes are subject to no other constraints than the ones above.16
Note that (I), (III), and (V) are all closely related to the idea of removing the orbits. By
removing the orbits, one purges the theory of its descriptive-ontological aspects, allowing
one to focus on the dynamical state-assignment and transition rules, which gives us (I).
Moreover, prior to Umdeutung, the translation schemes were applied to the solutions of the
classical equations of motion, namely the Fourier coefficients of classical orbits. By removing
the orbits, Heisenberg arrived at the innovative idea that the translation scheme must be
applied to the equations of motion themselves, rather than their solutions, and this gives us
(III). As he reflected later on:
One could see that the Fourier components were the reality, and not the orbits. So one had
to look for those connections between the Fourier components, which were true in classical
mechanics, and to see whether or not similar connections were trule also in quantum me-
chanics – i.e. if one took, instead of the Fourier components, the transition amplitudes of the
13See Aitchison et. al. 2004 for an excellent reconstruction.
14This is an augmented version of CP-i (Statistics).
15This is a special case of CP-ii (Analogy).
16This is a sharpening of CP-iii (Open-endedness).
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real lines of atoms. (Heisenberg, Conversations, 135; quoted from Mehra and Rechenberg
1982, vol. II, 189-190)
Finally, by removing the orbits, Heisenberg eliminated the problematic component of CP,
namely the orbital constraints (CP-iv) which prevented the transition rules from being max-
imally open-ended (or prescriptive), which gives us (V). Hence my claim above that Heisen-
berg achieved both aims of making the theory fully prescriptive and making it fully dynamical
by removing the orbits. As he wrote to Pauli, “all my wretched efforts are devoted to killing
totally the concept of an orbit” (Heisenberg to Pauli 7/9/1925).
Heisenberg begins by listing various classical relations and seeks after their quantum-
theoretical translations. First of all, Bohr’s frequency condition (eq. (30)) can be derived





where E is the energy written as a function of the action variables J . According to the
Born-Kramers-Heienberg translation scheme (39), the quantum-theoretical version would
be:
ω(n, n− τ) = 1
h
(En − En−τ ) (41)
which is just Bohr’s frequency condition. This in turn implies what is known as the Ritz
combination rule:
ω(n, n− τ) + ω(n− τ, n− τ − σ) = ω(n, n− τ − σ) (42)




its quantum-theoretical counterpart C(n, n − τ)eiω(n,n−τ)t. However, Heisenberg goes on to
point out, one must resist the temptation to form a “Fourier series” in terms of a sum of
quantities C(n, n− τ)eiω(n,n−τ)t.17 In light of (I) and (V), this is just as well.
17Heisenberg and Kramers (1925) attempted this strategy and failed.
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Next, Heisenberg sets out to address the following problem. We know that given a
classical orbit x(n)(t) characterized by Fourier coefficients C
(n)
τ , one can form the Fourier
series of x2(t) with coefficients D
(n)









What is the quantum-theoretical counterpart of this relation? Heisenberg suggests the fol-
lowing “simplest and most natural assumption”18:
D(n, n− τ)eiω(n,n−τ)t =
∑
σ
C(n, n− σ)C(n− σ, n− τ)eiω(n,n−τ)t. (45)
This is of course simply matrix multiplication, as Heisenberg, Born, and Jordan realized
soon after. Heisenberg comments that despite first appearances (or, to read between the
lines, despite Born’s arguments to the contrary), the phase is indeed important, because the
phases mix in expressions such as above, and therefore their relative values matter.
After the above kinematical considerations, Heisenberg then proceeds to examine dy-
namics. To deviate slightly from his order of presentation, let us consider his treatment of
the Bohr-Sommerfeld quantization condition in accordance with (IV) above. First of all,











It is not possible to apply the Born-Kramers-Heisenberg scheme to this formula directly, so









18In fact, this relation is not at all the simplest and most natural assumption that would follow from an
application of the Born-Kramers-Heisenberg translation scheme to equation (43). Rather, one would expect
to have:
D(n, n− τ)eiω(n,n−τ)t =
∑
σ
C(n, n− σ)C(n, n− (τ − σ))eiω(n,n−τ)t. (44)
Heisenberg is omitting an argument based on the requirement of the Ritz combination rule (42) that would
justify replacing the relation above with (45). For a reconstruction of this argument see: Aitchison et. al.
2004
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Now we have expressions of the form σ d
dJ
, σω(n), and C
(n)
σ , all of which we know how to







|C(n, n+ σ)|2ω(n, n+ σ)− |C(n, n− σ)|2ω(n, n− σ)
]
(48)
As Jordan proved shorly afterwards, (48) is just the canonical commutation relation [q, p] =
i~ where q and p are matrices (Darrigol 1922, 276 ff.). This is the relation used in the modern
formulation of quantum mechanics.
Now, Heisenberg points out that up to this point, the Correspondence Principle had
been applied by first solving an equation of motion of the form ẍ+ f(x) = 0 in action-angle
variables and then applying the Bohr-Sommerfeld quantization conditions. This violates
(I) and (V), for it imposes orbital constraints on the transition amplitudes: the solutions
to a classical equation of motion are classical orbits, and requiring that the quantum tran-
sition amplitudes add up to an orbit violates the principle that the theory must involve
only dynamical quantities (of which a classical orbit is not one) as well as the principle
that the transition rules be open-ended beyond the requirements of (I)-(IV). Thus, in place
of the traditional procedure, Heisenberg suggests following (III), i.e. applying the transla-
tion scheme directly to the equation of motion. At this point, however, Heisenberg has not
yet equipped himself with matrix calculus, which makes it difficult to produce an explicit
quantum-theoretical counterpart for the equation of motion, seeing as one is not allowed
to form a “Fourier series” of the quantum-theoretical quantities to plug into the equation
of motion. In light of this, Heisenberg suggests that we extract from the equation of mo-
tion recursive relations between the classical Fourier coefficients, and then translate these
recursive relations into quantum theory using the Born-Kramers-Heisenberg scheme. The
rest of Heisenberg’s paper is devoted to illustrating this procedure using simple examples of
aharmonic oscillators, which we will not get into. In modern quantum mechanics, the recur-
sive relations are replaced by matrix equations that imitate classical mechanical equations of
motion but with the dynamical variables replaced with matrices. Thus Heisenberg invented
modern quantum mechanics in the form of matrix mechanics, and did so by focusing on the
construction of a purely prescriptive-dynamical theory.
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Note, by the way, that the relations obtained by Heisenberg are still not sufficient for
fixing the transition amplitudes except in certain special cases (Darrigol 1992, 268), which
testifies to their open-endedness in accordance with (V) above.
5.7 Conclusion
I have argued that Heisenberg’s Umdeutung as well as the role of both principles of Corre-
spondence and Observability in its formation can be fully understood by taking Heisenberg’s
“sharpening” of CP as the attempt to make the latter principle fully prescriptive (i.e. open-
ended) and his promise to use only “observable variables” as the requirement that only
dynamical variables (states and transitions) appear in the theory. As we have seen, both of
those goals were intimately connected with the removal of orbits from Bohr’s theory.
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Figure 3: Transition probabilities constrained by orbital requirements
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Appendix A On Productive and Unproductive State Assignments
In §2.4.2.1, we introduced the idea of productive and unproductive theories. The former 
connect to experiment at an early stage through a fixed set of instructions for assigning 
dynamical states to the system, and thus allow us to construct new LEMPs for every new 
system we come across to which our state assignments are applicable. Unproductive theories, 
on the other hand, have no fixed state assignment rules and must derive their precise form of 
state assignment after the transition rules are known. This means that upon experimenting 
with a new system, such a theory would have no recipe for constructing a new local set of 
transitions rules (LEMPs). Unproductive theories can only connect to experimental systems 
by piggy-backing on a productive theory which has allowed us to record the required transi-
tion rules. In this Appendix, I will elaborate on all of this in more technical detail. As said, 
this section is intimately connected to the material discussed in §2.4.2.1.
Experimental state assignment is a highly non-trivial and historically rich process. One 
might use a “ladder” structure: begin by assigning the quantity of interest to some unique 
measurement procedure that is considered authoritative for determining the value of said 
quantity, and then through a series of inductive steps establish what other measurements 
happen to track the same quantity, and eventually build an experimental repertoire for 
assigning values to the quantity. Measures of x are some of the oldest inventions in history 
and there is much to say about them, but the complexity of the situation is more readily 
apparent in the cases of ẋ and p. In the former case, one might begin with a measurement 
procedure that is as faithful to the mathematical definition of ẋ as possible, i.e. by measuring 
two positions very close to each other (e.g. using photogates or reconstructed trajectories) 
and dividing their separation by the time it took the object to travel from one to the other. 
Once ẋ has been assigned to this procedure, one can then go on to show through a series 
of inductive steps that measurements based on the Doppler effect and other methods return 
the same values in the contexts of interest. Any of the procedures in this fixed experimental 
repertoire will then count as legitimate assignment (detection, preparation) of ẋ .1
1As always, “fixed” means fixed across the applications of the theory, not across time: the experimental
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What about the Hamiltonian momentum p? Can it be measured independently, i.e.
without going through a calculation mediated by velocity? The answer to whether or not
Hamiltonian mechanics can be an autonomous, productive theory depends on the answer to
this question. We need at least one measurement procedure that we can assign to p so that
we can build a repertoire of procedures on its basis. The most natural candidate for such a
procedure would be measurements of surface impact and cross-section in collision, because
those quantities depend on momentum, not on velocity. If it is accurate to say that collision
experiments measure momentum without going through a measurement of velocity, then
this state assignment makes Hamiltonian mechanics an autonomous theory which does not
piggy-back on Lagrangian mechanics. States of the form (x, p) can be assigned independently
of transition rules and the theory is therefore productive.
The question then becomes: what is the relationship between the productive Hamiltonian
mechanics and the parasitic one that is obtained from the Lagrangian solution through the
Legendre transformation? It seems to be an empirical fact that in many ordinary cases, the
two coincide. But this is not always the case. There are conjugate momenta derivable from
the Legendre transformations that are not the momentum of the system. Let me illustrate
this with an example.2 Consider a linearly damped system (e.g. a particle moving with
moderate velocity through air at zero gravity) with the EOM:
q̈ + bq̇ = 0 (49)
where b is some constant. This EOM can be compactified into the following (admittedly
quirkly) Lagrangian:
L = q̇ ln q̇ − bq (50)
repertoire is surely being expanded through new measurement techniques all the time, but at any given time,
it is the same repertoire regardless of local context.
2Some other aspects of this example are discussed by Smith (2008, 335) in the context of Noether’s
theorem.
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When plugged into the Euler-Lagrange equations (the master formula), this LEMP will





= ln q̇ + 1 (51)
H = pq̇ − L = q̇ + bq (52)
Plugging in the above Hamiltonian in Hamilton’s equations will surely return the same
equation of motion as before. This is indeed a model of Hamiltonian mechanics and it does
predict the behavior of the linearly damped system.
However, the Hamiltonian H = q̇ + bq is not the energy of the system. Here is why:
H is derived from a Lagrangian that is time-translation invariant, which means that H
is conserved as a result of Noether’s theorem; but the actual energy of the system is not
conserved, for it is damped. Therefore, H is not the energy of the system, which in turn
implies that the corresponding canonical momentum p is not what one would obtain in
impact and cross-section measurements. Therefore, the parasitic Hamiltonian theory cannot
relate its state assignment rules to a fixed repertoire of experimental procedures, which is to
say that it violates EPOC and is therefore an unproductive theory. In other words, while it is
true that given the above formulae for momentum and Hamiltonian, one would get back the
desired EOM from Hamilton’s equations, the Hamiltonian in question could not have been
discovered directly through local empirical measurement. It must necessarily be embezzled
from the Lagrangian framework. Note that my point is not that this Hamiltonian model is
unphysical: it is indeed as physical as a particle moving in air with moderate speed at zero
gravity. The problem is rather that this Hamiltonian model can only exist as a reformulation
of the Lagrangian model; it cannot stand on its own.
Note that the autonomous Hamiltonian mechanics which attaches its momentum assign-
ments to fixed experimental procedures could not have handled this case. Since the energy is
time-dependent, a linearly damped system simply has no model in the autonomous Hamil-
tonian framework. Consequently, the autonomous Hamiltonian theory has a narrower scope
of application: there are systems that the Lagrangian theory and the parasitic Hamiltonian
formalism can handle but the autonomous Hamiltonian cannot.
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This brings us to a potential worry about the use of Hamiltonian mechanics. Given
the above, the parasitic “Hamiltonian theory” might seem quite pointless: if the aim is
to arrive at an equation of motion, why bother converting things into Hamiltonian form
only to convert them back later? It would seem that one always ends up eliminating the
canonical momentum from the two Hamilton equations to get back the same equation of
motion that one could have derived from the Euler-Lagrange equations to begin with. Yet
this procedure seems quite routine in a physics textbook. The answer is that physicists
introduce this framework merely as a computational tool in Lagrangian mechanics for cases
in which numerical and simulated solutions are called for, as well as cases in which there are
cyclic coordinates, for which the Hamiltonian formulation is simpler. As Goldstein explains:
It has been remarked that the Hamiltonian formulation is not particularly helpful in direct
solution of mechanical problems. Often one can solve the first order equations only by
eliminating some of the variables, e.g., the p variables, which speedily leads back to the
second order Lagrangian equations of motion. But an important exception should be noted.
The Hamiltonian procedure is especially adapted to the treatment of problems involving
cyclic coordinates. (Goldstein 1980 [1950], 351)
Finn concurs in his Classical Mechanics :
The Hamiltonian method is better suited for numerical calculations and for phase space
visualizations. However, unless there are cyclic coordinates, the direct use of Hamilton’s
equations does not significantly reduce the complexity of the problem from an analytical
point of view. (Finn 2008, 130)
The fact that the parasitic Hamiltonian is not a theory of its own but rather a handy
side-note to Lagrangian mechanics is also obvious from the physicist’s common practice of
forming “Routhian” functions (Goldstein 1980 [1950], 352; Finn 2008, 137). Routhians are
hybrids between Lagrangians and Hamiltonians, and their purpose is to allow us to treat
only the cyclic coordinates in a Hamiltonian fashion, for there is no reason to bother with
Legendre-transforming the non-cyclic coordinates.
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Appendix B Evidence that Bohr’s Failure Was a Failure of Tracking
The aim of this appendix is to justify a claim I made in §3.3.1.3, namely that the main
failure of Bohr’s model with regards to helium was its inability to accommodate the no
combination rule (the fact that orthohelium and parahelium states never transition among
themselves), which is a failure of tracking.
As said above, orthohelium and parahelium were originally considered separate elements
due to the fact that their term series never mixed: one never observes spectral lines that
indicate a transition from a para-state to an ortho-state or vice versa. However, a series
of fascinating and meticulous experiments by Frank, Hertz, Reiche, and others soon estab-
lished that the “ground state” of orthohelium is in fact an excited state, equivalent to one
electron being in 1s and the other in 2s or 2p, but for some reason this 2p does not decay
spontaneously: it is a “meta-stable” state. So the two series of spectral lines turned out to
be parallel series for the same element, except one of them has no Lyman series (x → 1s).
These experiments left no doubt that 2sp is distinct from 2so (Gearhart 2017).
This immediately raised a puzzle: why the lack of mixing, given that all of these states
are energy layers of the same atom? What prevents transitions from parahelium states to
orthohelium states and vice versa? It was understood that any quantum theory of the helium
atom would have to answer this curious question or be doomed.
Around the same time, Landé proposed a Bohr-style model in which helium’s two elec-
trons could either occupy coplanar or perpendicular orbits, and hypothesized that the former
corresponds to orthohelium and the latter to parahelium.1 Bohr was encouraged by Landé’s
work but wanted to find a secure foundation for it in the principles of his own theory. Accord-
ing to the latest version of Bohr’s theory, electrons could occupy multiply periodic orbits2,
which gave the theory much more flexibility and crucially allowed for orbits that “penetrate”
1This was also taken to explain the fact that parahelium lines are singlets whereas orthohelium lines are
doublets (as said we know now that they are in fact triplets!), for the coplanar electrons could revolve either
in the same or opposite direction to each other. See Van Vleck 1926, 87.
2These are orbits that can be solved through separation of variables in the Hamilton-Jacobi theory, and
thus can be decomposed into an (infinite) sum of periodic terms. While such orbits are in general not strictly
periodic, given sufficient time they come arbitrarily close to the original position and velocity
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under the inner layers. Using this model, Bohr and Kramers offered a variant of Landé’s
model in which the parahelium electrons orbited at a relative 120 degree angle (Darrigol
1992, 164).3
And this all seemed fine and good at first. Frank and his colleagues believed that they
had tested and (somewhat qualitatively) confirmed Bohr’s model through a series of ex-
periments on helium ionization (e.g. Franck and Einsporn 1920). To be sure, there were
quantitative discrepancies between the experimental values of helium ionization energy and
those predicted from the Bohr-style model, but this was not taken as a definitive refutation
of Bohr’s theory, as the issue was widely considered a matter of finding the right orbital
configuration.4 Bohr himself tried to explain away the quantitative discrepancies by arguing
that the ground state of helium is unstable, which according to Bohr results in “indetermi-
nacy” (“Unbestimmtheit”) in its energy (Darrigol 1992, 176). Kramers similarly rationalized
that the theoretically obtained energies should not be identified with ionization energies to
begin with, because the latter depend not just on the final state, but on the process through
which the second electron arrives at its bound orbit from infinity (Kramers 1923, 340-341).
As late as 1922, a year before it was considered refuted, Born declared the Bohr-Kramers
model “the most probable configuration of helium” (Born 1922, 677).
So what was the real failure of Bohr’s model? The answer lies in a set of state assignment
rules that Bohr introduced in his 1918 “On the quantum theory of line-spectra” as a gener-
alization and clarification of the old quantization rules
∮
pdq = nh. One of the fundamental
principles that Bohr (1918) drew on to assign stationary states was called the “Principle
of Mechanical Transformability”5, which Bohr considered necessary both for well-defined
energy assignments and for his Correspondence Principle to be consistent. Without getting
into much detail, the principle states that given a quantum mechanically allowed stationary
3Edwin Kemble proposed a similar model in 1921. The model is sometimes called the Bohr-Kramers-
Kemble model. See Kragh 2012, 253.
4See, e.g., Sommerfeld 1923 for an example of attempts at solving the ionization energy problem. See
also Van Vleck 1926, 86 ff. for a survey of the different orbital models of helium and how they fare against
experimental values. Van Vleck presents the quantitative mismatch as a problem for helium models (ibid,
87 ff.), but places it second to Born and Heisenberg’s 1923 proof – which I will shortly argue was the truly
devastating problem – on the list of objections (ibid, 105-106).
5Van Vleck calls it the “Principle of Continuous Formation” (Van Vleck 1926, 98). Bohr introduced this
principle having been inspired by Ehrenfest’s adiabatic theorem; see Navarro and Perez 2006 for a discussion
of the genesis of Ehrenfest’s theorem.
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state, all and only those orbits are allowed that can be connected to said state through
a continuous, multi-periodic, classical path (see Perez 2009; Perez and Valls 2015). This
principle in general gives rise to several alternative families6 of orbits, each family closed
under mechanical transformability, such that states in each family can transitions among
themselves, but not across other families.
Now, the crucial point is this: Bohr and Kramers originally thought that their models
of coplanar and crossed orbits belong to different families prescribed by the Principle of
Mechanical Transformability. Since the two sets of states belong to alternative quantization
schemes, they could not be realized in the same atom at the same time. At any given
moment, the energy levels of the helium atom are quantized in accordance with either one or
the other family of state assignments, but not both. Therefore, Bohr and Kramers inferred
that if we assign the coplanar model to orthohelium and (their version of) the crossed model
to parahelium, we can deduce that orthohelium and parahelium states cannot transition
among themselves, which was the desired result. In correspondence with Ehrenfest, Bohr
spoke of this result as a crucial advantage of his and Kramers’s model over Landé’s (Mehra
and Rechenberg 1982, 407).
However, trouble came in 1923, when Born and Heisenberg embarked on what Heisenberg
described to Bohr as “a general investigation of all mechanically allowed orbits of excited
helium”. As Heisenberg explained, “if in the end the experimentally found terms are not
included, then one knows that the mechanics is wrong.” (Heisenberg to Bohr 2 Feb. 1923,
quoted in Kragh 2012, 255) The results were devastating: in particular, Born and Heisenberg
showed that the solution space is such that the principle of mechanical transformability
cannot be applied without serious trouble: insofar as stable, multi-periodic solutions are
available, they are all mechanically transformable into each other (Born and Heisenberg
1923, 240). And since Born and Heisenberg also show that the only permissible solutions are
coplanar and crossed orbits, this meant that the orthohelium and parahelium states of Bohr
and Kramers belonged in the same family of orbits after all. As such, they are realizable
in one and the same system, contrary to what Bohr and Kramers expected. Being realized
6One may use the phrase “equivalence class” here as well, but to avoid confusion with the way I have
been using this phrase (as indicating a “lumping” of states together), I will use the word “family” in this
context.
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alongside each other in the same atom means that analogous orbits, such as 2po and 2pp,
would be in the same dynamical equivalence class (they would be “lumped together”), which
in turn means that they must transition indistinguishably. Therefore, it turned out, Bohr’s
model could not explain the experimental fact that the orthohelium states never mix with
the parahelium states. This, it seems, is what brought Bohr’s atomic theory to its knees, as
it appeared that Bohr’s very method of state assignment was doomed. Bohr was the first to
declare defeat:
Born and Heisenberg’s investigation may be particularly well suited to provide evidence
of the fundamental failure of the laws of mechanics in describing the finer details of the
motion of systems with several electrons. (Bohr 1923, 271)7
That is, Bohr’s orbit-based way of picking out states (as encoded in the Correspondence
Principle and the Principle of Mechanical Transformability) lumps together true states that
detectably come apart upon transitioning. Thus, the mathematical algorithm through which
Bohr’s 1918 state assignments are prescribed is incompatible with the underlying dynamics
of the system. This is a qualitative (as opposed to quantitative) failure for Bohr’s theory,
which I have called failure of tracking.
7This is not to deny that the Bohr-Sommerfeld theory faced other problems around the same time, not
the least of which was the anomalous Zeeman effect (Kragh 2012, 314 ff.).
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Appendix C Evidence that Existing Accounts and their Critics Presuppose
Referential Transparency
Kitcher (1993, 143-144) seems to make a distinction between those posits that are gen-
uinely used / deployed to derive the predictions and those that merely appear to have been
used / deployed. For instance, the idea is that the luminiferous ether was not genuinely
deployed in Fresnel’s derivation of his laws and his (novel) prediction of a bright spot in the
shadow of a disk (ibid, 145-149). Inspired by Kitcher’s language, Lyons (2006; 2009) has
coined the term “deployment realism”, a view he has fiercely criticized. As the ether example
shows, deployment realism goes hand in hand with the notion of retention. Ether was not
“deployed” in the derivations and was therefore discarded. Ether waves (of the transverse
kind) were deployed and were therefore retained. This view therefore implies retention of
entities and/or properties.1
Psillos provides much more explicit and formal criteria for indispensability:
Suppose that H together with another set of hypotheses H’ (and some auxiliaries A) entail
a prediction P. H indispensably contributes to the generation of P if H’ and A alone cannot
yield P and no other available hypothesis H* which is consistent with H’ and A can replace
H without loss in the relevant derivation of P. (Psillos 1999, 110)
Psillos imposes some “natural epistemic constraints” on H’ such as being “independently
motivated, non ad hoc, potentially explanatory, etc.” (ibid). Since Psillos seems to assume
that the hypothesis H will survive intact, his account also requires retention, namely retention
of hypotheses rather than entities or properties.
Saatsi (2005) appeals to the notion of multiple realizability to make a distinction between
“higher-level” and “lower-level” properties, and argues for a realist attitude towards the
former, not the latter. Saatsi applies this idea primarily to the case of Fresnel’s theory
1While this is how Kitcher is understood in most of the literature, I believe this is an incorrect reading
of Kitcher’s account, likely due to the fact that Ch. 4 of The Advancement of Science has not been read
as much as its Ch. 5. The only exception to this near-universal misinterpretation that I am aware of is
McLeish (2005; 2006) and following him Ladyman (2011, 96). In any case, Kithcer offers an account of token
reference in which some token uses of, say, “dephlogisticated air” referred to oxygen while other tokens of
the same phrase referred to nothing. But since according to Kitcher none of the term-types of a successful
theory (phlogiston, caloric, ether, humor, miasma, etc.) need to refer to anything in reality, this account
appears to leave one as ignorant as ever of what to be realist about.
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of light. Having presented a “minimal derivation” of Fresnel’s laws, Saatsi argues that all
Fresnel ever needed for his derivations was to define a quantity we now recognize as the
amplitude of the wave and a quantity we now recognize as energy. Thus, according to
Saatsi, it is not only ether that was inessential: that light is a wave, that the former quantity
is its amplitude and the latter its energy – all these assumptions are eliminable from the
derivation according to Saatsi, but the two properties that matter survive. Saatsi’s account
therefore relies on retention of properties.
Drawing inspiration from Chakravartty (2007; 2008), Egg (2016) also suggests that one
be realist about properties rather than entities, and that essential content be identified with
what Chakravartty calls “detection properties” and idle posits with his “auxiliary proper-
ties”. Egg argues that detection properties refer to genuine properties of the system, and
are therefore expected to show up in future theories in recognizable form, i.e. he assumes
retention of properties.
As the last of the synchronic accounts, let us briefly review Vickers’s account, which is
perhaps the most sophisticated of all dispensability criteria. To begin, Vickers (2013) dis-
tinguishes between derivation-external posits (DEPs) and derivation-internal posits (DIPs).
The former are those assumptions that merely inspire scientists to advance a certain model
or suggest to them a direction to take, but that do not actually entail the prediction in
question. The latter, on the other hand, are those that are directly (typically deductively)
involved in the derivation of the prediction. Vickers’s idea is that the working posits are,
not the DIPs themselves, but contained within the DIPs: “Sometimes only part of such a
historically active DIP actually contributes to a given derivational step.” (ibid, 201) How is
one to extract these “essentially contributing parts” of the DIPs? The basic idea is straight-
forward: if a prediction has been derived from a proposition P which is a DIP, but it can in
fact be derived from a weaker proposition Q which is a logical consequence of P, then credit
for the confirmation of the prediction should only go to Q, not P.
Vickers’s account allows for some reformulation of the theory, so it is not as transparent
as the previous views. Nevertheless, Vickers seems to be assuming that each prediction comes
with a fairly unique derivation, presumably the one historically used to derive the prediction.2
2Peters (2012, 177 ff.) argues there is often no such thing as the derivation of a prediction, as a prediction
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Vickers does not recommend reconstructing this derivation, but merely to logically tighten
it up. Once one finds the weaker hypotheses “contained” within the unnecessarily strong
premises that are responsible for the predictive success, one should expect these weaker
hypotheses to survive future theory change. Thus, Vickers, too, works with a notion of
retention of hypotheses.
Moving on to diachronic accounts, Harker (2010; 2013) argues that novel predictive
successes are really only noteworthy when they signal progress over previous theories. Thus,
Harker suggests that the essential content can only be determined by comparing a theory
with its predecessors and successors and looking for those posits that resulted in incremental
advancements over the superseded theory. Although Harker admits that this form of realism
is more concerned with what is getting closer to the truth than what is already approximately
true, he still insists that his thesis “predicts that where past theories improved on the theories
they replaced, the parts responsible for such progress will be retained across subsequent cases
of theory change.” (Harker 2010, 201). Thus, Harker’s diachronic account adheres to entity
and hypothesis retention.
Cordero (2011a; 2011b) similarly argues that during the heyday of a scientific paradigm,
there are often too many entrenched metaphysical and methodological prejudices at work
to allow for a correct parsing of the theory into working and idle parts. Rather, Cordero
argues, it is the wind of subsequent scrutiny that separates the weed from the chaff, although
this process might take centuries (2011b, 1128). More recently, Cordero (2013; 2015; 2017)
has articulated five “naturalistic” strategies that scientists themselves use to diachronically
identify the essential content, which include, for example, hostile probing of a theory’s cen-
tral tenets by its opponents, revision of auxiliary assumptions by its proponents to test the
robustness of predictions, and external grounding of theoretical assumptions to give them
additional credibility. Despite emphasizing the complexity of this process of theory distil-
lation, Cordero follows the rest of the literature in characterizing the essential content as
those components that “we can expect to persist in successor theories” (2011a, 31). As such,
Cordero’s account is also centered around retention of entities and hypotheses.
may be arrived at through several lines of reasoning, thus creating ambiguity in the application of Vickers’s
method.
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Peters (2012) argues that the best account of empirical success is the “unification view”,
i.e. that success amounts to unifying otherwise disparate bodies of knowledge, and therefore
that working posits are those with genuine unificatory power. Peters’s method is to start
“from the bottom”, at the level of observable predictions, and “build up” by adding any
premise that would result in further unification of the predictions. While Peters’s view has
salient differences with diachronic accounts, it shares with them the idea that the virtues of
a posit that bestow the honor of essentiality on it can only be revealed over time, as only
time can tell whether a given posit will result in further unification. Peters also follows the
rest of the literature in expecting the working (i.e. unificatory) posits to be “preserved” or
“retained” in future theorizing (e.g. 14, 41, 45 ff., 107). In particular, Peters recognizes
two types of preservation: co-reference and structural correspondence, which indicate cases
where a posit is retained because it represents the same real entity and the same structure,
respectively, as the current theory.
This brings us to structural realism. Drawing on the case of Fresnel’s ether theory,
Worrall (1989) argued that while Fresnel was wrong about the nature of light, he was very
much right about its structure, which Worrall claims is captured in Fresnel’s equations.
And these equations, the argument goes, have been preserved in the modern theory within
Maxwell’s equations. Thus, Worrall subscribes to retention of structure.
Ladyman (2011) claims the case of phlogiston for the structuralist by arguing that while
phlogiston theorists were wrong about the nature of phenomena of oxydation and reduction,
they were quite right about the relations among these phenomena, e.g. that burning and
rusting are manifestations of the same phenomenon, and that some of these processes are
reversible.3 Ladyman concludes that “much of phlogiston theory is indeed retained in con-
temporary chemistry” (ibid, 92). Thus, Ladyman’s account is also committed to retention
of structure.
Votsis (2007; 2011a; 2011b) has tried to flesh out the structuralist view of essential
content as the “minimally interpreted mathematical parts”, where the latter is a form of
Ramsey-sentence for the theory. Votsis characterizes the following as a common tenet of
3See also Schurz (2009a; 2009b) for a fascinating analysis of the parallels between phlogiston phenom-
ena and electronegativity. Schurz, not a structuralist but a proponent of referential success, suggests that
“phlogiston” be taken to refer to “excess electron”.
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all forms of structural realism: “Approximately all and only operative structural elements
of scientific theories have been (and will be) preserved through theory change” (2011b, 11).
Once again, we see the commitment to retention of structure.
As for the critics, Lyons (2006; 2009) attacks the general notions of essentiality (i.e.
that the posit in question was genuinely responsible for the prediction) and indispensability
(i.e. that without the posit in question the prediction could not have been derived). Lyons
argues that if those are our criteria, then “credit will have to be attributed to all responsible
constituents, including mere heuristics (such as mystical beliefs), weak analogies, mistaken
calculations, logically invalid reasoning, etc.” (2006, 543) To support his claim, Lyons draws
on the case of Kepler’s predictions regarding planetary motion, specifically his famous second
law. Among the assumptions that Kepler deployed in his argument is that the speed of a
planet is inversely related to its distance from the sun, i.e. v ∝ 1
r
. We know from classical
mechanics that the correct formula is v ∝ 1√
r
. Kepler’s assumption is therefore simply not
true – not approximately, not partially, and not in any of its logically weaker consequences.
It is totally and hopelessly false. Or take the way Kepler calculated the areas. Seeing as
he did not have calculus at his disposal, he attempted to use Archimedean methods and
completely botched it (see Lyons 2006, 548). Again, Kepler’s math is flat-out wrong; it is
not true even approximately or partially. Yet, somehow, Kepler arrived at his correct area
law, which was the foundation of Newton’s inverse-square formula for gravitation. Kepler, it
would seem, arrived at a true and novel prediction via false premises and invalid reasoning.
Another example discussed by Lyons (2002) is that of Laplace and Haüy’s prediction that
all gases expand at the same rate based on several false premises. Lyons’s examples are
especially powerful in that one is even hard-pressed to claim, a la Vickers (see §3.4.1 above),
that any of the premises contains truth in one of its logically weaker implications. Note,
however, how Lyons assumes that Kepler’s and Laplace and Haüy’s derivations do not need
to be reformulated for us to find their essential content, suggesting his adherence to retention
of hypotheses.
Stanford makes several inter-related arguments against selective realism, but the core
of his complaint seems to be the suspicion that any prospective account of selectivism is
bound to require some amount of retrospective cheating, i.e. that prospective criteria cannot
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uniquely and informatively pick out the working posits by themselves; the benefit of hindsight
is necessary (2006; 2009, 384-385). Trying to determine what is dispensable by examining the
theory directly and imagining what can and cannot be removed from it, the idea goes, is just
a doomed exercise. The selectivist will end up taking uninformative and often unintelligible
positions, such as that there can be vibrations without something that vibrates. I argued
above that this happens because one should typically not expect to simply take one part
of a coherent theory, rip it apart from its home ontology, and implant it in an imagined
future theory without generating nonsense. If such a move is allowed, Stanford argues, then
anything is fair game. That is, if the ontological butchering required for posit retention
is not even constrained by intelligibility, such accounts of essential content would be too
uninformative to discriminate between what can and cannot be eliminated: the selectivist’s
“filter” for idle posits is too weak and that for working posits too strong (Harker 2010, 196,
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[265] Wüthrich, Adrian (2016), “Heisenberg’s Umdeutung: A Case for a (Quantum-
)Dialogue Between History and Philosophy of Science”, in Tilman Sauer and Raphael
Scholl (eds.), The Philosophy of Historical Case Studies, Springer International Pub-
lishing Switzerland Yoshimi, Jeffrey (2012), “Supervenience, Dynamical Systems The-
ory, and Non-reductive Physicalism”, The British Journal for the Philosophy of Sci-
ence, 63 (2), pp. 373-398
212
[266] Zednik, Carlos (2011), “The Nature of Dynamical Explanation”, Philosophy of Sci-
ence, 78, pp. 238-63
213
